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INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has often been perceived as a decentralised, anarchical 
network of networks, with no central point of failure, that is situated 
somewhere outside the reach of the law and of national governments, which 
on their part, suffer from the limit of being inherently confined within their 
own territory.  
The development of the last decade has, however, shown that activities 
and problems of the “real world” reproduced themselves in a new fashion also 
in the “virtual” one: instant and cheap communication, electronic commerce, 
easy and immediate access to enormous amount of information etc. were 
allowed by the new medium as well as new and old style frauds, infringements 
of Intellectual Property Rights, defamation and other illegal activities. It was 
then that issues of “governance” of the Internet eventually arose.  
The use of the word “governance” in connection with “Internet”, 
evocating traditional forms of governmental intrusion and control, seemed to 
many like a blasphemy. The ideal of a private sector, bottom-up, self-regulated, 
self-managed and consensus-based Internet always permeated – sometimes like 
a dogma – the debate on Internet-related issues (in a word: Government, 
hands off the Internet).  
In fact, these claims already imply the choice of a “governance” system, 
just that it is a system where participation of “traditional” political institutions 
is meant to be excluded. A system of governance may involve the allocation of 
property rights and obligations, the enforcement of such rights, the procedures 
through which decisions that affect the public are taken and the means for 
resolving disputes. In this sense, Internet governance is a rather broad concept 
that covers the regulation of access to the infrastructure, the control of the 
content, the discipline of the behaviour in the market, the protection of 
national security and of minors and so on. It seems, thus rather unrealistic to 
expect that governments and law-makers would simply ignore the “virtual” 
world and all that is going on therein and accept that the Internet is 
“unregulable”. As a matter of fact, State actors eventually stepped in, in 
different ways and with different success, for protection of Intellectual 
Property, of minors, disciplining business online and so on. 
There is however an aspect of the Internet Governance where the 
resistance to governments’ intrusion was possibly even greater, even though it 
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goes at the heart of the Internet itself, since it affects the discipline of the 
access to the network of networks. Existence on the Internet is assured 
through special identifiers: numbers, like in the telephone network, and names, 
like in human communities. Those who do not have such identifiers cannot see 
the network and cannot be seen, cannot send or receive any Internet 
communication, cannot buy or sell on the Internet, cannot infringe rights or 
violate laws. 
The system for assigning those names and numbers (IP Addresses and 
Domain Name System, described in Chapter I) is therefore crucial for the 
Internet and those who control it, control in fact the Internet itself: the 
controller can indeed discipline behaviour and regulate content through the 
threat of exclusion from the network; the controller can eventually even decide 
to “shut down” the Internet tout court. In the early days of the Internet, when it 
was just a scientific, academic network, this was not felt as a problematic 
feature. However, as the Internet stands today, with more and more activities 
(including research, broadcasting, voting, and even surgery) relying on online 
communication, there is a considerable power embedded in the operation of 
the system of Internet names and numbers. Yet the struggle for private 
bottom-up coordination was in this matter particularly evident. Perhaps the 
business’ fears of being suffocated by regulation, perhaps the Governments’ 
fears of the whole system being controlled by only one State (the US), brought 
about the creation of a peculiar system where access to Internet identifiers is 
supplied by a number of private companies and-not-for profit entities all over 
the world, belonging to the same network, at the top of which stands a private 
corporation called ICANN and headquartered in the USA. 
This system of Governance, that originally foresees the participation of 
public actors in a mere consultative function, contains an inherent tension 
between private commercial interests and public and general interests. A 
private business-oriented approach to the management of Internet names and 
numbers has been “polluted” with many public policy issues, without a suitable 
form of legitimacy or accountability. In fact, such a form of private sector self-
governance where, moreover, not all stakeholders are properly represented, is 
not well suited for addressing issues of public policy affecting the general 
public: stakeholders are many and diversified, are spread all over the world and 
through different jurisdictions, often have conflicting interests and the 
decisions of some groups may negatively affect others. 
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The European Commission stated already in 2000 that ICANN is 
“taking decisions of a kind that governments would, in other contexts, expect 
to take themselves in the framework of international organisations”.1 It is not 
surprising then that lately the World Summit on Information Society requested 
the United Nations Secretary-General to establish a Working Group to discuss 
at global level the elaboration of a new system of Internet Governance 
(WGIG), which is expected to take a final decision in November 2005.2 
However, as a matter of fact and despite public policy concerns about 
“governance”, the allocation of Internet domain names is currently run as an 
economic activity that has given rise to a lively market all over the world.  
Chapter II of this work will focus on the characteristics of this economic 
activity and of the domain names industry as a whole. 
Yet, something seems to be going wrong in this industry, even 
considering only the business part of the story: Internet users have a 
continuous impression that there are not so many domain names available; 
many wonder where the promised new domain names “extensions” or, recte, 
Top Level Domains have gone; new and existing operators wish to offer new 
services and are told that they cannot or should not. 
There are different ways to look into the problems of the domain 
names industry. Being an economic activity, an obvious rout to explore seemd 
to be the antitrust one: economic activities in most legal systems are subject to 
a number of constraints; the smooth functioning of the market is meant to be 
assured by the set of rules collectively denominated antitrust (or competition) 
law. These rules, present in national system and also in the European 
Community (EC) framework, address agreements between enterprises and 
unilateral conduct liable of hampering the proper functioning of the market. 
When such behaviour affects cross-border trade, the competence lies rather at 
the EC level.  
The structure of some segments of the markets for domain names 
presents itself already altered by the presence of big dominant players, partly 
because of historical reasons, partly because of the peculiar characteristics of 
the activities. In this kind of situations, a particular analysis, whose 
                                                 
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
of 7.4.2000, COM(2000) 202: “The organisation and Management of the Internet. 
International and European Policy Issues 1998-2000”. 
2 http://www.itu.int/wsis/wgig/index.html  
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characteristics in the EC setting are briefly described in Chapter III, is 
mandated by competition rules, in order to find out whether the functioning of 
the market is distorted by the behaviour of the dominant operator. Such 
analysis is conducted in Chapter IV, distinctively for each segment of the 
market(s) for domain names. When it could be useful, a presentation will be 
made of the way the same kind of problems have been approached under 
American antitrust law. 
The fact that the main legal framework remains, however, the EC one 
triggered another set of reflections about what the European Union is actually 
doing in domain names and Internet Governance matters. Chapter V is then 
aimed at sketching the European involvement in domain names and Internet 
Governance affairs and the peculiar competition issues raised with respect to 
some national country-code domain names. 
The approach just described to Internet governance issues, brings 
about some difficulties; the first is, at the outset, the actual understanding of 
the functioning of the technologies involved, what is technically impossible 
and what could be done by just changing the technical setting. The continuous 
evolution of both the technical and the regulatory scenario made and makes it 
a challenging exercise, that of interpreting such reality. Other difficulties lie in 
the complex public policy-private interests relationship and international nature 
of the management of the Domain Name System. A further intricacy stems 
from the fact that both economic and legal analyses are required to carry out 
the type of study contemplated above. Economics and law employ different 
methodologies to tackle problems and seem at instances to speak different 
languages. However, their combination can be very useful for a better 
understanding of the problems and for a better application of the law. Even 
more so when the law in question is competition law. Therefore, the present 
work tries to combine the various approaches and to face the challenge of 
unbundling the different complexities highlighted, in order to provide a 
meaningful way of explaining and tackling some of the problems of the 
Internet Governance.3 
                                                 
3 I am grateful to my professors at the College of Europe of Bruges, Jacques 
Pelkmans, Jacques Bourgeois and Pierre Larouche, as well as professor Martijn Van Empel and 
Mgr. Martin Priborsky for their the support and their useful remarks. 
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I. THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM 
Like the Internet itself, the Domain Name System (DNS) functions 
essentially as a network. But unlike the Internet, which is dispersed, the DNS is 
hierarchical. 
I.1 The domain name system, how it works 
“The Domain Name System (DNS) helps users to find their way 
around the Internet”.4 In other words, the DNS is a method to locate Internet 
resources (i.e. computers hosting websites), by organizing them in a de-
centralized and hierarchical way.  
The rationale of the DNS rests on the fact that every computer on the 
Internet needs a univocal identifier allowing it to get connected with all the 
others. Such identifier is but a number, more precisely a sequence of four 
numbers5 (called IP addresses) that look as weird to “normal” Internet users as 
190.51.225.1. Thus, in order to make it easier to find the resource responding 
to 190.51.225.1, a mnemonic alphanumeric “translation” was introduced: 
domain names.6  
                                                 
4 From http://www.internic.net/faqs/authoritative-dns.html last visited on Sept. 27, 
2003.  
5 Pursuant to the standard protocol currently in place, namely the so-called IPv4. 
However, the allocation of numbers under this system was not very efficient and thus we are 
currently facing a kind of scarcity. In order to solve this problem, a new protocol is being 
experimented, the so-called IPv6, that will allow for a higher number of identifiers and more 
advanced functions. It is not yet known when this protocol will replace the old one. At the 
time of writing proposals are being “introduced” and “discussed” within the ICANN structure. 
See http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-16sep04-2.htm last visited on 21 
October 2004. Also the European Commission has intervened to stimulate the process, 
repeatedly stressing the importance of the migration towards the IPv6 standard; see for 
instance the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament “Next generation Internet – priorities for action in migrating to the new Internet 
protocol IPv6”, of 21.2.2002, COM(2002) 96 final. 
6 To be precise, not every computer on the Internet has its own IP address. Indeed, 
in some cases there are some fixed IP addresses, so-called “static”, attributed to the same entity 
for longer periods of time, while in many other cases, IP addresses are called “dynamic” 
because they are subject to a sort of rotation among different users. This is happening 
especially when it comes to private users connected through their ISP via a dial-up connection: 
the ISPs attributes each IP address to a certain customer, as long as she needs it and then it can 
be given to another one. 
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Domain names, that look much better to humans7 (amazon.com, 
uniroma1.it, wto.org, repubblica.it), are to be read from right to left, so that in 
the previous examples .it, .com, .org are the so called Top-level Domains 
(TLDs – those at the top of the hierarchy), “amazon”, “repubblica”, “wto” are 
Second-level domain (SLDs) and it is possible to have also third-level domain 
(such as blog.repubblica.it), fourth-level domains and so on. 
The only requirement that is technically mandatory is that the 
correspondence names-numbers be univocal: there cannot be two perfectly 
identical domain names. There can be two identical SLDs only under two 
different TLDs (it is perfectly possible to have www.pizza.com8 and 
www.pizza.museum9), otherwise there must be a difference in the way the SLD 
is spelt (the way two Universities of Rome can have a similar identifier is to use 
www.uniroma1.it as different from www.uniroma2.it). 
However, the translation numbers-names referred to above, does not 
stem from some pre-determined mathematical algorithm, but is the result of an 
arbitrary link operated between the domain name and the IP address, thus 
implying the necessity of a database (i.e. a file) univocally relating each address 
with the corresponding domain name.  
It was for the purpose of making this database file manageable, that the 
first engineers of the DNS thought of a distributed and hierarchical structure 
of databases: at the top of the hierarchy, the so-called root file only links each 
top-level domain with the IP address of their own registry; this one, on its part, 
contains the indication of the IP of the registrant of every second-level domain 
under that TLD (for example the owner of “amazon” in the .com database or 
the one of “repubblica” in the .it registry), whose database will, in turn, contain 
the indication of the assignee of any third-level domain (like blog.repubblica.it) 
and so forth.  
                                                 
7 This is not a technically mandated feature of domain names: from a technical point 
of view, qwrt.seedsac.vukotih is as valid domain name as www.europa.eu.int. However the 
main reason to have domain names in the first place was that they had some semantic value 
and for this purpose the former domain name makes no sense. 
8 Interestingly enough, pizza.com that according to the common theory of 
attractiveness of domain names should rank quite high, is instead registered just for resale 
purposes, and it is still for sale. 
9 There is no museum of pizza currently registered under the new sponsored TLD 
for museums. On new and sponsored TLDs, see later in this chapter. 
 7 
Moreover, to make sure that the DNS would not inadvertently 
collapse, the root file is replicated by thirteen root servers, spread around the 
world, identified by letters from A to M, where A is the authoritative or legacy 
root, whilst the others simply reproduce the changes introduced into the A-
root database. Each of the thirteen copies receives queries and responds 
communicating the corresponding IP address. The reason to have several 
copies of the root is to assure that the whole system will keep working even in 
case one or some of the root servers crashed. 
We can statically depict the hierarchy underlying this system, having at 
the top the root file, then the registries of the individual TLDs. It is in the 
latter that some entities called “registrars” perform the actual registration on 
behest of their customers – those wishing to run a website (Fig. 1).10 
                                                 
10 Originally, the registration process was somewhat simplified, since only one entity 
was in charge of managing the registries and granting registrations therein to the applicants. 
This initial system was changed because of the competition concerns it raised. See next section 
in this chapter. 
Figure 1 – The Hierarchy of the Domain Name System (DNS) 
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From a dynamic perspective, the operation of finding out of this 
hierarchy, which IP number corresponds to the domain name typed in the 
browser is called “to resolve a domain name”. When the user types in her 
browser a domain name, her computer will send to her access provider11 the 
request of which IP address corresponds to the domain name typed in; if the 
provider has the information, the computer will immediately be directed 
towards the correct IP address and thus to the website sought. If the provider 
does not have such information, it will enquire all the way up the DNS 
hierarchy: asking the root for the IP number of the registry of the TLD in 
question, then asking this registry for the IP of the assignee of the SLD and so 
on, until the correct IP address is found and the website sought can be 
displayed on the screen of our user (Figure 2). 
 
 
                                                 
11 The company that provides users with access to the Internet. 
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RESOLVING A DOMAIN NAME 
 
Root server 
 
 
.com registry      USER’S REQUEST 
 
 
 
microsoft.com       
 
 
 
Figure 2 – The chain of queries/answers for “resolving” a domain name into 
an IP address and thus accessing the website sought 
 
The root-file currently contains 257 entries: 14 correspond to the so-
called generic TLDs (gTLDs) and 243 to the so-called country code TLDs or 
ccTLDs.12 The idea behind this is that a two-letter TLD would identify 
resources from a given country, while the generic three-four letter TLDs would 
be used to characterise the “sector” to which the resource belongs.13 
                                                 
12 Leaving out the .arpa TLD, not open to the public and used exclusively for 
technical infrastructure purposes, see http://www.iana.org/arpa-dom/ last visited on Nov. 18, 
2003. 
13 Explanations are to be found in the RFC 1591 of March 1994, available at 
http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1591.txt, last visited on 8.9.2004. RFCs (Request For 
Comments) are, traditionally, the way policies for the Internet were introduced: following the 
principle of reaching consensus across the Internet community, the proposed texts were 
circulated in order to be commented before being adopted. 
.com=190.112.23.0 
.net 
.it 
microsoft.com= 
192.125.31.0 
yahoo.com 
seattle.microsoft.com 
laboratories.microsoft.com = 
192.125.31.15 
http://laboratories.microsoft.com 
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As for ccTLDs, it was decided to base the choice of the two letters 
identifying a country on the country-codes from ISO 316614 and to leave the 
decisions concerning the organisation of each registry to the national operator. 
This was appointed, in the early days of the Internet, upon simple request 
coming from the concerned country and resulted in the attribution of the 
function to universities, agencies or consortia around the world. This approach 
was to eventually change as from the late ’90s, when several new ccTLDs have 
been created and some existing ccTLDs ended up being re-delegated to new 
entities. 
As for the gTLDs, originally there were only seven: .com, .net, .org, 
.int, .edu, .gov and .mil. The first five, according to the RFC 159115 were 
“international in nature” while the last two were intended for US governmental 
and military institution respectively. In the original intentions of the inventors 
and early managers of the DNS, the .com was for “commercial entities, that is 
companies”,16 .edu for “educational institutions”, .net for “computers of the 
network providers”, .int for “organizations established by international 
treaties”17 and .org for “organizations that didn’t fit anywhere else”. As all of 
us Internet users came to realise, however, the .org and the .net story are 
somehow different today, as they are considered open gTLDs. 
To the original seven gTLDs just mentioned, seven more have been 
added in November 2000: .biz (for business), .name (for physical persons), .pro 
(for liberal professions), .info (unrestricted), .coop (for cooperatives), .aero (“to 
serve the global aviation community”)18 and .museum (self explanatory). Of 
these, .biz, .info, .name, .pro are called “unsponsored” while .coop, .aero and 
.museum are sponsored gTLDs. The difference between these two groups lies 
                                                 
14 See RFC 1591 sub para. 2 and 4. For a presentation of the main issues connected 
to such choice, see A. Papa Malatesta’s contribution in A. Papa Malatesta, F. Chirico, K. Stagi 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE, Luiss University Press 2004. 
15 See above at footnote 13. 
16 All quotations are taken from the mentioned RFC 1591, if not indicated otherwise. 
17 The European Union’s website is currently registered under .int, 
http://europa.eu.int where “.int” is the TLD, “eu” is the Second-Level Domain and “europa” 
is the Third-Level Domain. However, the EU since a number of years is trying to obtain a 
TLD directly referable to itself, the long awaited “.eu”. On this issue, see Chapter V. 
18 See the .aero Charter, available at 
http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/aero/sponsorship-agmt-att1-20nov01.htm, last visited 
on 8.9.2004. 
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in the fact that a sponsored gTLD “is a specialized TLD that has a sponsor 
representing the narrower community that is most affected by the TLD.”19 
This means that a sponsored TLD has only a limited and restricted reach, most 
of the times predetermined.  
Whilst the addition of new ccTLDs has usually not required any test or 
proof of concept,20 as long as the country two-letter code was indicated in the 
ISO standard, the introduction of the new gTLDs was conceived as a first 
attempt which then needed be studied and evaluated. At the time of writing, 
and after a sometimes slow start, all the seven new gTLDs have come into 
operation, although with different success, and most of them have completed 
their proof of concept. The Report on the “Evaluation of the New gTLDs: 
Policy and Legal Issues” has been released not so long ago.21 The further 
introduction of generic TLD is also subject to lengthy discussion and seems 
that will likely result in the creation of only some sponsored TLDs.22 
I.2 Historical overview and relationship among the players 
In order to have a better understanding of the current system of 
governance of the DNS and of the Internet, it is useful to recall some of the 
evolutionary steps that have led to the point where we are now.23 
                                                 
19 See http://www.icann.org/tlds/, last visited on 8.9.2004. In the case of sponsored 
TLDs, the sponsor carries out delegated policy-formulation responsibilities over many matters 
concerning the TLD. 
20 With the remarkable exception of the forthcoming .eu TLD, that is however, not 
exactly a ccTLD. See Chapter V. 
21 See “ICANN Publishes Comprehensive Evaluation of the Introduction of the 
.aero, .biz, .coop, .info, .museum, .name and .pro gTLDs – 31 August 2004”, at 
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-31aug04.htm last visited on 21 
October 2004. 
22 See for instance the new gTLD Strategy Implementation published on ICANN’s 
website at http://www.icann.org/topics/gtld-strategy-area.html last visited on 6 December 
2004 and the press release of 27 October 2004 available at 
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-27oct04.htm. 
23 My intention here is just to give a few insights that can help understanding the 
current problems and not to give the full historical picture. For this, see the thorough 
reconstruction in M. Mueller, Ruling the Root. Internet Governance and the Taming of 
Cyberspace, MIT Press 2002. 
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The system described above, developed in the USA first by a military 
agency24 and then by the National Science Foundation (NSF), had been 
successfully managed during some decades by a bunch of scientists, collectively 
known as IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority).25 Domain names to 
identify the computers connected to this early Internet were attributed on a 
pure first come, first served basis. 
This system that relied on consensus policies and on the authority of 
the people managing it, was unfortunately unsuited for the Internet of the 
1990s, with growing commercial interests within and outside the USA. Domain 
names, indeed, had acquired significant economic value for companies that had 
realised the profit-making potential of the new Internet industry. Facts are well 
known: the .com had become a must-have for e-companies as well as for 
“traditional” firms starting to operate through the Internet; shortage of “good” 
domain names26 had become relevant and the practice of cybersquatting had 
given rise to disputes as domain names could create confusion with existing 
trademarks; while case and statutory law on the subject started developing,27 
trademark holders were gaining more and more attention to their rights at 
legislative, judiciary and public opinion levels. 
Apart from the US, also European governments had started to be very 
interested in domain name matters and in the Internet governance in general: 
in 1997, the French government commissioned a study into the legal issues 
raised by the development of the Internet;28 in Italy, the government tried to 
enact an urgency decree, then converted into a normal bill, the contested 
“Passigli bill”,29 then replaced by different proposals, including the creation of 
a foundation to supervise the Italian Internet governance;30 discussions were 
                                                 
24 ARPA, within the Defense Department of the US. 
25 IANA pages are still available on the Internet at http://www.iana.org.  
26 Meaningful words, memorable names or even domain names corresponding to 
own trademarks/names but already been (legally) taken by somebody else. 
27 Apart from the numerous trials taking place in several countries, also legislation 
was enacted in order to discipline the possible conflicts, such as the US Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) of November 1999. 
28 French Report on Domain Names. 
29 Available, inter alia at http://www.interlex.it/nomiadom/testo.htm last visited on 6 
December 2004. 
30 See A. MAIETTA, “La fondazione Meucci: un primo passo verso la 
«istituzionalizzazione» di Internet”, in Dir. Inf. 2003, p.563 
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carried on within the framework of the European Union,31 the Council of 
Europe and the OECD.32 
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the actual 
registration of domain names to end-users had been conferred by means of a 
so-called “Cooperative Agreement” to a private contractor of the US 
government, namely Network Solution Inc. (NSI), an American company 
headquartered in Delaware. This company was since performing the task of 
managing the registry for the .com, .org and .net TLDs and was maintaining 
the authoritative A-root.33 After it was authorised to charge for each 
registration, its business became one of the most profitable of the so-called 
new-economy and was eventually acquired by Verisign, a dominant company 
in the field of Internet security and certifications, for 21 billion US$34 in 2000.  
The cooperative agreement had granted a de facto monopoly to NSI, 
thus raising substantial concerns among customers, potential competitors and 
sovereign governments. In fact, a number of lawsuits was started against this 
company.35 
In this complex and rapidly evolving environment, the conviction 
rapidly spread across the global Internet community that a reform was 
necessary towards a higher degree of “institutionalisation” and formalisation, 
while, at the same time, increasing competition and supply of domain names, 
in particular through adding new gTLDs to the root.  
The first proposals were oriented to the increase of the available 
gTLDs through registries’ competition36 or to the attribution of the 
management of the DNS to an international body, in a similar way as the ITU 
(International Telecommunication Union) of the UN, that would offer the 
necessary expertise and be non US-centric. These proposal, however, run into 
fierce opposition especially from within the US, probably both for the loss of 
                                                 
31 See below in Chapter V. 
32 See OECD paper “Internet Domain Names: Allocation Policies”, 
OCDE/GD(97)207. 
33 The copy of the root server that is mirrored by the other 12. See above, on page 7. 
34 http://money.cnn.com/2000/03/07/deals/verisign/ last visited on 4 October 
2004. 
35 On this issues, see below for more details at page 61 et seq. 
36 The hypothesis was that of adding up to 150 new gTLDs to the root. 
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US control on the resource and for the fears of excessive governmental control 
over the management of the DNS if a UN-style governance was to be adopted.  
The prevailing view at that time was that the new system should be 
worked out while clearly having in mind the protection of private stakeholders 
and should preferably be left to the private sector. 
With the view of privatising the DNS, in 1998 the US Department of 
Commerce (DoC) eventually issued first a Green and, after a consultation 
period,37 a White Paper38 on the management of the DNS, within the Clinton 
Administration’s Framework for Global Electronic Commerce. In this document, the 
DoC envisaged the creation of a new private corporation, based in the US but 
with international Directors, that should take care of the allocation of the IP 
numbers to the regional administrators, oversee the operation of the 
authoritative root server, oversee the policies for the introduction of new 
TLDs. 
As it has been effectively emphasised,39 the White Paper, differently 
from the previous proposals, was considered a satisfactory compromise by the 
main stakeholders participating to the discussion: US Government, EU and 
foreign governments, trademark holders and most of the technical community. 
Thus, in 1998 the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (or ICANN) was created under the laws of California, as a not-for 
profit entity.40 The DoC recognised it as the new corporation it referred to in 
the White Paper and entered into an agreement, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU).41 The mission of the new corporation was “to 
coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet’s systems of unique 
                                                 
37 And a number of severe critiques, see M. Muller, Ruling the Root, cit above at 
footnote 23, at pages 163 et seq. 
38 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE “Management of 
Internet Names and Addresses”, Docket Number: 980212036-8146-02, available at 
www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm last visited on 30 September 2004. 
39 See M. Mueller, Ruling the Root, cit. above at footnote 23. 
40 The bylaws of the new corporation, as amended over time, are available at 
http://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm, last visited on 3 October 2004. The archive of the 
previous bylaws is at http://www.icann.org/general/corporate.html, last visited on 4 October 
2004. 
41 The MoU and all its subsequent amendments are available on this page: 
http://www.icann.org/general/agreements.htm, last visited on 3 October 2004. 
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identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the 
Internet’s unique identifier systems.”42 
The principles that would guide ICANN’s action were: stability of the 
Internet and of the DNS; competition in order to lower costs and enhance 
innovation; private bottom-up coordination to meet the changing needs of 
Internet stakeholders; representation in order to reflect the global and 
functional diversity of Internet users.43 The first tasks to be accomplished were 
the set-up of a system for dispute resolution able to effectively protect 
Intellectual property right and in particular trademark rights; the introduction 
of a competitive registration environment and the addition of new gTLDs, 
after the development of adequate policies. 
As for the protection of trademarks, a Uniform Dispute Resolution 
Procedure (UDRP) was rather rapidly developed with the involvement of the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and subsequently included 
among the obligations that all present and future ICANN-accredited registrars 
are required to accept and include in their contracts with domain names 
registrants. 
With respect to the task of promoting a more competitive structure of 
the markets for domain names, ICANN introduced the aforementioned 
separation of functions between registrars and registries and, with the help of 
the US DoC,44 forced first NSI, then any subsequently appointed registry 
operator, to accept a “shared registry system”: in such system any company 
acting as registrar can access the registry database in order to assign domain 
names to end users. This form of reorganisation has been compared to the one 
in the US telephone market following the AT&T divestiture, although with the 
remarkable difference that in the DNS there are no comparable barriers to 
those existing in the telecom local exchange market.45 
                                                 
42 See ICANN’s bylaws, cit. at footnote 40, at Article I, Section 1. 
43 As dictated in the MoU at II.C. The Principles. However, the implementation and 
specification of these principles in the bylaws has been subject to a number of amendments, 
resulting in a list of eleven “core principles” that include the recognition of the role of 
Governments and the commitment to promote competition “where practical and beneficial” 
and “where feasible and appropriate”. See bylaws, cit. at footnote 40, Article I, Section 2. 
44 NSI was still a US Government contractor and therefore the DoC could leverage 
its position in order to force NSI to accept and to enter into the ICANN system. 
45 M. Mueller “Towards an economics of the domain name system” available at 
www.icannwatch.org at page 28, last visited on 30 August 2004. 
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Competition in the registry markets was, however, a much more 
delicate issue, as the DoC itself had indeed acknowledged in the White Paper,46 
thus leaving it to be dealt with by the envisaged new corporation. 
In fact, even after the said reorganization of the system to allocate 
domain names, NSI/Verisign still maintained the control of the registries for 
.org, .net and .com and moreover it continued to run also its registrar business 
through a subsidiary. Furthermore, NSI was (and is) still the biggest registrar. It 
is, thus, understandable that despite the increase in the number of the entities 
operating in the markets for domain names, this concentration of activities in 
the hand of one single firm was still the source of concerns and complaints. 
Therefore, the US Department of Commerce and ICANN pushed through a 
plan of divestiture of parts of its business, that NSI was forced to accept,47 in 
exchange of several reassurances and the prorogation of its control over the 
.com registry: both (1) separation of the three registries and (2) unbundling of 
the registry from the registrar business were in the agenda.  
As implementation of the point sub (1), Verisign was forced to give up 
the management of the .org registry, then reassigned to the Public Interest 
Registry (PIR).48 However, the PIR avails itself of the services of Afilias, 
another existing registry operator;49 this implies that the reduction of the 
weight of NSI (because it was deprived of the .org management) did not result 
in an increase in the number of market actors. Lately, also the contract for the 
management of the .net has been put under review. The process of reassigning 
the .net registry is still under discussion at the time of writing and several 
companies have proposed themselves for this task, including Verisign itself, 
and it is not excluded, in principle, that it could be allowed to maintain it.50 
                                                 
46 See the White Paper cit at footnote 38 at point 6, lett. b. 
47 The first agreements in this sense date back to September 1999 and were 
renegotiated in 2001, postponing the divestiture of the registrar business in exchange of the 
dismissal of the .org registry. For details, see M. Mueller, Ruling the root, cit at footnote 23, at 
page 194 et seq. 
48 The transfer took effect from 1st January 2003. See 
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-03dec02.htm, last visited on 30 
September 2004. 
49 Afilias is the registry for the .info TLD. See below at footnote 57 and 
accompanying text. 
50 Verisign is indeed pleading for having the .net reassigned. The feeling, however, is 
that the intention is to choose a company other than Verisign. The final outcome will depend, 
of course, on the relative bargaining power of the parties and on the “threat” that Verisign 
 17 
As for the point (2), Verisign had to divest its registrar business, still 
run under the denomination of NSI. The transfer was expected already in 
2002, but was eventually postponed and finally completed in November 2003, 
with the sale of the NSI registrar branch to Pivotal Private Equity.51 Verisign, 
however, retained a 15% equity share. 
A third instrument called for in order to enhance competition in the 
registry market (as well as for satisfying the great demand from all over the 
world) was the long awaited creation of new gTLDs: these would be operated 
by new companies, thus increasing the number of competitors in the market.52 
The process of adding these new TLDs was however far from smooth: it took 
two years since it was created, before ICANN resolved itself to call for 
proposals of new gTLDs; when the time came, each applicant was required to 
pay a non refundable 50.000 USD application fee; in ICANN’s words, this fee 
was “intended to cover ICANN’s costs of receiving and evaluating the 
application, including performing technical, financial, business, and legal 
analyses, as well as ICANN’s investigation of all circumstances surrounding the 
applications and follow-up items”.53 Forty-four applications were received for 
nearly 300 new TLDs,54 and ICANN announced that the outcome of the 
selection would be a test or a proof of concept requiring further study before 
being repeated.55 At the end of a fuzzy selection process, only seven TLDs56 
                                                                                                                            
might still able to exercise, given its position of former leader of the market. On the whole 
procedure, see http://www.icann.org/tlds/dotnet-reassignment/dotnet-general.htm, last 
visited on 30 September 2004. 
51 See the press release on Verisign’s website at http://www.verisign.com/verisign-
inc/news-and-events/news-archive/us-news-2003/page_200312181054389.html last visited 
on 6 December 2004. 
52 It is not for granted, however, that the new operators would in fact be true 
“competitors”, as this qualification presupposes a certain definition of the relevant market, 
which is the subject of Chapter IV. Moreover, in principle, one company could be allowed to 
run more than one TLD and thus to control more than one registry: this would increase the 
availability of TLDs but would obviously not increase the number of operators in the market. 
53 ICANN’s 30 August 2000 “New TLD Application Process Overview”, point no. 2 
at http://www.icann.org/tlds/application-process-03aug00.htm last visited on 4 November 
2004. 
54 The archive of the TLD Application Process is available at 
http://www.icann.org/tlds/app-index.htm last visited on 4 November 2004. 
55 No schedule was foreseen for this evaluation to take place. Only recently a report 
was published. See above footnote 21 and accompanying text. 
56 Mentioned above at page 10. 
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were chosen and ended up being awarded to bidders very close to or already in 
the ICANN structure (especially existing registrars and their consortia).57 
One last point worth mentioning refers to the principle of assuring 
global representation of Internet users within ICANN. For this to be achieved, 
an at-large worldwide election of some members of the Board had been 
foreseen. Unfortunately, it resulted in a very unsatisfactory operation: the 
whole organisation was flawed and a large share of Internet users was de facto 
excluded;58 serious doubts were raised with respect to the actual possibility of 
obtaining a true representativeness all over the world, due to the digital divide, 
difference in Internet-awareness and so on; moreover, in any case, the newly 
at-large elected directors were kept away from the most important and 
sensitive decisions, as their participation to the Board was foreseen only after 
the approval of the mentioned Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)59 
and of the selection of the new gTLDs.60 
As a matter of fact, not so long after its creation, ICANN’s 
management of the DNS was already seen as unsatisfactory, unworkable and 
was subject to severe criticism: tasks had not been accomplished or not in a 
satisfactory way, lack of transparency and democratic deficit were lamented as 
well as the lack of legitimacy and capture by its constituencies. The US 
Congress directly threatened an action if the situation was not improved within 
a reasonable delay.61 
Another process of review and reform was then started, this time 
conducted within ICANN itself and led to the creation of what has been called 
                                                 
57 For a list of all the TLD registries see Appendix I at the end of this work. A 
detailed and amusing report on the selection process is contained in M. Mueller Ruling the 
root, cited above at footnote 23. 
58 This writer was herself among the excluded users, despite many attempts to obtain 
the necessary codes from the California headquarters. 
59 See above at page 15. 
60 A lawsuit and an order of the Court of California was necessary even for allowing 
one of the at-large Directors to gain access to the corporation’s financial documents. The 
material of this case is posted at http://www.domainhandbook.com/legal.html#auerbach last 
visited on 24 November 2004. 
61 For some examples of the initiatives within the US Congress, see 
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=02/06/21/123224&mode=thread and 
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=02/03/11/120932&mode=thread last visited on 6 
December 2004. 
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ICANN 2.062 in December 2002. The result of this process was the creation of 
today’s ICANN: an organisation that stays private in nature, but committed to 
recognise the input of main Internet stakeholders and of sovereign 
governments; the attempts of direct at-large participation of worldwide 
Internet users were given up, and their role was converted into the creation of 
an at-large advisory committee. However, to date, the reform has not showed 
to have influenced ICANN’s conduct to a great extent nor proved it 
particularly effective in addressing the sources of dissatisfaction. Indeed, at the 
time of writing, several rounds of discussion on the future of the Internet 
Governance are taking place at international level; the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) in particular has been active through the so-
called World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)63 which is gathering 
many governments around a table to discuss the most relevant issues, and has 
so far produced a Declaration of Principles and a Plan for Action.64 The WSIS, 
which is gaining more and more support around the world, has set up a 
specific Working Group on Internet Governance in preparation of the second 
phase of the summit that will take place in 2005.  
I.3 ICANN: structure and functioning 
As just said, ICANN is an American not-for-profit company 
incorporated in 1998 under the laws of California. In the current structure,65 
after the reform of 2002, ICANN has a President and CEO, a board of 
directors, appointed in a rather complicated way, intended to represent the 
                                                 
62 See M. Froomkin, “ICANN 2.0: Meet the New Boss”, in Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review, 2003, vol. 36, p. 1087 
63 See http://www.itu.int/wsis/ last visited on 23 October 2004. 
64 In particular, the ITU is gaining more and more support from governments all 
over the world and especially from third-world countries, dissatisfied of ICANN’s current 
organisation. See, for instance 
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=03/12/12/1140241&mode=thread and for a more 
recent action http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=04/09/17/0431226&mode=thread 
last visited on 4 October 2004. As for an example of the reactions generated by these 
international meetings, see, for instance, the testimony of a US DoC officer at a Congressional 
hearing, stating that the ITU is not qualified to perform the functions currently carried out by 
ICANN. See http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1324&wit_id=3863 via 
www.icannwatch.org, last visited on 4 October 2004. 
65 See the diagram of ICANN’s organizational chart in Appendix 1. 
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Internet stakeholders, in particular registries, registrars, Internet service 
providers (ISPs) and intellectual property right (IPR) holders; there are also 
three supporting organizations (one of them representing again registries, 
registrars, ISPs, businesses and IPR holders) with the right to elect two 
directors each, and a number of advisory committees set up for different 
purposes, including a Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC).  
The board is the governing body of the corporation and has 15 voting 
members appointed for three years, renewable for a maximum of three 
terms,66 and six non voting liaisons. The board take decisions in the course of 
one of its meetings or when the consent has been reached without any meeting 
but is documented in writing. The so-called Supporting Organizations (SOs), 
are defined by ICANN’s bylaws as “policy development” bodies. Each in its 
own field discusses and proposes what it considers the most suitable policy, 
while the final decision with respect to the adoption of such a policy rests with 
the ICANN board. However, the board shall adopt the policy proposal coming 
from the SO, unless at least 66% of the board members expresses the view 
that such policy is not in the ICANN interest or in the interest of the ICANN 
community.67 
 
                                                 
66 Artiche VI, Section 8 of ICANN’s bylaws. 
67 See Appendix 1 to ICANN’s Bylaws, section 13 b) and Appendix 2 to ICANN’s 
Bylaws, section 15 b). 
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Table 2 – Overview of ICANN’s Organization 
ICANN’s organizational structure includes a board of directors, three supporting organizations 
and a number of committees. Going in detail: 
The board of directors consists of 15 voting members (and 6 non voting liaisons): a president, 
8 members appointed by the Nominating Committee and 2 by each of the supporting organizations. 
 The President. 
 2 members appointed by: the Country-Code Names SO (ccNSO) consist of the ccTLD 
managers and a ccNSO Council. 
 2 members appointed by: the Address SO includes the Regional Internet Registries that are 
signatories of the MoU: ARIN, APNIC, RIPE, LACNIC. 
 2 members appointed by: the Generic Names SO (GNSO) consists of various Constituencies and 
a Council that decides the policy orientation of the SO.  – appoints 2 members of the board. 
The Council consists of: 
- 12 representatives of the Constituencies (2 each) 
1. Registries (each representative casts two votes) 
2. Registrars (each representative casts two votes) 
3. ISP 
4. Commercial Users 
5. Non-Commercial Users 
6. Intellectual Property holders 
- 3 members appointed by the Nominating Committee 
- 2 non-voting liaison (appointed by GAC and ALAC) 
 8 members appointed by: the Nominating Committee which in turn consists of 17 members and 
5 non voting liaisons. The members of the Nominating Committee are appointed: 
- 5 by the ALAC 
- 7 by the constituencies of the gNSO (generic Names Supporting Organization): 
1. gTLD Registries Constituency 
2. gTLD Registrars Constituency 
3. ISP Constituency 
4. Small businesses (Business Users Constituency) 
5. Large businesses (Business Users Constituency) 
6. Intellectual Property Constituency 
7. Non-Commercial Users Constituency 
- 1 by ccNSO (country-code Names Supporting Organization) 
- 1 by ASO (Address Supporting Organisation) 
- 1 by IETF 
- 1 by ICANN Technical Liaison Group 
- 1 by the Board intended to represent academics 
The non voting liaisons are appointed by: 
- the ICANN Board (Chairperson) 
- immediately previous Chair (appointed by the board) 
- SSAC 
- RSSAC 
- GAC 
 6 non voting liaison to the Board, each appointed by: 
- the GAC (Governmental Advisory Committee) 
- the ALAC (At-Large Advisory Committee) 
- the Root Server System Advisory Committee (RSSAC) 
- Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) 
- Technical Liaison Group (TLG) 
- The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
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Among all ICANN’s bodies, it is interesting to take a look at the 
Supporting Organizations. The Address SO, whose members are the Regional 
Internet Registries,68 advises the Board with respect to issues related to 
management of IP addresses.69 So far, these addresses have not been the 
source of major disputes or discussions, except for the issue connected to the 
introduction of a new standard protocol (called IPv6) which would allow to 
have more of them.70 
The country-code SO gives advice on ccTLDs issues. Its members are 
ccTLD registries that have agreed in writing to be part of it.71 This SO was 
only very recently created, when the minimum figures indicated in the 
Transition Article of the ICANN bylaws were finally met.72 Nevertheless, the 
vast majority of ccTLD managers, in particular in Europe, have refrained from 
entering the ICANN structure.73 
The most influential SO, at least for the time being, is the Generic 
Names Supporting Organisation (GNSO). This SO consists of various 
constituencies, representing the different stakeholders, and a Council that 
decides the policy orientation. The competences of the GNSO cover all those 
aspects related to the generic Top Level Domains.74 Article X, Section 5 of 
ICANN’s bylaws prescribes that half of the votes in the GNSO Council shall 
                                                 
68 There are 4 Regional Internet Registries (RIR) that are in charge of blocks of 
Internet addresses all around the world. Each has received a delegation by IANA, currently 
absorbed within ICANN, for a certain region: Europe (RIPE-NCC), Asia- Pacific (APNIC), 
America and Sub-Sahara Africa (ARIN), Latin-American and Caribbean (LACNIC). 
69 Article VIII, Section 1 of the bylaws. For instance, this SO is guiding the 
discussion for the introduction of the new standard protocol for IP addresses, called IPv6. See 
the announcement of 16 September 2004, on ICANN’s website at 
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-16sep04-2.htm last visited on 8 
December 2004. 
70 See above in Section I.1. 
71 Article IX, section 2. 
72 Article XX, Section 4 provides that at least 30 ccTLD registries and, among them 
at least 4 from each geographic region, are required in order to create the SO. This threshold 
was eventually met in March 2004, although the founding members are far from being truly 
representative of the ccTLD community: for instance, the four European ccTLDs are from the 
Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Gibraltar and… the Caribbean Cayman Islands (!). See 
http://ccnso.icann.org/announcements/ccnso-statement-01mar04.pdf last visited on 3 
October 2004. 
73 See the discussion of this issue below at page 116. 
74 Article X of the Bylaws. 
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be controlled by the constituencies that are under contract with ICANN, that 
is Registries and Registrars. This feature has important consequences. While 
the other constituencies within the GNSO have a potentially unlimited and not 
predetermined membership, and not necessarily converging interests and 
views, the two mentioned above are in fact well determined ex ante: all 
registries and registrars are those selected and accredited by ICANN and in 
some cases, they may (partially) overlap.75 Moreover, these two constituencies 
have rather homogeneous interests and the potential for agreeing on common 
goals, goals that are often shared by another constituency, the IPR holders. 
This implies that the above mentioned rule X.5 has practically the effect that 
the policies developed by this SO as adopted by this SO Council will in fact 
mirror the interests of the registry/registrar constituencies. This is particularly 
important when considering some of the most debated issues concerning 
gTLDs, upon which the ICANN board will be inclined to follow the policy 
orientation of the GNSO Council. The paradigmatic example is the 
introduction of new gTLDs, where the policy orientation of the SO is – 
understandably – likely to be very conservative: to introduce new TLDs would 
amount to accepting new competitors, a possibility that the incumbents have 
obviously all the incentives to minimise.76 Indeed, the introduction of new 
gTLDs is currently conducted as a lengthy process at the end of which only 
some TLDs of limited interest are being added to the root.77  
Two other bodies are worth mentioning, especially after the 2002 
reform brought about some substantial changes concerning the role of national 
governments and the representation of Internet users: the Governmental 
Advisory Committee (GAC) and the At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC). 
The approach to worldwide Internet users representation within the 
                                                 
75 Just to give an example, Afilias, the registry operator for .info is actually a 
consortium of accredited registrars. 
76 This position would be even backed by another constituency of the GNSO, 
namely that of IPR holders, which strongly oppose any increase in the name space for fears of 
parallel increase in the cybersquatting.  
77 The last two being proposed are .post and .travel. See the announcement of 27 
October 2004 “ICANN Moves Forward in First Phase Commercial & Technical Negotiations 
with Two sTLD Applicants” on ICANN’s website at 
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-27oct04.htm last visited on 8 
December 2004. Recently, ICANN has announced that .travel and .jobs have been “officially 
designated” while for a bunch of other sponsored TLDs (including .post) discussions are 
ongoing. See the 8 April 2005 announcement at 
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-08apr05.htm. 
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organisation in ICANN 1.0 was rather ambitious, and was meant to be assured 
by at-large elections of some board members;78 nowadays this system has been 
replaced by the creation of ALAC, another ICANN’s advisory committee 
representing the interests of at-large users, holder of consultative functions and 
of the right of electing a minority of the nominating committee which in turn 
will elect a few members of the board. 
As for the GAC, in their original version, ICANN’s bylaws79 had 
already foreseen the existence of a governmental advisory committee, but had 
also stressed ICANN’s independence from sovereign governments in the 
decisions concerning DNS policies.80 The new bylaws, on the contrary, 
recognise a greater role for governments,81 albeit still a consultative one. In 
short, although ICANN is still a private corporation and no governmental 
representatives can be board members,82 the GAC has the right to send a non-
voting liaison to board meetings83 and may recommend the ICANN board to 
take certain actions;84 on its part, the board has to notify to the GAC “any 
proposal raising public policy issues”85 and has to motivate any departure from 
GAC’s recommendations.86 The GAC Secretariat is currently run by the 
European Commission.  
                                                 
78 See above at page 18. 
79 Available at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-06nov98.htm 
last visited on 8 December 2004. 
80 Of course, this does not mean in any way that ICANN is above the law: it is a legal 
person, a US corporation and its actions are always subject to the law, according to the 
ordinary principles. 
81 Article I Section 2.11 of the bylaws states that ICANN shall, “While remaining 
rooted in the private sector, recogniz[e] that governments and public authorities are 
responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments’ or public authorities’ 
recommendations”. 
82 Article VI Section 4: “Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, no official 
of a national government or a multinational entity established by treaty or other agreement 
between national governments may serve as a Director. As used herein, the term “official” 
means a person (i) who holds an elective governmental office or (ii) who is employed by such 
government or multinational entity and whose primary function with such government or 
entity is to develop or influence governmental or public policies”. 
83 Article VI, section 9.1 a). 
84 Article XI, Section 2.1.i.  
85 Article XI, Section 2.1.h. 
86 Article XI, Section 2.1.j. 
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A few words are deserved for ICANN’s relationship with the US 
Government. As a private corporation, ICANN is formally independent, in the 
sense that the government plays no role in the selection of the directors and, in 
principle, only participates to the GAC as any other government. Nevertheless, 
there are rather obvious links: the basic principles of ICANN’s actions are 
those described in the US Government’s White Paper; ICANN is a US DoC 
contractor, through the MoU and the other contracts entered into in order to 
accomplish the tasks related to the privatisation of the DNS and to perform 
IANA’s functions;87 the DoC exercises ongoing supervision, although it has 
not shown a real intention to review ICANN’s decisions.88 Moreover, those 
contracts are concluded only for a determined period of time, subject to 
renewal, thus putting ICANN in the position of risking having the contract 
terminated, should it not properly fulfil its task. However, it has to be 
acknowledged that this possibility seems, at the current state, rather theoretical: 
on the one hand, there is no actual or potential successor for ICANN’s role 
and, on the other hand, it does not seem that the US government will be 
willing to step in to directly manage the DNS. 
Besides, the US Congress itself has held several hearings in order to 
examine the situation of ICANN, of the international cooperation in 
management and governance of the DNS, and the security of the Internet’s 
root servers and the DNS.89  
The relationship with the US government cannot, therefore, be 
completely equated with that of the other governments around the world, and 
this makes the case for persisting international concern about the American 
control of an essential global resource and helps explaining the attempts of 
achieving a global system for Internet governance.90 
                                                 
87 IANA is the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, in charge of the management 
of the IP numbers. See above at page 12. 
88 See M. Froomkin and M. Lemley cit. above at footnote 127, at p. 112 et seq. 
89 http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/witnesslist.cfm?id=1324, via 
www.icannwatch.org, last visited on 19 October 2004,  
90 For example, the repeated attempts at ITU level, which I have referred to above in 
Chapter I. 
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I.4 Alternate roots  
In our story there are also some “ogres” that eventually came out to 
alter the crystalline hierarchical structure of the DNS. These are the so-called 
alternate roots.  
The commercial Internet was growing; the most desired SLDs under 
the existing (and appealing) TLDs were already taken; the need for new and 
“attractive” gTLDs was apparent everywhere. The problem was that, except 
for the addition of some new ccTLDs, the generic TLDs were still the initial 
seven, of which only some were available to the general public. 
As it usually happens when there is demand for a new product, 
somebody started offering it. However, if users’ ISPs point to one and the 
same authoritative database, i.e. the A-root or one of its copies, a company 
wishing to offer access to new gTLDs has to convince the manager of the A-
root to add their entries into the database, otherwise users would not be able to 
see them. More specifically, it meant trying to persuade then NSI and later 
ICANN to accept them as registries for those new TLDs. In both cases, it 
proved unrealistic. NSI would never accept competitors in the market where it 
was, at that time, the de facto monopolist; when it was sued in Court in order to 
get a new TLD into the root, it could successfully shield itself behind the US 
government.91 When it came the turn of ICANN, among whose tasks was 
specifically the addition of new TLDs, the California corporation was revealing 
itself as very bureaucratic, slow and rather conservative: as mentioned, it 
eventually decided to add to the root some TLDs, but very limited a number 
and after the above described burdensome and not very transparent process.92 
Nonetheless, at different times and with different success, some 
companies found their way. A first attempt was to run ccTLDs, more easily 
added to the root, as actual gTLDs, putting aside any connection with the 
“country” or territory they referred to, and instead stressing the evocative 
meaning: the typical examples are the Tuvalu Islands’ .tv or the Cocos Islands’ 
.cc.93 A more risky attempt was made by those companies that decided to 
                                                 
91 There had been specific statements by the DoC that new TLDs would be added 
only upon its authorisation. 
92 At page 17. 
93 In fact, even the Italian TLD .it could be used evocatively for English speaking 
customers: www.buy.it, www.eat.it and so on. 
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operate, not as registries, but as alternative roots to the mainstream one. They 
represent the real “ogres” because they put themselves outside the mainstream 
hierarchy and outside ICANN’s control.  
Alternate roots proved in fact to be quite ingenious in the systems they 
employed to overcome the problem of being accepted in the legacy A-root. 
Because of the way the DNS is structured, users (their ISPs) have to point to 
one root in order to resolve a domain name. In principle, there is no necessity 
that they point to the mainstream NSI/ICANN94 managed A-root. However, 
there is a limitation to the freedom of choice and it depends on the fact that if 
ISPs point to more than one root, the result might be conflicting answers to 
the same query: in response to a certain domain name, the user might be 
directed to different resources on the Internet. In this situation, therefore, if a 
ISP has to choose between two competing roots, it is likely to choose the big, 
“official” one rather than these unofficial and small alternatives.95 
In order to go around this problem, some companies proposed 
themselves as supersets of the “official” DNS hierarchy, positioned upstream 
to the official hierarchy and “transparent” to the NSI/ICANN system. This 
way, if an ISP decided to point to the alternative root, instead of the 
NSI/ICANN A-root, not only would it be able to access the new gTLDs but it 
would allow users also to “see” the whole hierarchy of the classical ones.96 In 
other words, users were gaining the new TLDs without losing the old ones: if 
users requested a domain name under .com, .net etc., they would be redirected 
to NSI/ICANN; if they requested a .web, the domain would be resolved 
within the alternate root’s hierarchy. Obviously, neither NSI nor ICANN did 
anything similar to allow users to access alternate roots’ databases: if a user, 
whose ISP pointed to NSI/ICANN, typed something.web, she would receive 
just a “Not found” response. 
                                                 
94 Alternate roots emerged both before and after ICANN came into existence. 
Therefore, I am referring to the “official” hierarchy not as the “ICANN system”, but as the 
NSI/ICANN one, NSI being ICANN’s predecessor in the maintenance of the authoritative A-
root; see above at page 13. 
95 The reasons for and the problems raised by this result will be explored in more 
details in the following chapters. 
96 This was the case for companies like AlterNic or Name.Space or Chris Ambler’s 
.web registry. Some of them had even applied for running a ICANN approved TLD in 2000, 
but were rejected because of being existing alternate roots. 
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Another strategy, used in combination with the previous one by an 
alternate root called New.net,97 consisted of offering new TLDs within the 
structure of the existing hierarchy, but requiring users to install an additional 
software in order to view the new domain names: a special plug-in software 
would allow users to look for a website responding to an address under a 
gTLD not belonging to the official root and the software would translate it 
into a fourth level domain of the new.net database, which in turn belongs to 
NSI/ICANN’s hierarchy. For example, users have the possibility to type in 
their browsers www.pizza.shop (where “shop” is the TLD and “pizza” a 
second level domain) and the plug-in software would translate it into 
www.pizza.shop.new.net (where “shop” is a third level domain and “pizza” a 
fourth level domain) that is resolved within the mainstream domain names 
database via new.net (respectively second and top level domain).  
While there is in principle nothing wrong or illegal (at least for the time 
being) with the attempts of developing new root servers, as one can easily 
imagine, they were not really welcomed by the companies belonging to the 
mainstream hierarchy. Their reactions were said to have assumed the 
characteristics of a religious war,98 with alternate roots being accused of 
breaking the Internet and endanger the universal resolvability of the DNS.99 It 
has been reasonably suggested that the rise of alternate roots is inversely 
related with the showed willingness of the incumbent mainstream root 
operator to add new entries (i.e. TLDs) into the database:100 when there are 
expectations of an increase of the entries in the legacy root server, the interest 
in the activity of the competitors declines. However ICANN has failed to date 
to provide a clear and predictable plan for the creation of new gTLDs,101 
                                                 
97 http://www.new.net. 
98 Milton MUELLER, “Competing DNS Roots: Creative Destruction or Just Plain 
Destruction?”, in 3 Journal of Network Industries, 313 (2002), at page 2 of the version available 
online at http://istweb.syr.edu/~mueller/tprc-2001-mueller.pdf last visited on 4 October 
2004. 
99 On this issue, see more in detail later, in Chapter IV. 
100 Id. at page 15. 
101 A recent attempt to draw up a “strategy” in this sense has been published on 
ICANN’s website on 30 September 2004, in execution of an obligation contained in the MoU 
with the US DoC, but many commentators have convincingly argued that it cannot be 
reasonably claimed as a substantial improvement. See below at footnotes 317 and 318 and 
accompanying text. 
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therefore it cannot be excluded that a new wave of interest in alternate roots 
will arise. 
 30 
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE DNS 
To begin with an economic assessment of the DNS, it might be 
interesting to have a look at some of the figures of the industry. There are over 
50 millions domain names registered worldwide, not counting those registered 
under national ccTLDs;102 the domain name industry is generating revenues 
estimated in 2.5 billion USD per year in 2002;103 the main domain names 
registry/registrar operator was acquired by Verisign for 21 billion USD104 in 
2000; ICANN’s budget anticipated around 16 million USD expenditure for the 
next fiscal year. 
Yet, economic analysis is not just about numbers, therefore in the 
following sections I will try to delineate a possible understanding of the 
domain names industry, pointing out the main economic characteristics. 
II.1 Domain Names scarcity: there is no such thing as a free lunch 
It has been often stated that domain names are “scarce”; it has been 
argued that the DNS root service itself is a “scarce” resource”.105 The 
characteristic of being “scarce” needs a more careful look.  
Scarcity, in economic sense, means that it is costly (also in terms of 
opportunity costs) to produce a good, that in order to obtain a good, some 
resources (time, money etc.) have to be deviated from the realization of 
something else.  
Clearly having this in mind, Prof. Manheim and Solum argue that the 
root is a scarce resource, basically for two reasons: first, because it takes time, 
money and resources to run the root and second because different domain 
names (including TLDs) have different market values and different functional 
                                                 
102 Source www.webhosting.info last visited on 27 April 2005. 
103 See Milton Mueller “Towards and Economics of the domain name system”, cit 
above at footnote 45 at page 2. 
104 http://money.cnn.com/2000/03/07/deals/verisign/ last visited on 4 October 
2004. 
105 MANHEIM, Karl M. – SOLUM Lawrence B. “An Economic Analysis of 
Domain Name Policy”, Loyola Law School Research Paper no. 2003-14 – May 2003, available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=410640, at pag. 33 and following.  
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utilities (if freely sold on the market, .cool and .c-djw would have different 
prices and different utility – exactly as business.com and xgfkjrf.com have 
different prices and utility. Yet, incidentally, it is worth noting that among the 
most valuable domain names we can count many which were just invented or 
with no particularly evocative meaning). 106  
Furthermore, they argue, scarcity of the root is the consequence of the 
principle that domain names are not allowed to fail: once one of the available 
TLD “slots” has been allocated to a specific gTLD (say .int) and this gTLD 
does not “sell” on the market (because only a few hundreds registrations have 
taken place), the unsuccessful TLD cannot be replaced with a more successful 
one because the .int subscribers would be eliminated from the Internet and this 
violates the principle of non-failure. Therefore, the slot will be locked up 
forever. This last statement, to be sure, is based on two assumptions which are 
both questionable: first, why should it not be possible to reallocate the slot? 
And second why should the number of slots even be limited? 
Beside this, in general, this understanding seems reasonable: hardware, 
software, people are needed to “produce” TLDs107 and run the root file and 
undeniably different people deriving different utility from a TLD108 (for any 
reason, depending on their personal preferences) are willing to pay a price 
(different prices).109 Therefore, the root can be considered as “scarce” in pure 
economic sense. 
Yet, the consequence of the attribute of scarcity is, at this point of the 
analysis, simply that domain names – and Top Level Domains – are “economic 
goods”, which can be analysed economically and, recurring other conditions, 
can be sold on a market. It is actually a basic assumption in order to further 
discuss the problem. 
                                                 
106 I am referring to those names that were made famous on the Internet itself, such 
as google or yahoo or amazon: investments on building a brand make possible that even non 
obviously meaningful words as msn or icq develop all the potential to become valuable, just as 
it normally happens in the “real” world. 
107 However, it is a different question the one about the measure of the resources to 
be employed for the production of this “good”, which is a matter of efficiency. This will be 
discussed below. 
108 As with any other second or third level domain name. 
109 Indeed, business.com has been sold for 150.000 USD in 1997. 
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Indeed, we can equally reasonably assume that there is no natural110 
scarcity of domain names, as the cited authors also acknowledge:111 the 
possible combinations of letters and numbers under the current setting 
(allowing 2, 3 or 4 letter TLDs) are almost two millions, and the setting itself 
can be changed if necessary, allowing longer TLDs, for instance. Users’ and 
commentators’ common impression of “scarcity”, in the non-technical 
meaning that too big a share of the demand of TLDs remains unsatisfied, is a 
different issue that requires further investigation. This circumstance seems 
rather to be dependent on the policy of perpetuation of scarcity pursued so far 
by the root operator: indeed, as it was mentioned above, in 2000 only a few 
TLDs were introduced and what is being proposed in 2004 is the insertion in 
the root only of one or two new sponsored ones.112 If things stay as they are 
now, the issue of (good) domain names scarcity does not seem will be solved 
in the near future within the mainstream hierarchy. 
II.2 Public goods 
Another misunderstanding about the domain name system relates to 
the nature of the DNS as a “public” resource. This is an important claim, since 
public goods represent a market failure that needs the intervention of the state 
in the form of regulation or, ultimately, of direct supply of those goods.  
However, while it is an understandable claim that the DNS be of public 
interest, in pure economic terms it is but a “private” good, as opposite to 
“public” goods. In fact, like the concept of scarcity, also the expression 
“private good” has a peculiar economic meaning which is different from the 
common one and refers to the circumstance that the good in question is 
“rivalrous in consumption” and “excludable in supply”. As for this 
qualification, I agree with Solum and Manheim’s arguments, which are 
straightforward.113  
                                                 
110 Or engineering scarcity, as the cited authors call it. 
111 Cit. at footnote 105 at page 32. 
112 See http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-27oct04.htm last 
visited on 6 December 2004. 
113 Cit. at footnote 105, page 41 and following to which the reader is referred for 
further explanations. 
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“Rivalrous in consumption” means that the use of the good by one 
individual prevents or limits the use by another individual; “excludable in 
supply” means that the supplier of a good cannot exclude any individual from 
enjoying that good. 
Let’s briefly recall the way the root file works: it connects any TLD 
with its own registry operator, so that anyone looking for a website under 
some domain will be addressed first to the registry operator of the TLD, then 
from there to the registry of the SLD under that TLD and so forth. Therefore, 
the assignment of the TLD .com to one registry operator, prevents anybody 
else from being assigned the .com, thus any end user will be pointed only to 
the assignee indicated in the given root: the use of that root is therefore 
rivalrous; it is also excludable, since the root service provider can at any time 
decide to prevent the current .com registry from accessing the root, simply 
eliminating the entry in the database so that users will not connect to the 
former registry anymore.114 
It follows that there is no public nature to be invoked to make the case 
for a state supply of domain name service or a state managed DNS. 
II.3 Natural monopoly 
It could be – and it has been115 – argued that the DNS constituted a 
natural monopoly. 
A natural monopoly occurs when the production of a good or service 
by a single firm minimizes costs and is therefore, in principle, more efficient 
than the production by competing firms. However, just as any other form of 
monopoly, also natural ones cause losses to the society through reduction of 
output and monopoly pricing. In order to solve this dilemma, natural 
monopolies are most of the times subject to public regulation. 
Generally, natural monopolies are those industries in which relevant 
initial investments are necessary to build the basic infrastructure whose 
                                                 
114 The same happens with respect to lower level domains: the assignment of the 
SLD “microsoft” in the registry .com to one company prevents anybody else from being 
assigned the same domain name; moreover, the .com registry operator can at any time, or 
according to the contract, decide to deny the previously granted assignment, thus excluding the 
former client. 
115 Cfr. Solum and Manheim cit. at footnote 105, page 47 and following. 
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reproduction by competing firms is not economically feasible or not desirable, 
since it would constitute just a loss for the society. The cost structure of a 
natural monopolist is thus characterized by declining long run average costs for 
the relevant volumes of output. 
However, all this might not be enough to qualify an industry as a 
natural monopoly or, at least, to qualify it as a permanent one. Indeed, the level 
of the demand must also be taken into account. It might happen that a 
production that enjoys large economies of scale and declining average costs for 
a certain amount of output, for higher volumes shows rather constant average 
costs, meaning that the dramatic per-unit savings enjoyed at the beginning are 
finally over: with high enough demand, an industry is no longer a natural 
monopoly and a working competitive market can take place.116 
In the case of the root server, as in the case of natural monopolies, the 
major investments occur at the moment of the establishment and the 
organization of the root-database, the DNS hierarchy and all the necessary 
protocols. Once the DNS has been set up, the cost of adding an additional 
gTLD to the root is, at least in theory, practically negligible:117 it is just the cost 
of putting a new entry into a database file. The costs of keeping the legacy root 
(and its copies) always up-to-date does not influence the level of the marginal 
costs, since the updating activity is part of the fixed costs for managing the 
root and is, anyway, mostly computerized.118  
However, apart from these similarities, there are also some relevant 
differences with natural monopolies. 
First, it must be taken into account that traditional natural monopolies 
are characterized not only by a large gap between fixed and variable costs, but 
                                                 
116 Viscusi-Vernon-Harrington Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, MIT Press, 
2000, page 338. 
117 To this, the costs for making a contract with the registry operator are to be added. 
However, it is fairly easy to elaborate a standard form which can then be used for all 
subsequent cases. For example, to date the contract with the registrars is standardised. It is 
available on ICANN’s website at http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-
17may01.htm, last visited on 6 December 2004. 
118 In other words, the new version of the root file must be mirrored by all the 13 
copies around the world and by all the lower level name servers. However, this cannot be 
considered part of the marginal costs, since it is an activity which is not done only in the event 
of a new TLD added to the legacy root, but it is regularly performed in order to keep the name 
servers always up-to-date. 
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also by the very relevance of the fixed costs, most of them being sunk.119 In 
the case of the domain name industry, it does not seem that the basic 
infrastructure to operate a root file could be considered non reproducible nor 
that creating and maintaining a competing root could be seen as a loss for the 
society. On the contrary, setting up such a competing root looks quite easy and 
cheap, as the rise of several of them showed120 and could even be deemed 
beneficial for society, helping satisfying the excess demand. 
The costs of setting up the root file itself are not that high and most of 
them, as well as the costs for organizing and managing it are actually absorbed 
– or at least enjoy relevant economies of scope with the management of the 
TLD registry downstream – since competing roots can and often do run also 
TLDs registries. 
As for the technologies underlying the functioning of the Internet as 
well as the main Internet Protocols (TCP/IP, HTTP etc.), they are all open 
and available for free. The very idea of the hierarchical organization of the 
domain name system is not proprietary. Therefore, alternative roots can – and 
do – make use of all these at no cost , as well as the main root operator does. 
This is the consequence of the peculiar history of the DNS and of the 
Internet itself. Indeed, such technologies and ideas have been the result of the 
work of scientists, researchers and academics, sometimes financed with public 
funds, whose choice was to let these ideas and technologies be available to 
everybody in order to favour the growth and development of the Internet. As a 
matter of fact, nobody has ever questioned the right to freely use all these 
protocols and technologies. This fact also implies that, differently from other 
cases of natural monopoly, there is little case for advocating a reward for 
innovation or investments incurred by the incumbent root 
It is interesting to observe here, that doubts about the qualification as a 
natural monopoly are more and more frequently raised even with respect to 
traditional communication networks, like the telephone one, where the costs 
                                                 
119 See A. Portolano “Il caso Microsoft e la concorrenza nelle network industries”, in 
Dir. Inf. 1999, p. 704. 
120 Keeping these competing roots into existence or even their success are different 
issues. See below in section II.4. 
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for reproducing the basic infrastructure are definitely higher than in the case of 
the DNS.121 
From a different perspective, recalling the difference between a 
temporary and a permanent natural monopoly referred to above, the very 
history of the Internet governance could be seen as showing some features of 
an evolution from a more or less understandable monopoly, towards a viable 
competition: at the beginning of the Internet, the little demand of domain 
names and of TLDs was satisfied by a unique supplier. As the demand grew, 
however, the previous organization of the management of the DNS appeared 
not to be sufficient anymore. 
Moreover, it can be noted that, looking at ICANN’s budget,122 the 
costs of managing the DNS seem to have increased as the demand for TLDs 
and other domain names is growing higher and higher. Therefore, in the 
persisting shortage of output (i.e. TLDs), new suppliers arose, out of the 
established hierarchy, showing that competition is actually possible and that it 
is profitable to run such a business. 
II.3.1 Cost-efficiency 
In the system as it is being managed today we can, however, start 
doubting that marginal costs are so low: when a new generic TLD has to be 
added to the existing legacy root, an enormous amount of resources is devoted 
to that. What we have learned from recent history is that years of discussions 
and debates precede the decision of actually increasing the number of gTLD; 
then prospective registries have to submit a complicated and costly application 
that is subsequently processed in some “mysterious” way. Once registries and 
gTLDs are selected, the negotiation phase starts and can last a couple of more 
years.  
In fact, the growth in the costs of managing the DNS at root level, is 
more general, as it is testified by the increased budget expenditures.123 Search 
                                                 
121 See M. Cave “An economic analysis of remedies in network industries”, in 
“Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-specific Regulation” ed. D. 
Geradin, Intersentia 2004. 
122 The last adopted budget (fiscal year 2004/2005) is available at 
http://www.icann.org/financials/budget-fy04-05-06oct04.html last visited on 24 April 2005. 
123 For reference, http://www.icann.org/general/financial.html.  
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costs, negotiation costs, transaction costs, the costs for decision making  within 
the same organisation, have reached and maybe risen above the attention 
ceiling. Also the Council of European ccTLD operators called the figures of 
the 2004 ICANN budget “unrealistic and inappropriate”. All these 
considerations raise the suspicion that we might be observing the phenomenon 
of the growth of X-inefficiencies. These arise when, absent competitive 
pressure, cost control becomes loose.124 It is among the consequences of a 
monopolized control over a certain resource, part of the monopoly dead-
weight loss that could be minimised through the establishment of a more 
competitive market structure.  
Recalling again the history of the issuance of the new gTLDs gives an 
interesting illustration of the point just made: each new applicant for a registry 
was required to pay 50.000 USD. In ICANN’s words, this fee was “intended to 
cover ICANN’s costs of receiving and evaluating the application, including 
performing technical, financial, business, and legal analyses, as well as 
ICANN’s investigation of all circumstances surrounding the applications and 
follow-up items”.125 Forty-four applicants sent their 50.000 USD cheque, thus 
contributing to ICANN’s budget for an amount of 2.2 millions USD. 
However, the actual costs of the whole application process, on ICANN’s part, 
have been estimated in a little more than 800.000 USD.126 Thus, it seems that 
ICANN has estimated its costs for the application/evaluation process for an 
amount almost 3 times as big. 
It is true that ICANN is a non-profit corporation and therefore it has 
no direct incentive deriving from maximisation of profits through cost 
reduction. Nevertheless, x-inefficiency is a normal consequence of a “cost 
plus” system similar to the one that characterised pre-liberalisation public 
utilities, that were run with no incentives to make profits and that at the same 
time were highly x-inefficient. In those cases, the situation substantially 
improved due to the liberalisation process and to the rise of new competitors.  
                                                 
124 See Scherer and Ross Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 3rd 
Ed. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990. 
125 ICANN's 30 August 2000 "New TLD Application Process Overview", point no. 
2 at http://www.icann.org/tlds/application-process-03aug00.htm, last visited on 27 April 
2005. 
126 These data are derived from “The roving_reporter” posted on 15 January 2001 at 
http://www.tbtf.com/roving_reporter/icann5.html, last visited on 27 April 2005. 
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This is not to say that the DNS is a public utility, but it maybe suggests 
that a California corporation is being run as a quasi-bureaucracy,127 whose 
interests are maximisation of budget, functions and prestige as well as “quiet 
life”. 
II.4 Network effects 
So far, I have excluded that the DNS is to be qualified as a natural 
monopoly, and that existing “technical” limits can block the emergence of 
some competition in the market for root server operations. It has also to be 
excluded that large initial fixed or sunk costs are discouraging entry into the 
market. Indeed, some competitors do exist, the above mentioned alternate 
roots. However, as a matter of fact, they are not at all strong, only a few users 
point to them and, in general, they do not constitute a great threat for the 
incumbent root operator. Part of the reason for that is another peculiar feature 
of the DNS, making it likely that a situation of monopoly or dominance will 
eventually arise. 
The main reason lies in the very nature of the domain name system as a 
type of network industry, exhibiting so-called network effects.128 While natural 
monopolies are characterized by supply-side economies of scale, network 
effects occur when there are so-called demand-side economies of scale or 
positive feed-back, causing the value of a good for consumers to increase when 
more goods of the same type are sold. In these markets, the demand is 
function both of the price of the good and of the expected size of the network 
                                                 
127 However, ICANN is not a public agency nor an enterprise entrusted with the task 
of performing a public service. It has, admittedly, a procurement contract with the US 
government for carrying on certain economic activities, but this does not seem enough to 
transform it into a state actor or a bureaucracy. See later in Chapter IV at page 108. See also M. 
Froomkin and M. Lemley “ICANN and antitrust”, in University of Illinois Law Rev. 2003, 
available at http://personal.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/icann-antitrust.pdf  
128 For reference, see N. Economides “Competition Policy in Network Industries: an 
introduction”, Working Paper 04-23 of the NET (Networks, Electronic Commerce and 
Telecommunications) Institute, June 2004, M. Katz and C. Shapiro “Antitrust in software Markets”, 
in Competition, innovation and the Microsoft monopoly: Antitrust in the digital marketplace ed. by J. 
Eisenach and T. Lenard, Kluwer 1999, p.29; Lemley, Mark A. – McGowan, David “Legal 
Implications of Network Economic Effects”, in California Law Review, May, 1998, p.479; 
Liebowitz & Margolis in “Network Externality: an uncommon Tragedy”, in Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. 1994, p. 133; Cfr. Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro “Network externalities, 
competition and compatibility”, in American Economic Rev. 1985, p.425. 
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and therefore the demand curve slopes downward as usual, but shifts upward 
with increases in the number of units expected to be sold.129  
The classical example of a market with network externalities is the 
telephone network: it makes no sense to be the owner of the only telephone in 
the world, while, on the other hand, the more people subscribe to the 
telephone service, the more valuable is for the others to subscribe as well. A 
more recent and perhaps more questioned example is the software market: 
simplifying a little, the more people use Microsoft Word, the more it is 
valuable to have it to be able to exchange documents using the same 
codification and standard.130  
The common feature of these markets is that the strong gets stronger 
and the weak gets weaker because a bigger network is preferred to a smaller 
one since it gives users the possibility of communicating with more 
subscribers.131  
Network effects bring about several implications for the market 
structure: when these externalities are particularly strong, the optimal number 
of networks might be one and its optimal size might be “as big as possible”; 
but powerful network externalities might also work as a barrier to entry 
because to join an existing network with many customers, gives consumers 
more utility than to join a newly created – even if more efficient – one.  
The issue is particularly important. These are likely to be so-called 
“winner-take-all” markets, meaning that they exhibit a strong tendency towards 
standardization and thus the one who wins the competition for the standard to 
                                                 
129 For the model, see N. Economides “The economics of networks”, in Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 1996, p.678  
130 There is, however, a difference between these two examples: the telephone 
network is what has been called an “actual network” while the software example is a “virtual 
network”, because in the latter case, the constituents of the network are not linked to a 
common system, but are tied together by functional compatibility. Moreover, goods 
constituting virtual networks are not deprived of any inherent value if not part of the network, 
differently from what we called “actual” ones. Cfr. Lemley-McGowan “Legal Implications of 
Network Economic Effects”, in California Law Rev. May 1998, p. 490 and following. 
131 Shapiro and Varian refer to Metcalfe’s law, according to which if there are n 
people in a network and the value of the network to each of them is proportional to the 
number of other users, then the total value of the network to all the users is proportional to n x 
(n-1), which means that the value of a network goes up as the square of the number of users. 
Cfr. C. Shapiro and H. Varian, Information Rules, Harvard Business School Press, 1999, at p. 
184. 
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be adopted will likely have the lion’s share of the market, regardless of being 
the best. This is what has been called “tipping”. Moreover, in network markets, 
history matters, with strategic advantages (like first mover advantages) being 
long lasting. Therefore, who was there first has bigger chances of setting the de 
facto standard. 
However, it is not always necessary to worry about that: the market 
could indeed have tipped in favour of the most efficient one, assuming the 
winner as the best player. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily imply that 
there must be only one supplier in the market, let alone that this supplier 
should be granted exclusive rights. Competition for the standard may still 
evolve into competition within the standard: whenever a standard has to be – or 
has been – adopted, the issue at stakes becomes compatibility: if more 
compatible products can use the same standard, there can still be competition 
in the market.  
The conclusion is that we cannot say a priori that one market structure 
is preferable to others and maybe even a monopoly could maximize social 
surplus and reach the highest level of efficiency. It has to be noted, however, 
that the existence of network effects does not constitute a justification for a 
monopoly structure: it has been shown, indeed, that even in markets with 
relevant network effects, consumers’ and total surplus will likely be lower in 
monopoly than in perfect competition.132 
II.4.1 Network effects at work in the DNS 
Coming to the domain name system, strong network effects are a quite 
obvious feature: every user wants to be connected with the ICANN’s system 
because it was the first and it is the one allowing to reach the highest number 
of co-users.  
In theory, each potential new operator can start a completely new 
network, using different protocols, and specially, different or even the same 
TLDs used in ICANNs network. There is no inefficiency in this reproduction 
of the “facility”, because, as said above, it is not costly to duplicate the 
                                                 
132 Cfr. N. Economides, “The economics of networks”, in Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 1996, p. 682 and following. See also CAVE and MASON “The economics of the 
Internet: Infrastructure and Regulation”, in Oxford Rev. of Econon. Pol. 2001, vol. 17, no. 2, p. 
188. 
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infrastructure (i.e. the connection of domain names, the whole tree), differently 
from the duplication of, say,  railways.  
Nevertheless, in a situation of complete separation and incompatibility 
between networks, alternate roots are in general much less attractive and have 
a hard time in reaching the “critical mass”, necessary to take off, and the 
reasons are those explained above: if a domain name belongs to a smaller 
network, it cannot be seen by the majority of Internet users and thus the 
advantage of having a catchy TLD (like .shop or .kids or .sex) is neutralized by 
the impossibility of reaching and being reached by many customers. 
Moreover, the incumbent has an easy task in locking in its customers 
even more, making use of specific contractual agreements or peculiar new 
business practices, similar to the one called vaporware. This practice, developed 
in the software market, consists of announcing the introduction of an update, a 
new component, a new release: the mere announcement is enough to 
discourage customers from switching to another product, currently perceived 
as better, because waiting for the upgrade is perceived as less costly than 
switching. It has been, allegedly, a fruitful strategy for Microsoft in the 
software industry and for IBM in the hardware one and it can be profitably 
used also by the dominant DNS root server operator. In other words, a user 
will not subscribe for .travel with an alternate root if ICANN says – as it 
actually does – it is “considering” introducing “soon” into the legacy root the 
same TLD.133 
II.4.2 Interoperability issues 
In this scenario and for the purpose of communication, which is the 
main goal of the Internet, a single network where anybody is able to reach 
everybody else may be essential, thus capturing all the network effects of the 
DNS and reaching the greatest efficiency. Yet, as said supra, this does not 
necessarily mean a single supplier. Compatibility (or rectius interoperability), 
indeed, may be a viable option, allowing the greatest variety within a common 
and standardized base.  
                                                 
133 For one of those announcements about the introduction of new TLDs “in 2004”, 
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-31oct03.htm, last visited on Nov. 6, 
2003.  
 42 
Interoperability is beneficial for consumers because it brings about a 
further enlargement of the network and thus a further expansion of the 
network externalities. Moreover, it spares consumers from having to choose 
one of the players taking the risk of being locked-in or stranded. Consequently 
interoperability would allow for competition among networks,134 thus being 
beneficial also for reaching higher levels of efficiency on the supply side. 
With respect to domain names, interoperability would mean to allow 
ICANN’s competitors to access the legacy and to insert their TLDs therein. Or 
it could also mean to allow for more roots but making sure that the Internet 
community is guaranteed against the risk of instability and colliding domain 
names, assuring univocal resolution of domain names into IP addresses. In 
other words, interoperability is strictly speaking a technical issue. 
Interoperability in the DNS can be reached through the “positive” 
action of mutual recognition of the different existing hierarchies, but also 
through the “negative” factual non-interference with each other. In the 
presence of more than one root, there are three possible scenarios:135 full 
interoperability is achieved through full coordination; partial coordination is 
achieved when the incumbent root server refuses to recognise/not interfere 
with the entrant; incompatibility, due to reciprocal non-recognition or 
interference. I borrow these explicative tables from Milton Mueller:136 
 
                                                 
134 The networks I am referring to herein are not physical networks but the networks 
of relationships root server-TLD registries-registrars-registrants. 
135 See Milton Mueller, Competing Roots, cited above at footnote  98 at page 7. 
136 Id at page 6.  
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Figure 3 – Root Competition 
 
In what Mueller calls Type 2 Competition, the Root I (the incumbent) 
prevents full interoperability with root C (a competitor) through not 
recognising it or by giving rise to colliding entries. In Type 3 Competition, also 
the entrant Root-C introduces colliding entries and/or does not allow its users 
to access the Root-I database. Type 1 Competition, not showed in the tables, 
would be the ideal case in which each root operator has interest in being 
compatible with the other one.  
As a matter of fact, the likelihood of occurrence of the described types 
of “competition” is not equal. This situation is not different from the one, 
described in the economic literature,137 in which firms compete for the 
adoption of a standard and have to choose between compatibility and 
incompatibility of their respective standards. It is explained, indeed, that when 
competitors are similar in their size, market and technological position, they 
will likely choose the same strategy: either both prefer compatibility and try to 
reach an agreement on a single standard (so-called “Battle of the sexes”), or 
both prefer incompatibility and fight a standards battle (so-called 
“Tweedledum and Tweedledee”). However, when competitors are asymmetric, 
                                                 
137 See Besen and Farrell “Choosing how to compete: Strategies and Tactics in 
Standardisation”, in Journal of Economics Perspectives Vol. 8, no. 2, Spring 1994, page 117 et seq. 
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and one of them has a large installed base or is otherwise in a strong market 
position, the strategies are going to be “logically inconsistent”:138 the big player 
prefers incompatibility, while the small one is interested in following the 
other’s standard (so-called “Pesky Little Brother”). 
In fact, it is intuitive that a big network prefers to stay incompatible, 
because this way it alone will benefit of the size, will exploit and internalise all 
the network externalities and eventually capture all the customers that want to 
benefit from its standard; conversely, the manager of a big network risks more 
in allowing others to be interoperable, because customers will then choose the 
network they prefer on different bases than the size, thus eliminating the 
feedback effect for the big network. In other word, the one who has won the 
competition for the market is not so keen on giving the start to the new 
competition within the market. This has also been formally modelled in the 
economic literature:139 big existing networks will tend to be against 
compatibility, even when it could increase social welfare, whereas small 
networks will be in favour of compatibility, even when it has high social costs. 
The same authors140 also show that if the costs of adapting are negligible and 
there are no other barriers to entry, the market can and will be a competitive 
one.  
And indeed, in the DNS case, the observed behaviour of root 
operators clearly reflects the “Pesky Little Brother” form of competition: 
alternate roots have strong economic incentives to make themselves 
“compatible” with the ICANN network, bearing the costs of adapting, which 
are not so high: as explained above,141 alternate roots began to work as super-
sets of ICANN network, so that their subscribers can have access to that one 
too, and issue non colliding TLDs. Obviously, they have all the incentives for 
doing so: alternate roots cannot be attractive for customers if they are not 
given access also to the established network; moreover should they issue 
colliding domain names, loss of reliability and univocity is so high that users 
and especially ISPs will not be willing to run such a risk as a consequence of 
dealing with an alternate root. By contrast, ICANN’s behaviour tends in the 
                                                 
138 Id. at page 127. 
139 Cfr. Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro “Network externalities, competition and 
compatibility”, in American Economic Rev. 1985, p.425 
140 Id. p. 439. 
141 See above at page 27. 
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opposite direction, trying to obstruct the growth of the competitors, by making 
use of its stronger position and, as it will be discussed infra, by exercising 
market power in order to strengthen the foreclosure that derives from the 
network effects. The tactics at the incumbent’s disposal are to some extent 
different from classical standards battles,142 in particular in that there are no 
intellectual property rights to be invoked.143 However, a very useful tactic 
available to the incumbent that wants to make itself incompatible is that of 
adding to the root TLDs which already exist in the database of its competitors. 
If this conduct (or its credible threat) takes place before the competitors have 
achieved a critical mass, this would likely result in the further foreclosure of the 
market. 
In this scenario, therefore, it is crucial to pay attention to the existence 
of barriers to entry and especially to those which result from the strategic 
behaviour of the dominant firm and, from the perspective of the antitrust 
enforcers, to verify that no such kind of abuses is being perpetrated in order to 
stifle competition. 
II.5 Costs of a DNS competitive structure 
The logical consequence of what has been said thus far is that the 
artificial perpetuation of scarcity within the mainstream domain name root 
server can be corrected by the rise of alternate root operators that would 
compete with the incumbent and satisfy the excess demand. The direct effect 
would be increased consumer surplus and there could be an indirect reduction 
of costs due to the pressure on the incumbent to become more X-efficient as 
well as an increased pressure to innovate. 
However, competition at the root level is not without costs. ICANN 
itself and its technical advisory boards have at various instances put forward 
the idea that having a unique root is necessary in order to ensure the stability of 
the Internet and it is the only way to assure univocal resolution of domain 
names, which would otherwise be impaired by the existence of those unofficial 
root servers. 
                                                 
142 As described by Besen and Farrell cit. in footnote 137 above. 
143 As explained supra, all the protocols and software are public domain. 
 46 
The authority cited to support these claims is the RFC 2826 of May 
2000, issued by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB).144 This document 
testifies that “it is not technically feasible for there to be more than one root in 
the public DNS.”145 As it has been effectively argued,146 this statement is at 
the least imprecise: alternate roots do exist, thus showing that technically it is in 
fact perfectly feasible.147 It is a different issue that of whether they should be 
allowed to exist. 
The core of the discussion is the need for coordination in order to 
assure the uniqueness of domain names, principle that is valid at every level of 
the DNS hierarchy. It is undeniable that if there is more than one supplier at 
the top of the DNS, the transaction costs will inevitably increase: it could be 
necessary to introduce new software and protocols to allow coordination 
among multiple suppliers; it could be necessary to educate users (or ISPs) to 
the existence of alternative root operators among which they can choose. It is a 
situation that resembles the one that followed the introduction of competition 
for fixed phone calls: when new companies started offering telephone services, 
users were given the possibility of carrier selection, by dialling a code prior to 
the phone number, and later also of carrier pre-selection that required no 
further code to access the services of the new entrants.  
Whilst it is not possible at this stage to precisely determine their actual 
size and incidence, it is important to ask whether these costs are enough to 
claim that single-supplier organization of the market is the most efficient one. 
In presence of such costs it is necessary to weigh them with the benefits that 
will derive from the introduction of competition at the root level.  
It seems likely that currently, the risk of abuses and of losses because of 
the existence of a dominant operator with market power is greater than the risk 
                                                 
144 Available at http://www.rfc-archive.org/getrfc.php?rfc=2826 last visited on 24 
October 2004. IAB website (www.iab.org) reports that “The IAB is chartered both as a 
committee of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and as an advisory body of the 
Internet Society (ISOC). Its responsibilities include architectural oversight of IETF activities, 
Internet Standards Process oversight and appeal, and the appointment of the RFC Editor”. 
145 Id., page 1. 
146 M. Mueller “Competing roots” cited above at footnote 98 at page 10. 
147 Interestingly, it seems that China has issued TLDs in Chinese characters (so called 
internationalised TLDs) corresponding to .com, .net and .cn without going through ICANN. 
See http://www.i-dns.net/newsroom/news/GE050301-01.html.en via www.icannwatch.org.  
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of incompatibility caused by alternate roots.148 This would make the case for 
the introduction of competition in the root server layer of the domain names 
industry. 
                                                 
148 Milton Mueller, “Competing DNS Roots”, ITU Strategy and Policy Unit Lunch 
Seminar, Geneva 23 November 2001. 
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III. ANTITRUST AND THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
So far I have commented on the main characteristics of the Domain 
Name System from an economic perspective. The previous analysis will serve 
as a basis for proceeding with an analysis of the existence and abuse of 
antitrust dominance in this industry. 
However, the study I will conduct will not be carried out in a legislative 
vacuum: I will refer to the antitrust law in force in the European Union, and 
more precisely to the articles contained in the First Section of Chapter one of 
Title IV of the Treaty of Rome (articles 81 to 86), Rules on Competition 
applying to undertakings. The purpose of the following sections is not, and 
cannot be, that of giving an extensive and complete presentation of the 
European Community antitrust rules applicable to undertakings,149 but rather 
the methodological one of pointing out the main principles and rules that will 
be applied in the subsequent sections to the facts and the behaviour occurring 
in the industry concerned. My purpose is, in other words, to describe how I 
will proceed about the assessment of the anticompetitive nature of certain 
types of behaviour. In particular, this work is going to investigate the 
possibility that abuses of dominant position, within the meaning of EC 
antitrust law, be committed in the industry of domain names. In order to 
establish this, a number of steps must be undertaken and I am hereby going to 
briefly introduce which ones. A last section will summarise the main 
precedents in which antitrust rules and the management of the DNS have 
already entered in contact and in conflict. In doing this, I will have to go 
beyond the EC boundaries, since the relevant precedents come from another 
jurisdiction, namely the American one. It is nevertheless interesting to have 
knowledge of what has been decided (or not decided) there, in order to have 
the complete picture and, moreover, competition problems in this kind of 
industry usually have a global character. 
                                                 
149 There is very qualified literature on the subject, such as, inter alia, Korah AN 
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE, Oxford Hart Pub. 2004, 
Whish COMPETITION LAW, Lexis Nexis 2003, Jones-Sufrin EC COMPETITION LAW, Oxford 
UP 2004, Bellamy & Child EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF COMPETITION, Sweet & Maxwell 
2001, Faull and Nikpay The EC LAW OF COMPETITION, Oxford UP, 1999, Frignani-
Waelbroek DISCIPLINA DELLA CONCORRENZA NELLA CE, UTET Torino, 1996. 
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III.1 Abuses of dominance 
In European Community Law, abuses of dominance are prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market:150 if a firm holds a dominant position 
in the common market or in a substantial part of it and carries out certain 
abusive behaviour (of which the article of the Treaty provides some examples), 
such undertaking commits an antitrust offence and is therefore susceptible of 
being ordered to cease and desist from that conduct and of being fined; if 
necessary, structural or behavioural remedies are possible.151  
It is clear that this norm is concerned with market structure, but only in 
so far as it allows the undertaking in question to perform a conduct that is 
capable to produce adverse effects on competition. In order to verify if such 
kind of behaviour is being perpetrated, a number of operations must be carried 
on and the first one is to properly define the market(s) we are talking about.  
(i) The definition of the relevant market for antitrust purposes is a 
peculiar concept152 and, in the European Commission’s words, is to be seen as 
primarily an analytical tool “to identify in a systematic way the competitive 
constraints that the undertakings involved face.”153 It is an economic exercise 
                                                 
150 Article 82 of the EC Treaty:  
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between 
Member States.  
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:  
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions;  
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers;  
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;  
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts”. 
151 Structural remedies are now mentioned explicitly by article 7 of the so-called 
Modernisation Regulation no. 1/2003, in OJ 2003 L 1/1. 
152 And it is to be distinguished from market definitions conducted for other 
commercial or economic purposes. 
153 Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, in OJ C 372 of 9/12/1997. 
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that helps to identify which other goods or services exert a competitive 
pressure with respect to a certain undertaking. It is but the first step in order to 
establish whether an undertaking is capable of exercising market power, which 
constitutes the actual concern of competition enforcers. 
A remarkable economic definition of the relevant market is that of “a 
market which is worth monopolising”. According to the recurring case law of 
the European Courts,154 the relevant market comprises all goods or services 
that consumers see as interchangeable by reason of products’ characteristics, 
prices and intended use, taking into account also the conditions of competition 
and the structure of supply and demand. The relevant market has also a 
geographical dimension, covering the area in which conditions of competition 
are sufficiently homogeneous and can be distinguished by neighbouring areas 
where conditions of competition differ substantially.155  
For European competition law purposes, the most important thing to 
be assessed is demand-side substitutability,156 although also supply-side 
substitutability might be taken into consideration, while potential competition 
is considered only at a later stage, when assessing the actual competitive 
constraints within a defined relevant market.157 
In order to proceed with market definition, a test that is commonly 
applied and recommended by the Commission’s Notice is the test of the 
hypothetical monopolist or SSNIP test,158 according to which the relevant 
market is the smallest set of products for which a small but significant and 
stable price increase (generally about 5-10%) would be profitable. 
                                                 
154 Besides the Commission Notice above mentioned. See Case C-333/94 P, Tetra 
Pak v Commission [1996] ECR I-5951, paragraph 13, Case 31/80 L'Oréal [1980] ECR 3775, 
paragraph 25, Case 322/81, Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 37, Case C-
62/86, AkzoChemie v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke v 
Commission [1997] ECR II-923, paragraph 81, T-65/96, Kish Glass v Commission [2000] 
ECR II-1885, paragraph 62, Case C-475/99, Ambulanz Glöckner and Landkreis Südwestpfalz, 
[2001] ECR I-8089, paragraph 33.  
155 It can be added that the relevant market may also have a temporal dimension. 
156 Although some economists might disagree with this statement. 
157 The Notice distinguishes supply-side substitutability from potential competition 
basing itself on the time needed by undertakings producing different things in order to revert 
their manufacturing processes to the realization of a product capable to compete with the one 
under consideration. 
158 SSNIP stands for Small but Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price. 
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This fascinating way of defining the relevant market has several 
renowned advantages, for example, that it allows a definition of relevant 
market based on actual data rather than speculation on preferences; but it has 
nevertheless some limits,159 especially with respect to its application in article 
82 cases. I am referring here to the situation in which the market is already 
monopolized or protected by entry barriers and an increase in the current price 
would not be profitable for reasons other than constraints from competing 
products. In such conditions, indeed, this fact would not imply that the scope 
of market definition has to be enlarged but that the price is already influenced 
by the exercise of market power.160 Obviously, even in such cases, the 
dominant firm will not be able to raise its prices indefinitely. Yet the 
constraints will not come from products present in the same market but by 
other factors influencing the shape of the demand curve for that product. In 
other words, at some point, consumers will eventually allocate their resources 
differently, towards a completely different product. The question is then where 
we draw the boundary of the relevant market. 
This is where a more qualitative evaluation of the market definition 
may come back in, despite having been criticised in the past.161 Indeed, as 
mentioned, the approach of the European Courts has been to give relevance 
also to elements other than price and namely to the physical characteristics and 
the intended use of the product.  In Bronner,162 for instance, the European 
Court of Justice restated that “the market for the product or service in 
question comprises all the products or services which in view of their 
                                                 
159 Besides the fact that it requires the actual knowledge of a substantial amount of 
observed data on prices, quantities and elasticities in the industry concerned. 
160 This problem is commonly known as the “cellophane fallacy” after an American 
antitrust case in which the judge did not recognise the issue and considered cellophane in the 
same market with aluminium and other packaging materials. It is often argued that using 
estimates of the competitive price instead of the actual market price would avoid the 
distortion. However, it is true that estimating the level of the competitive price is not an easy 
task for regulators and antitrust enforcers and that’s precisely the reason why it is left to the 
market to work it out. Moreover if antitrust enforcers already knew that prices are above the 
competitive level, it would mean that they are already aware of the existence of a situation of 
dominance. 
161 See, for instance Van den Bergh R. – Camesasca P. European Competition Law 
and Economics, Intersentia 2001, p. 103. 
162 Judgment of 26 November 1998, in Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co. KG 
v Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791 at paragraph 33. 
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characteristics are particularly suited to satisfy constant needs and are only to a 
limited extent interchangeable with other products or services”. 
It can be finally remarked that, even more caution is to be paid to the 
application of a test such as the SSNIP to new technology industries, like the 
one I am examining, where sole reliance on pricing issues is not the point, 
competition being often not based (or at least not predominantly) on prices. 
(ii) Once the market has been defined, as said, this is only the first step 
that is necessary in order to identify the presence of market power that a 
dominant firm is capable to exert. 
In legal terms, an undertaking is considered to be dominant in a certain 
relevant market when it enjoys a position of economic strength enabling it to 
“prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market” by 
allowing it “to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.”163 A firm in a 
dominant position can thus “determine or have an appreciable influence on the 
conditions under which competition […] will develop.”164 
The first indicator that an undertaking might be capable of exercising 
market power is that such undertaking holds a large market share; this, 
according to the case law of the European courts, is in itself an evidence of the 
existence of a dominant position.165 In economic terms, market shares are not 
significant in themselves as they are not suitable to give full account of the 
competitive constraints coming from prospective entrants; what matters then 
is to assess the existence of barriers to entry, able to prevent potential 
competitors from “disciplining” the behaviour of the enterprise with the big 
                                                 
163 Judgment of the European Court of Justice United Brands v. Commission, case 
27/76 in 1978 ECR p. 207, paragraph 65. The definition has since been repeated in subsequent 
judgments. See also, recently, the Commission guidelines on market analysis and the 
assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for 
electronic telecommunications network and services, OJ 2002/C 165/6 at paragraph 5. The 
Framework Directive, moreover, seems to equate the notion of dominance to the one of 
market power. See art 14 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
network and services, OJ L 108 of 24 March 2002, p. 33. 
164 See judgment Hoffmann La Roche Case 85/76, in 1979 ECR 461, paragraph 39. 
165 Case C-62/86, AKZO v Commission, [1991] ECR I-3359, paragraph 60; Case T-
228/97, Irish Sugar v Commission, [1999] ECR II-2969, paragraph 70, Case Hoffmann La-
Roche v Commission cit at the previous footnote, paragraph 41, Case T-139/98, AAMS v 
Commission [2001] ECR II-3413, paragraph 51. 
 53 
market share. The discussion over what can be considered – from a sound 
economic perspective – a barrier to entry is long and will not be repeated 
here.166 Also from the legal point of view, there is no generally accepted 
definition of barriers to entry, but rather a case-by-case approach. In the course 
of the subsequent analysis, I will take into account, where necessary, both so-
called absolute barriers and strategic advantages of the firm that happened to 
be the first to enter the market. The expression “absolute barriers” usually 
refers to exclusive rights granted by law or to privileged access to necessary 
inputs or, sometimes, to economies of scale. Strategic advantages, refers to a 
more complicated – and debated – category that includes first mover 
advantages, sunk costs or conduct capable of deterring entry or raising rivals’ 
costs.167 
Finally, it is worth noting that the frequently restricted definition of 
market power as the ability to raise price above the current level without 
suffering from the constraints of competitors168 would give only a somehow 
limited view of the phenomenon. As Stiglitz put it “Monopoly and competition differ 
in far more significant ways than just simply the price charged.”169 In presence of a 
monopoly, consumers are denied the choice of alternative suppliers. The very 
possibility of such choice could be seen in itself already as an added value of a 
competitive market structure.170 Yet, even leaving this claim aside, the 
monopolist will invest in keeping its market share, in locking-in its customers, 
in erecting more entry barriers, thus preventing the competitive process from 
selecting the best products, bringing along increased efficiency and favouring 
the emergence of increasingly better products. If the monopolist is able to 
erect or reinforce entry barriers, or to raise rivals’ costs, such barriers will 
protect its position, not the superiority of the monopolist’s products. 
                                                 
166 See the extensive literature on the subject and review thereof, such as Bain 
BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION, 1956, Stigler THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY, 1968. See 
also Bishop and Walker, Economics of EC Competition Law, Sweet & Maxwell 2002. 
167 See, Bishop & Walker, cit. above at footnote 166. 
168 This idea is consistent with the reliance on the above mentioned SSNIP test and 
suffers from the same defects. See above at page 51 et seq. 
169 Stiglitz 1977, p.429 
170 See for instance, Leland, Heyne E. “Quality choice and competition”, in 67 
American Econ. Rev. Mar 1977, p.127. 
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Therefore, in the markets involving domain names which I am going to 
analyse, I will not rely solely on consequences on prices, as they will not, in 
many cases, give a full sense of the loss that consumers might suffer from the 
behaviour of dominant firm or of a monopolist.  
(iii) If it has been established that a firm holds a dominant position in 
the relevant market, the European Courts have stated that under European 
Competition Law, such undertaking has a special responsibility, “not to allow 
its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common 
market”.171 Even more so, when the undertaking concerned holds a position 
that can be called of super-dominance.172 
However, Article 82 is a difficult antitrust tool and it is not always clear 
what a dominant firm should or should not do and what kind of behaviour 
may ultimately be qualified as abuse. In this respect, it is illustrative to observe 
different jurisdiction adopting different approaches to similar problems173 or 
to see the different positions taken in high profile cases, such as the recent 
Microsoft case174 dealt with in the European and in the American system; the 
reactions to the (stricter) European decision are also significant in this respect. 
In fact, the European Commission itself, in recognising the difficulties 
                                                 
171 See Case T-219/99, British Airways v Commission, nyp; Case 322/81 Michelin v 
Commission cit., paragraph 57, and Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v Commission [1999] ECR II-
2969, paragraph 112. 
172 This situation occurs when the undertaking has very high market shares 
approaching a situation of monopoly. 
173 For example, at the same time the European authorities issue the Microsoft 
Decision and the IMS judgment (Judgment of 29 April 2004, Case C-418/01, nyp). dealing 
with the general conditions at which a dominant firm must give access to its proprietary 
facility, the American Supreme Court states different principles in Trinko (Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP (02-682), 305 f.3d 89): that the 
monopolist’s incentives to innovate must be protected; that it has a right to refuse to deal, 
albeit “qualified”; that the exceptions to this rights (i.e. obligations to give access) are very 
restricted; that the risk that antitrust enforcers will make mistakes in the application of the rule 
and will chill the conduct that antitrust law is designed to preserve, is too big and it will 
overcome the expected benefits. 
174 On the American case, see http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_index.htm and 
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/microsoft-2001.html; the EU case is numbered COMP/C-
3/37.792, culminated in the decision no. 900 of 24 march 2004, hereinafter the “Microsoft 
Decision”. 
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embedded in article 82, decided to start a process of discussion and revision to 
clarify the application of such rule.175 
What black letter law says is that abuses are prohibited, whereas the 
mere possession of a position of dominance is in itself legal. What constitutes 
an abuse is not explicitly defined, but for a non exhaustive list of examples. 
Therefore, in the European legal system, the concept of abuse is a judge-made 
one: a dominant undertaking’s behaviour which is such as “to influence the 
structure of a certain market” and which through “methods” for competing 
that are “different from those governing normal competition” hinders the 
maintenance of the degree of existing competition in the market or its 
growth.176 Subsequent case law has elaborated that the market(s) referred to in 
this definition, on which the negative effects are going to be produced, need(s) 
not be the same market where the undertaking in question is dominant.177 
From this open ended definition, what follows is that a specific 
conduct will not be deemed abusive if it is the expression of “competition on 
the merits”. Despite this straightforward statement, in practice, however, in 
many instances it proved to be very difficult to distinguish abusive behaviour 
from competition on the merits, especially when the market structure is already 
altered by the presence of a dominant undertaking. 
As said, some examples of what constitutes an abuse are given directly 
in the Treaty,178 but nonetheless most types of actions (or refusals of an 
action) oblige antitrust enforcers to a great effort in order to get through some 
complicated and multifaceted forms of behaviour and find out whether they 
are abusive.  
By way of categorisation, it is common to distinguish exploitative from 
exclusionary abuses and price from non price abuses. In the present work, 
pricing issues will actually not be the focus of the discussion, as the types of 
                                                 
175 See P. Lowe, “DG Competition’s review of the policy on abuse of dominance”, 
in International Antitrust Law and Policy – Fordham Corporate Law Institute 2003, ch. 10, 
page 163. 
176 This concept is taken from the ECJ judgment in Hoffman-La Roche, case 85/76 
in 1979 ECR, 461, at paragraph 91.  
177 See Commercial Solvents, case 6-7/73 in 1974 ECR, p. 223; Tetra Pak II, case C-
333/94 P in 1996 ECR I-5951; British Airways, case T-219/99, judgement of 17.12.2003, not 
yet published. 
178 See above at footnote 150. 
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conduct that constitute the source of concerns in the markets for domain 
names are not primarily based on pricing, although some have argued that 
prices, although already at a low level, could be even lowered by introducing 
effective competition.179 With respect to the other distinction mentioned 
above, while exploitative abuses are those directly harming consumers, 
exclusionary ones operate only in an indirect fashion, because they actually 
harm the competition process itself; therefore prohibiting such abuses is 
tantamount to protecting the competitive structure of a market.180 
Exclusionary abuses are particularly important for the purposes of this work 
and will come into consideration when dealing with the particular cases 
discussed.181  
However, a conduct may still not be considered abusive and thus 
escape the prohibition if it restricts competition but is “objectively justified”. A 
plausible justification, according to the European practice, could be the fact 
that the conduct constitutes legitimate business behaviour; the ECJ has 
admitted that, in principle, legitimate public interest, like health or consumer 
protection may be accepted too.182 In any case, even if these justifications are 
present, the dominant firm’s action must also be proportionate, meaning that 
that firm cannot exceed what is necessary to pursue such legitimate interests 
and in a way that does not restrain competition more than necessary.183 
However, there is no general framework that we can rely upon in order to find 
out what constitutes an objective justification of behaviour that might seem 
abusive and, once again, it will be for a factual analysis of the particular case to 
solve the issue. 
(iv) A last point to be emphasized with respect to abuses of dominance 
and that might be of relevance for the analysis that will follow, is the fact that 
                                                 
179 See for instance, former ICANN At-large Director Karl Auerbach’s post on 
http://cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000115.html last visited on 1 September 2004. 
180 See judgments Continental Can, case 6/72 in 1973 ECR, p. 215; Hoffmann-La 
Roche cit.; Michelin cit.. 
181 See infra in Chapter IV. 
182 Although the justification was not considered present in the specific case. See for 
instance the Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 12 December 1991 Hilti, Case T-
30/89, in ECR 1991 Page II-01439. 
183 See Bellamy & Child European Community law of competition, cit. page 717, 
Whish COMPETITION LAW, cit. p. 207 et seq., Jones-Sufrin EC COMPETITION LAW, cit. at page 
251 et seq.. 
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also public undertakings or undertakings entrusted with special or exclusive 
rights are subject to the prohibition of abusive behaviour. The EC Treaty, 
indeed, at Article 86, paragraph 2, provides that antitrust rules will not apply to 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of “general economic 
interest” or operating in the market in a position of legal monopoly only in so 
far that it is necessary to perform “the particular tasks assigned to them” and 
provided that the development of interstate trade is not affected in such a way 
that is contrary to the European Community interest. According to the 
European Courts’ case law, a state cannot introduce a legislation according to 
which the undertaking in question will be inevitably led to commit an abuse 
prohibited by Article 82;184 an undertaking will not be excused because the 
abuse is encouraged by national law.185 In general, it is deemed that article 86, 
paragraph 2 is to be interpreted strictly186 and that any restriction should satisfy 
the principle of proportionality in order to be allowed.187 
Article 86 is not a stand alone provision and is always to be applied in 
conjunction with another provision of the Treaty. In the cases that will be 
discussed later on, it may be appropriate to apply Article 86 in conjunction 
with the prohibition of abuses of dominant position, in particular when 
considering the national registry operators within the European Union.188 
III.2 Antitrust and new technologies 
Before proceeding, however, it is worth noting that it has sometimes 
been argued189 that antitrust has become obsolete and is not suitable anymore 
for facing the challenges posed by new technologies and network industries. 
The point is not that all the problems have been solved and perfect 
                                                 
184 Judgment of 23 April 1991, Hoefner and Elser, case C-41/90, ECR 1991 page I-
1979. 
185 See Judgment of the Court of 16 November 1977 SA G.B.-INNO-B.M. v 
(ATAB), case 13-77, in ECR1977 Page 02115. 
186 See R. Whish, cit. at footnote 149, at page 231. 
187 Ibidem.  
188 See infra in Chapter V. 
189 Especially after the beginning of the US Microsoft case. See for instance David B. 
Kopel, Antitrust after Microsoft: The Obsolescence of Antitrust in the Digital Era, Heartland 
Institute, February 2001. 
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competition is in place. The opposite is true: big firms gain control over large 
shares of the market, single proprietary standards are adopted, tying and 
bundling are largely applied, allegedly, for the benefit of consumers and 
innovation. 
Yet, the opinion goes, these industries are such that no monopoly is 
lasting, that if a monopoly lasts it is because it is the best, and that in any event, 
should a better standard arise, it will eventually replace the existing dominant 
one. Therefore, antitrust enforcers should rather refrain from intervening, 
because they cannot do any better and are likely to do much harm, especially to 
the innovation process.190 
Also in the recent Microsoft case,191 the company under investigation 
by the European Commission, claimed that in Information Technology 
industries competition works differently from “old economy” industries and 
that the notion of dominance changes accordingly: a sort of “technological 
revolution” will inevitably make it possible that a new product will completely 
replace the one that is dominant now.192 
However, as the Commission has convincingly argued on that 
occasion, without denying the specificities of a particular IT industry, even if a 
dominant position might be limited in time, this does not limit at present the 
market power of the dominant undertaking, if the threat is not sufficiently 
identifiable.193 Therefore, the potential for abuses still exists. 
Such kind of discussion, aiming at shrinking the scope for antitrust 
intervention, seems to come back at every controversial case of antitrust 
enforcement.194 However, if the controversy or the alleged failure lies in the 
application of the wrong rule or rather in the wrong application of the rule, 
                                                 
190 It has been said (see, for instance, Lind – Muysert “Innovation and competition 
Policy: Challenges for the new Millennium”, in ECLR 2003, p. 88) that this can be defined as a 
world of “Schumpeterian dynamic competition”, after the famous economist that considered 
monopoly superior to competition when it comes to stimulate innovation, because only 
monopolistic profits can attract the necessary investments in innovation.  
191 Cit. above at footnote 174. 
192 See the Microsoft Decision at section 5.2.1.4, paragraph 465 et seq.. 
193 ibidem. 
194 As, for instance, the structural remedies proposed in the US Microsoft case or the 
remedies imposed in the European Microsoft case. See Liebowitz and Margolies Winners, 
Losers & Microsoft, Ed. Independent Institute 1999. 
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without taking due care of the peculiar characters of the market or of the 
industry concerned, this calls for a better antitrust enforcement, not really for 
abandoning competition law tout court.  
New technology markets are certainly peculiar under many respects. If 
this kind of markets are characterised, as they normally are, by on-going 
technological progress, then currently high barriers to entry do not necessarily 
mean protection from potential competition and thus they do not necessarily 
leave room for abuses of dominance. In these cases, the evaluation should be 
based on a more forward rather than backward-looking approach. However, 
equally peculiar characteristics of these markets might instead lead to the 
reinforcement of some other barriers to entry, as it might be the case of 
powerful network effects.195 
Therefore, these peculiarities seem to be not enough to send antitrust 
law to retirement and have not been proved to be sufficient to eliminate the 
possibilities of abuses nor dominant firms’ incentives to exploit such position 
whenever possible. Successful companies, of the “old” and of the “new” 
economy, must not be punished if their behaviour creates efficiencies and 
benefits consumers.196 However, when those firms’ actions have 
anticompetitive implications, there could still be the need for an intervention 
by antitrust enforcers.197 As it has been authoritatively observed, reliance on 
the market mechanisms in order to achieve the optimal (most efficient) 
outcome does not equate unconditional faith that such mechanisms will 
properly work if there is no will to preserve them from being abused.198 
                                                 
195 As the Commission noted in the decision MCI WorldCom/Sprint at para. 194 
(decision of 28 June 2000, case no. COMP/M.1741 in OJ of 18.11.2003 L 300/1) “given that 
innovation will play an increasingly important role in the future development of the Internet, a 
dominant player with a large customer base will be best placed to set the pace for such 
innovation. The technology used by the dominant operator to provide a given service would 
become a de facto standard since all customers of this dominant undertaking would have 
adopted the technology chosen by the incumbent”. 
196 And, one could argue, does not conflict with other values that policy makers 
might pursue, such as market integration within the European Union. 
197 The basic tenet that what’s good for a successful company need not always equate 
what’s good for the economy is not denied by fast innovation or by network effects.  
198 Mario Monti “European Competition Policy for the 21st Century”, in 
International Antitrust Law and policy, Fordham Corp. Law Institute 2001, p. 257. 
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To be sure, it has been reported199 that it is common understanding 
that competition policy has yet a role to play in the new economy, but it must 
be applied with caution and flexibility, principle that seems sensible for any 
antitrust case indeed. 
When it comes to the unilateral behaviour of a dominant firm, the 
usefulness and the appropriateness of competition law instruments is even 
more questioned on the ground that competition law ought to protect 
competition and not smaller and inefficient competitors.200 It has been 
sometimes argued that only increases in prices or restrictions of output by a 
dominant undertaking reduce consumers’ surplus and can thus justify the 
intervention of antitrust enforcers. In any other case, the conduct of such firm 
can only be pro-competitive.201 This would rule out the possibility of 
challenging behaviour such as foreclosure or raising rival’s costs or leverage. 
It is to be noted, however, that this very strict interpretation of the 
concept of abusive conduct does not take into account that in situations where 
the dominant firm dictates the standard and competitors can only follow, 
exclusionary conduct can be an extremely fruitful strategy in the short run to 
preserve the dominance and in the long run to discourage competitors from 
even trying to develop new products. In the next Chapter, I will try to show 
how this is relevant in the domain names industry. 
III.3 DNS and antitrust in Court 
After the brief presentation of the legal framework in the previous 
sections, it is useful to give account also of the main judicial precedents in 
which the DNS has been faced with competition law. As said before, there are, 
                                                 
199 See the CRA Report for the UK Office for Fair Trade “Innovation and 
Competition Policy”, available at www.oft.gov.uk/News/Publications, last visited on 24 
September 2004 and the presentation that its authors Lind and Muysert published in the 
ECLR, op. cit. supra at footnote 190. 
200 A great amount of criticism restating this principle came from the United Stated, 
after some remarkable European antitrust decisions, like the prohibition of the GE/Honeywell 
merger (Commission decision of 3 July 2001, case COMP/M.2220) and the Microsoft decision 
(cited in footnote 191 above).  
201 Tertium non datur, said judge Bork: “No third possibility suggests itself”. See E. 
Fox, “We protect Competition, you Protect Competitors”, in World Competition, 2003, 2, p. 
149. 
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unfortunately, no European precedents in the field; however some interesting 
issues have been discussed in the context of American antitrust law. Indeed, in 
a number of occasions, American courts202 have been asked to deal with this 
kind of issues. Unfortunately they have so far decided mainly on the basis of 
procedural grounds, thus leaving us with no statement on the merits. The 
beginning of the litigation era coincided, obviously, with the time when it 
became clear that domain names were a fruitful business. 
At that time, the whole domain names industry had a vertically 
integrated monopolistic structure, with NSI/Verisign being the only registry 
operator for all the so-called open gTLDs (.com, .net, .org).203 It used to be 
also the only registrar, since no separation had yet been made between these 
two functions.  
As said before, the promotion of a more competitive structure of the 
market for domain names was indeed one of ICANN’s first actions, task that 
was fulfilled through the introduction of the aforementioned distinction 
between registrars and registries and of the shared registry system.204  
Before ICANN came into existence, however, a number of 
companies205 wishing to enter the lucrative domain name business began 
challenging NSI’s monopoly bringing antitrust suits against it in several 
American district courts. In most cases, the plaintiffs addressed the issue that a 
refusal to add new TLDs to the root file was illegal because it perpetuated 
NSI’s monopoly in the supply of domain names services and thus violated the 
US antitrust law, the Sherman Act.206 In no case, however, did courts find the 
defendant liable of antitrust offences, on the grounds that it was merely 
                                                 
202 No such cases were brought to court elsewhere, as far as I could verify. Some 
complaints had been filed also with the European Commission, but no decision has come out 
nor did they end up in court. See below in Chapter V for more details.  
203 The other four gTLDs (.edu, .gov, .mil and .int) were not available to the public 
or commercial use, being reserved to specific entities. See above in Chapter I. 
204 See above at page 15. 
205 To be true, also the European Commission had expressed similar concerns. See 
Chapter V below. 
206 The Sherman Act of 1890 prohibits at Section 1 conspiracies in restraint of trade 
and at Section 2 acts or attempts of monopolization. These two provisions are loosely, though 
not completely, correspondent to the prohibition of restrictive agreements and of abuses of 
dominance under EC Competition Law. See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law, 2d ed. 2000. 
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executing the actions compelled by the US government.207 In one of these 
cases,208 the court dismissed the claims because the plaintiffs lacked the quality 
of competitors, necessary for moving the claim. In all these cases, having so 
ruled, courts did not need to adjudicate upon whether the conduct in question 
was in fact violating antitrust rules. 
The reorganisation of the management of the legacy root and of the 
DNS through the creation of ICANN was expected to remove the kind of 
problems raised in those trials. However, antitrust litigations did not stop, 
directed to both NSI’s successor Verisign and to ICANN itself. In particular, 
given its relatively short existence, ICANN has collected a good number of 
lawsuits.209 With respect to antitrust claims, the most prominent ones were 
originated by Verisign’s introduction of certain highly questionable services or 
attempt thereof. These lawsuits were brought against both Verisign and 
ICANN and one of them opposes ICANN and Verisign to each other. 
Verisign sued ICANN in February 2004210 for violation of antitrust law 
and for a number of contractual claims. The complaint was initially dismissed 
without prejudice in order to allow Verisign to supplement its incomplete 
antitrust claims. And so it did, but the antitrust claims were irrevocably 
dismissed at the end of August 2004, for Verisign having failed to properly 
allege, in the court’s view, an antitrust violation. The trial will now continue 
before a state court for the contractual claims.211 
                                                 
207 For citation of these cases and for a more detailed analysis thereof, see M. 
Froomkin and M. Lemley “ICANN and antitrust”, cit. above at footnote 127at page 124 et seq. 
208 US DC Circuit Court of Appeal, Thomas v. Network Solutions, decided 14 May 
1999, No. 98-5502. 
209 ICANN keeps a webpage where litigation documents are posted: 
http://www.icann.org/general/litigation.htm, last visited on 20 October 2004. 
210 US District Court, Central District of California Verisign v. ICANN, complaint 
filed on 26 February 2004. Most documents related to this and to the other trials against 
ICANN are available at the webpage cited in the previous footnote. 
211 In the United States, Sherman Act claims are under federal jurisdiction, while 
contractual claims must be brought in state courts. If there is federal jurisdiction, the Federal 
Court shall retain the whole case. That is why the case was brought to the federal court of the 
Central District of California, but when the antitrust claim has been dismissed, the rest of the 
case can be adjudicated by a state court. Verisign has indeed filed the complaint for breach of 
contract before the California State Court on 27 August 2004. ICANN responded invoking the 
arbitration clause contained in the registry agreement and filed a request for arbitration. See 
announcement of 12 November 2004 at 
http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-12nov04-2.htm.  
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The core of this lawsuit was not a monopolisation issue (what in the 
EU we would call an abusive behaviour of a dominant firm), but onspiracy: 
Verisign had alleged that it had been victim of a conspiracy orchestrated by 
ICANN and “its members”212 that are in fact Verisign’s competitors. The 
object of this conspiracy was allegedly that of preventing Verisign from 
deploying its new services (in particular the so-called Waiting List Service and 
SiteFinder service)213 and thus putting it at a competitive disadvantage with 
respect to other registry operators or other companies offering similar services. 
ICANN’s response had been that (i) it does not compete with Verisign and (ii) 
that its decisions are exclusively referable to its Board, which is not controlled 
by any of its constituencies, including the alleged competitors of Verisign. 
Accordingly, the elements of a conspiracy are lacking and ICANN’s actions 
affecting Verisign’s cannot, in ICANN’s view, raise any antitrust issue.214 
In dismissing the antitrust claims, the Court ruled that Verisign had 
failed to allege that the co-conspirators constituted or controlled the majority 
of the ICANN board, which, ultimately, held power for the final decisions 
concerning Verisign’s services.215 The Court remarked that “there is nothing 
inherently conspiratorial in a bottom-up policy development process that 
considers or even solicits inputs from advisory bodies” where the Board is not 
required to accept the advisory body’s position and is not controlled by it.216 It 
is not fully clear whether with this statement the Court has conclusively stated 
that there is no cartel within ICANN or simply that more factual allegations 
are needed in order to move such a claim. 
As for the cases in which ICANN and Verisign stand on the same side, 
they were initiated by a number of domain name ICANN-accredited 
                                                 
212 Sic in the Complaint at page 24, paragraph 85. 
213 See the discussion of these two services infra at page 85. 
214 See ICANN’s Motion to dismiss. Later ICANN has filed a cross-complaint in 
which it claims Verisign has breached the Registry agreement and therefore the contract should 
be terminated. See announcement at http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-
12nov04-2.htm.  
215 US District Court, Central District of California, Verisign v. ICANN “Order 
dismissing Antitrust claim with prejudice” of 26 August 2004, at page 15.  
216 Ibidem at page 10 et seq.  
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registrars217 or registrants,218 charging Verisign with unlawful tying of 
otherwise separate services and attempt of monopolization of adjacent 
markets, by leveraging the monopolistic position in the market of .com and 
.net registration services. At the time of writing, both cases are still sub iudice, 
but it is already apparent that the plaintiffs have had some difficulties in 
alleging the constitutive elements of an illegal tying agreement. However, it is 
noteworthy that the lack of antitrust standing for ICANN was not proposed as 
a defence and that nothing in the court order suggests that ICANN could be 
immune from antitrust liability, as it used to be with NSI. If the plaintiffs will 
be able to allege sufficient factual basis for their claims, there might eventually 
be a ruling on the merits of the actions, i.e. the lawfulness of the conduct 
pursuant to (American) competition law. 
 
                                                 
217 US District Court, Central District of California Registersite.com (assumed name 
for a group of accredited registrars) v. ICANN and Verisign, complaint filed on 27 February 
2004. 
218 First Amended and Supplemental Class Action Complaint Syncalot, Inc. et al. vs. 
Verisign, ICANN and the US Department of Commerce of 12 January 2004. In addition one 
similar action was initiated in Canada to complain about the deployment of the WLS 
(Pool.com v. ICANN) and one, opposing ICANN to some registrars was settled in December 
2003 (Dotster and GoDaddy v. ICANN). 
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IV. INVESTIGATING THE RELEVANT MARKETS 
IV.1 Introduction 
After having described the main characteristics of the industry as a 
whole and the legislative framework of the analysis, it is necessary now to go 
more in detail in the observation of the different segments of the market of 
domain names, in order to identify possible competition concerns.  
As shown in Figure 1 above,219 the structure of the Domain Names 
industry can be represented by three levels. 
At the bottom, there is the level where retailers sell registrations to end 
users wishing to obtain a domain name under a certain TLD.  
The second level is the one where the registration procedure actually 
takes place: here both the product on offer and all the players are determined 
by ICANN that selects the TLDs to be put on the market, the operator who 
should maintain each gTLD registry and the registrars “accredited” to actually 
assign a domain name.  
At the top of the tree, there is the level of the operation of the root 
server. The controller of the root server supplies access to the root to registries 
of TLDs. 
Before proceeding with analysing each of these levels, there are some 
preliminary remarks to be made. The separation among these three layers looks 
easy to explain from the demand side substitutability point of view: domain 
names demanded for identification of a website are quite a different product 
than the management of the registry of any of the TLDs and than the 
management of the whole root server. It is easy to say that the degree of 
substitutability of the registration of yahoo.com with the management of the 
whole .com registry or the take-over of ICANN is quite negligible. 
To be true, if we take into account also supply side substitutability, it 
may seem not too difficult for a registry operator to enter the business of 
supplying registration services to end users or for ICANN to start selling 
(second level) domain names instead of allocating just TLDs. Indeed, until not 
                                                 
219 See above at page 7. 
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so long ago, the same company (NSI/Verisign) was both the registry manager 
for .com, .net and org as well as the main registrar for those gTLDs.220  
However, this is not the case in the real world, where switching from 
one business to the other is currently made impossible by the very organisation 
of the DNS hierarchy; in fact, a kind of contractual barriers has been erected in 
order to keep the segments separate: pursuant to a number of agreements 
entered into by the US government, ICANN and Verisign, ICANN is 
prevented from entering the downstream markets221 and NSI/Verisign has 
been forced to divest its registrar business. Moreover, becoming registry or 
registrar depends on ICANN’s decision and thus no entry in the market is 
possible by operators’ autonomous choices. 
In the following sections the three levels will be discussed, introducing 
the main antitrust concerns that can arise (or have actually arisen) with respect 
to each of them.  
However, a caveat must be indicated here. As said before, in total, 
there are 257 registries: 14 gTLDs and 243 ccTLDs. However, the statuses of 
ccTLD and of gTLD registries are quite different. ccTLD registries, especially 
the ones pre-existing to the creation of ICANN, still enjoy some degree of 
independence from ICANN, although from the technical point of view they 
rely on the same hierarchy and moreover new or re-delegated ccTLD registries 
are bound by special registry agreements.  
On the contrary, gTLDs are “regulated” by several agreements and 
totally subject to ICANN’s authority and hierarchy. Therefore, most part of 
the following analysis, although in some points generaliseable, will concern 
mainly gTLDs and the noteworthy peculiarities of ccTLDs will be commented 
explicitly, where necessary. 
IV.2 The bottom layer 
As mentioned before, at the bottom of the pyramid there is a market 
where domain name registration services are supplied to end users. End users 
                                                 
220 See later in the chapter. 
221 The proviso of point V.D.1 of the MoU (see above at footnote 41) prohibits 
ICANN from acting “as domain name Registry or Registrar or IP address Registry in 
competition with entities affected by the plan developed under this Agreement”. 
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can be individuals as well as businesses interested in getting an “address” for 
their web site. In this market, the suppliers are of two kinds: those who can 
directly assign a domain name, being entities qualified as “ICANN accredited 
registrars”,222 and simple retailers that offer intermediation services towards 
the accredited registrars. The activity carried out by the registrars is that of 
performing the actual registration of the domain name sought by the user into 
the registry database, plus all marketing, billing and other related activities. The 
domain name registration service has rather unique characteristics that make it 
non interchangeable with other services. To some extent, some limited 
demand-side substitutability comes from the service that combines the offer of 
webspace with a third level domain address (www.zop.splinder.com) or an 
address as subdirectory (www.geocities.com/name). However, these options 
are attractive rather for personal pages and are often precluded to commercial 
users. 
At this level, the structure of the market seems quite dispersed, with 
respect to the type of suppliers and customers and the range and price of 
products offered. Quite often the registration is offered in a bundle with 
Internet connection or with hosting services or with the maintenance of a web 
site on behalf of the client.  
With respect to the accredited registrars, while some of them are only 
dealing as wholesalers,223 others sell both to resellers and to individuals224 and, 
generally, the latter are also ISPs offering Internet access, web hosting225 or the 
whole management of a website.226  
Leaving aside the simple retailers for which there are no data available, 
with respect to the number of domain name registrations placed through 
accredited registrars, the following chart gives an idea of the current registrars’ 
situation and shows also that NSI that used to be the only registrar, while still 
being the largest operator, has seen its position in the market declining 
overtime: 
                                                 
222 The list of accredited registrars is available on ICANN’s website at 
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html, last visited on 27 April 2004.  
223 Like the Danish http://www.ascio.com, the Spanish http://www.nicline.com etc. 
224 Like the British http://www.nominate.com, the Italian Register.it 
(http://we.register.it/) and so on. 
225 Like  http://www.register.com/ or http://www.tuonome.it/. 
226 Like Register.it mentioned at footnote 224. 
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Figure 4 – Largest domain name registrars227 
 
                                                 
227 Source: http://www.webhosting.info/registrars/top-registrars/global/ last visited 
on 27 April 2005. 
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With respect to the prices charged, they vary across the spectrum of 
registrars and retailers; moreover, in a forest of bundles of different services, it 
is quite difficult to assess, as external observers, the share of the price and the 
cost components exclusively attributable to the activity of domain names 
sale.228  
It is nevertheless possible to single out some recurrences that are 
relevant for the purposes of this work: 
- the request for a higher price for .com addresses occurs with a certain 
frequency. This “rent” is an understandable consequence of present 
and past policy choices (i.e. of keeping the resource as scarce) which 
have also influenced consumers’ (i.e. those who demand registration) 
preferences; 
- the basic (wholesale) costs for registration of domain names are the 
same for every registrar (and indirectly to their retailers): the price to be 
paid for obtaining a name in a certain registry is top-down imposed to 
registrars, since it is fixed upstream in the agreement between ICANN 
and each registry;  
- decisions taken upstream influence the range of products and other 
non-price conditions offered by the companies operating in this 
segment: a Uniform Dispute Resolution Procedure (UDRP) is imposed 
by ICANN in order to get accredited; if a registry operator is strong 
enough to introduce in the market some new features, this could result 
in a change in the market structure also downstream and thus in the 
elimination of suppliers or products.229 
Since the main features of this layer of the domain name industry are 
influenced or determined at the upstream level, it does not seem indispensable 
at this stage to conclusively investigate the retail segment. By contrast, much 
more attention needs to be paid to the upstream layers. This will be the subject 
of the subsequent sections. 
                                                 
228 When the undertakings in question offer domain names together with other 
Internet services and products, they face costs referable to the whole activity as e-companies, 
like the rent of parts of the cable backbone from the backbone suppliers, the maintenance of a 
website and so on, so that it is difficult to identify which part of those are costs exclusively 
referable to the registering activity.  
229 I am referring to the Sitefinder and to the Waiting List Service cases. On these, 
see below at page 85. 
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IV.3 Registries and Registrars 
The middle layer has a peculiar structure. In this segment, there are a 
number of accredited registrars and 257 registries, i.e. as many as the entries in 
the root file database. However, I will refer specifically only to the gTLDs 
registries and among them, specifically to the unrestricted ones (.com, .net, 
.org, .info, .biz),230 although the same reasoning remains, in principle, valid for 
all registries.  
As explained earlier,231 these entities with such confusingly similar 
names perform a separate but interconnected function: each registry maintains 
the database of a specific TLD, registrars “sell” entries into the databases to 
those wishing to have a domain name for their website. 
The current system can be roughly characterized as the wholesale 
segment in a selective distribution system, but it also has odd features. Here, 
the registrars assign to a client a domain name in one of the registries, say the 
.com database, and pay fees pursuant to the registry-registrar agreement232 to 
the manager of the registry for each assigned domain name. However, both 
registries and registrars are respectively selected and accredited by ICANN.  
Almost all registry operators have been selected through a burdensome 
and not very transparent process. A different story, as already explained,233 
applies to NSI/Verisign, that has not been selected by ICANN but existed 
even before the creation of ICANN and was the original contractor for the 
management of the DNS. NSI was subsequently “assimilated” by forcing it to 
enter into a Registry agreement with ICANN which contains peculiar features 
that reflect the special position of the company. 
What is true for all registries, however, is that there can be only one 
operator for each TLD and that each operator charges the same (wholesale) 
                                                 
230 .biz is actually a restricted TLD because it can be assigned only to businesses; 
however, for the purposes of this work it can be considered as unrestricted, being businesses 
the main purchasers of domain names. 
231 At page 7. 
232 This is a part of the registry-ICANN agreement. See the page on ICANN’s 
website with the list of all registry agreements 
http://www.icann.org/registries/agreements.htm, last visited on 7 September 2004. 
233 See above at page 15 et seq. 
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price for every domain name assigned;234 this price is fixed by the respective 
ICANN registry agreements.235 
For what concerns registrars, they also have to fulfil the requirements 
established by ICANN in order to be “accredited”236 and they are all subject to 
the same contractual conditions as indicated in the Registrar Accreditation 
Agreement (RAA);237 among the most important ones, the acceptance of the 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), a set of rules to solve 
controversies concerning the attribution of domain names. 
The main aim of the registries-registrars structure just described was 
the creation of competition for offering registration services to end-users; the 
effects of such structure in the retail layer of the market have been described in 
the previous section.238 Competition in the registry services was meant to be 
introduced, as explained already,239 through the creation of new gTLDs. 
                                                 
234 To be sure, some discounts are explicitly foreseen in some registry agreement and 
some occasional “promotional sales” have been notified to ICANN. 
235 See, for instance, the provisions concerning fees contained in the.com registry 
agreement at http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/verisign/registry-agmt-appg-com-
16apr01.htm last visited on 7.9.2004, or in the .info agreement at 
http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/info/registry-agmt-appg-20jan04.htm last visited on 
7.9.2004. Similar provisions are contained in the registry agreements for every gTLD, although 
with some specificities as for the sponsored ones. 
236 The requirements and the process are described at 
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accreditation.htm last visited on 7.9.2004. 
237 The Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) states that “registrar shall comply, 
in such operations, with all ICANN-adopted Policies insofar as they: 
i. relate to one or more of the following: (A) issues for which uniform or 
coordinated resolution is reasonably necessary to facilitate interoperability, 
technical reliability and/or stable operation of the Internet or domain-
name system, (B) registrar policies reasonably necessary to implement 
Consensus Policies relating to the Registry, or (C) resolution of disputes 
regarding the registration of domain names (as opposed to the use of such 
domain names)”.  
It is interesting to note, however, that the RAA specifies immediately after the 
previous indent: “[insofar as those policies] do not unreasonably restrict competition”. 
The accreditation agreement for traditional gTLDs is available at 
http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-10nov99.htm, last visited on 7.9.2004; while 
the new agreement applying to all gTLDs, including the new ones, is at 
http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-17may01.htm last visited on 7.9.2004. 
238 See page 67 et seq.. 
239 See supra in Chapter I. 
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Indeed since November 2000, more registry operators entered the scene. 
Nevertheless, since there can be only one operator for each TLD, it is not so 
clear if we can conclude that registries of different TLDs, generic and country-
code, are actually competing with each other. This will be investigated in the 
following sub-section. 
IV.3.1 Can .com be considered a separate relevant market? 
To begin with, the “summa divisio” amongst TLDs is the one between 
gTLDs and ccTLDs. Verisign has stated, though not demonstrated, in its 
lawsuits that they are all competing with one another and that therefore the 
market comprises all TLDs indifferently.240 
There are not sufficient data available to quantitatively verify such 
claim, through the calculation of elasticities;241 however, from a qualitative 
point of view it is not very convincing. It is true that a domain name can 
resolve anywhere in the world regardless of its top level and that the 
corresponding website can therefore be reached by Internet users worldwide. 
This could in principle imply that it is indifferent for a registrant to choose one 
TLD or another. Nevertheless, this is just the “technical” part of the story and 
does not explain the features of the demand and supply of domain names 
under any particular TLD.  
If we look at the characteristics of the demand, we see that the type of 
customers that ask for a registration under a particular ccTLD, does not 
overlap with those asking for a different TLD, whether country-code or 
generic, and those who wish to have a generic TLD find of no use to obtain 
instead a name in a TLD which identifies a particular country. This is because 
the function, the intended use of each ccTLD is seen as specific to itself: a 
national TLD is attractive only to those who want to do business or otherwise 
have an interest in a certain country.242 Users know that a website under their 
                                                 
240 See complaint cited above at footnote 210 at page 6. 
241 And I would moreover leave the relative researches to professional economists. 
242 The United States represent a sort of exception, as the TLD .us has not acquired 
the same meaning as other ccTLDs have for the nationals of that country. This is the 
consequence of the fact that since the origins of the Domain Name System, American 
companies always preferred generic TLDs that would characterise the company’s field of 
activity, and thus disregarded the “national” TLD. 
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national TLD is likely to be addressed specifically to them, will probably be in 
their own language, will reflect the local preferences and customs for 
advertising, marketing, prices and so on. This is true no matter if the company 
in question is from the same country or if it is a foreign one. A national TLD is 
thus not considered useful to reach customers who do not belong to that 
country, nor to reach a global audience. In fact, it often happens that 
companies operating in a number of countries wish to obtain a domain name 
under the TLD of each of them, on top of a generic TLD, that will fulfil the 
function of reaching American or undetermined customers,243 or to identify 
the “portal” website through which accessing the national ones.  
This implies that each country-code TLD fulfils a different need and 
thus they are, from the demand-side perspective, not substitute to one another, 
but to some extent, though not necessarily, complementary. 
The characteristics of the supply of the two types of TLDs are also 
different. First of all, the prices at which domain names under national TLDs 
are sold appear to be unrelated with what happens with other TLDs and may 
differ substantially.244 This fact suggests that there is no real pressure on prices 
coming from the managers of other TLD registries. Second, also the 
contractual conditions at which domain names are sold differ across ccTLDs. 
To cite an example which will be discussed later,245 some ccTLD registry 
operators consider potential customers to be only those who have an interest 
in doing business in or have a link with the country in question. In some cases, 
the websites of the registry manager is just in the language of that country246 or 
has a rough and brief English version which does not mirror the whole content 
of the website.247 
                                                 
243 For example, www.amazon.com sells books (and other things) worldwide, but 
www.amazon.fr is specifically addressed to French users and www.amazon.de to German ones, 
although in principle anybody can order books through any such website, provided that they 
speak the relevant language, that are willing to pay in the local currency and so on. 
244 The price charged for a SLD by the registry of the .es (Spain) ccTLD is currently 
110 Euros; the one charged by the German registry is 116 Euro; in Italy the price is about 6 
euros, including VAT. The wholesale price for a .com is currently 6 USD. 
245 In Chapter V. 
246 Like the Slovak http://www.sk-nic.sk. 
247 Like the Spanish Registry Esnic https://www.nic.es/ingles/index.html last visited 
on 3 November 2004. 
 74 
All these indicators suggest that a single ccTLD represents a market on 
its own and is immune from competitive constraints coming from other 
national registries as well as from gTLDs. Therefore, ccTLDs cannot be put in 
the same market as gTLDs. 
The following step is to look only at gTLDs as a category, and they 
might seem to compete with each other, at least to some extent. However, we 
can immediately observe a high degree of product differentiation amongst 
them. By reason of historical development, marketing, or specific policy 
choice,248 each gTLD has come to identify a certain category of websites and 
therefore to be addressed to different categories of customers (i.e. registrants). 
A first distinction should then be made among gTLDs because not all of them 
appear to be substitutable with any other one. First of all, the sponsored TLDs 
are not offered or purchased as an alternative to the non sponsored ones,249 as 
well as the restricted ones are foreclosed to registration by those individuals or 
entities not belonging to the prescribed category.  
This implies that, first of all, the “old” reserved TLDs such as .mil, 
.edu, .gov, .int are to be considered as separated and not competing with the 
others. Secondly, the same can be predicated with respect to some of the new 
ones, namely .museum, .coop and .aero, each of them having a limited and 
generally predetermined reach. Of the remaining ones, .name is also addressed 
to a specific category of consumers, because it is targeted to physical persons, 
.pro is open only to liberal professions and .biz is restricted only to business.  
It could be argued that the conclusion that restricted and sponsored 
TLDs are not competing with unrestricted ones cannot necessarily be 
predicated the other way around: it could, indeed, be reasonably stated that 
.com, .net, .org or .info can be considered, at the present stage, as a viable 
alternative by an airline or a museum or a cooperative that are not happy with 
the policies or the service provided by their own dedicated registry. Therefore 
the operators of such registries may face some competitive constraints from 
the open gTLDs. However, this is likely to change depending on the success of 
the dedicated TLD as a sort of brand name: if .museum becomes an actual 
                                                 
248 In particular with respect to the new gTLDs: all but one were restricted to certain 
categories of registrant, with the consequent necessity of assessing the actual fulfilment of the 
envisaged criteria by each applicant. 
249 For the distinction between sponsored and non sponsored TLDs, introduced by 
ICANN in occasion of the introduction of the new gTLDs in 2000, see above in Chapter I. 
 75 
categorizer instead of a simple identifier for museum institutions, the 
alternative offered by .net or .info will not exercise competitive constraints any 
longer. 
In sum, if any form of competition can be imagined, it has to take place 
between the so called non restricted gTLDs: .com, .org, .net and .info. 
However, I consider .biz, although restricted, as assimilable to the previously 
mentioned four: at the end of the day, the main stakeholders for the purposes 
of this discussion are commercial businesses, i.e. those to which the .biz is 
open for registration. However, its inclusion would not have a major influence 
on the substance of what will follow: for reasons related to its launch and 
arguably precisely because of its “restricted” character, its introduction was not 
particularly successful.250 
If we adopt this definition of the relevant market and we move on to 
the calculation of market shares,251 then the figures indicate that the operator 
of the .com is by far the dominant one with a share of over 72,5% of all 
registrations, followed by the operator of the .net with about 11,3%, that 
happens to actually be the same undertaking and therefore the two separate 
market shares shall be summed up to almost 84%. 
 
 
                                                 
250 See the Evaluation Report of the Introduction of the new gTLDs, completed in 
July 2004 and available as from 31 August 2004 on ICANN’s website at 
www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-31aug04.htm.  
251 Market shares are here calculated with respect to the number of domain names 
registered under each TLD. The figures, as well as the chart and the table below are taken from 
http://www.webhosting.info/registries/global_stats/, last visited on 28 April 2005. 
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Figure 5 – Chart representing the number of second level domains registered under the 
unrestricted gTLDs (including also .biz) 
 
 
Table 1 – Number of second level domains registered under the unrestricted gTLDs 
(including also .biz)252 
 
                                                 
252 Source: http://www.webhosting.info. 
Rank TLD Total Domains 
Net Gain  
(one week) 
Share 
1 COM 36,315,179 241,153 72.5087 % 
2 NET 5,666,051 27,775 11.3131 % 
3 ORG 3,512,672 12,759 7.3044 % 
4 INFO 3,453,076 9,428 6.8946 % 
5 BIZ 1,136,936 2,469 2.2701 % 
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It is interesting to have a look also at the growth of each TLD. The 
tables below indicate the weekly growth. The figures of the last month show 
that all registries are growing but in absolute figures the .com is still the one in 
which the net increase in the total number of domain names is the highest and 
is even higher than the increase in the other four altogether. To be sure, the 
starting of the operations of .info has had an impact on the share of the other 
TLDs and at some point, thanks to a promotion (four month free registration) 
combined with an arguable speculation of some registrars,253 the number of 
registrations under .info jumped up considerably. However, it clearly appears 
from Table 3 that .info exceptional growth of last autumn is largely over. 
 
 
  
                                                 
253 See http://www.domaines.info/english_article.php?art_id=7 last visited on 9 
November 2004. However, it is fair to predict the likely occurrence of a large drop in the 
number of domain names .info, particularly when the speculative registrations will not be for 
free anymore. 
Weeks 
Total Domains 
.com 
Gain Loss Net 
04/25/05 36,315,179 530,154 289,001 241,153 
04/18/05 36,074,026 452,378 280,307 172,071 
04/11/05 35,901,955 467,368 281,127 186,241 
04/04/05 35,715,714 458,691 274,781 183,910 
03/28/05 35,531,804 439,652 263,972 175,680 
03/21/05 35,356,124 483,023 232,282 250,741 
Table 2 Total domain names for .com 
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Weeks Total Domains .info Gain Loss Net 
04/25/05 3,453,076 15,367 5,939 9,428 
04/18/05 3,443,648 15,985 7,006 8,979 
04/11/05 3,434,669 13,879 6,513 7,366 
04/04/05 3,427,303 13,925 6,114 7,811 
03/28/05 3,419,492 13,565 5,148 8,417 
03/21/05 3,411,075 14,310 6,147 8,163 
 
Table 3 Total Domain Names for .info254 
 
                                                 
254 Source: http://www.webhosting.info/registries/reports/domains/INFO last 
visited on 27 April 2005 
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These figures and the absence of potential new entrants and of 
constraints from existing “competitors”, should be enough to support the 
finding of dominance.255 
However, what has been shown so far does not necessarily represent 
the relevant market. If we go more in depth, we see that this market definition 
is not completely satisfactory. 
As it has been pointed out, the controversial selection process for 
enlargement of the root zone through the introduction of the new gTLDs did 
not lead to the emergence of competitors, as “winners were all established, 
politically connected insiders”256 with the effect that the new gTLDs registry 
operators are either already existing operators or their affiliates. 
Apart from this kind of considerations, it is important to further note 
that among the unrestricted gTLDs, there is no complete substitutability. It is 
rather common sense that for a business it is much more valuable to register a 
.com than a .info or a .org, for example. The much awaited .biz proved to be 
not a real alternative: despite the big expectations when it was created that it 
would replicate the success of the .com, as a matter of fact it is among the least 
popular gTLDs with only a rather small number of registrations.  
There are no actual data available about the cross-elasticity of the 
demand for different TLDs; however if I undertook a SSNIP-test exercise, I 
would expect that a small but significant increase in the price for a registration 
under the .com would not bring about a massive migration towards a different 
TLD, since the .com has acquired a particular “semantic” value for commercial 
users of the Internet. However, there are two kinds of objections to the very 
possibility of going along the SSNIP-test path: on the one hand, this statement 
might not make sense at all, for competition in this segment of the domain 
names market is arguably not based on prices; on the other hand, it is even 
difficult to be verified in a direct way, since the price that registries charge to 
registrars is fixed in the registry agreement they enter into with ICANN.257 
                                                 
255 Very high market shares could, according to the judicial precedents quoted above 
at footnote 165, already be considered in the European legal system as sufficient to establish 
dominance.  
256 See M. Mueller Ruling the Root, cit. above at footnote 23, at page 203. 
257 See, for instance Appendix F to the .com registry agreement at Section 5.1 or 
Appendix G to the .info registry agreement and so on; all Agreements are available on 
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In (arguably to some extent) similar cases, where the price is not freely 
determined but subject to regulation, the European Commission’s Guidelines 
on market analysis within the regulatory framework for telecommunications258 
suggest259 that such regulated price is presumed to be the competitive one. 
This presumption might be workable for other regulated industries but in the 
domain names case suffice it to remark that there is no regulatory authority 
that has fixed such price, but two private undertakings and there is no 
reasonable indication that in fixing the price they made an evaluation of the 
actual costs and reasonable profit so that we can assume that it is set at the 
competitive level. 
Perhaps, we could take some indirect evidence from the observation of 
what happens in the downstream market for second level domains assigned to 
end users: in this market, as said before, for what concerns prospective 
customers the price charged for a .com is on average higher than the one for 
any other gTLD.260 
However, the problem is further complicated, for those who are 
already customers of a given TLD. Even if the domain name subscription 
expires every year, users of a domain name under a certain gTLD are actually 
locked-in: while it is not so costly for a user to change the registrar or the 
ISP,261 once a registrant has started its business using a second level domain 
under a particular gTLD, the costs of transferring the website to a domain 
name under a different gTLD are very high and make it unlikely that such 
company will change its DN because of an increase in price or a change in the 
quality or the characteristics of the services provided by the registry manager. 
In practice, companies carrying out business over the Internet invest a lot in 
promoting the address of their websites in order to get customers to remember 
it. The same promotional effort also aims at building a reputation around that 
domain name. Moreover, they often make agreement or pay to have other 
                                                                                                                            
ICANN’s website at http://www.icann.org/registries/agreements.htm last visited on 8 
December 2004. 
258 Cited above, in footnote 163. 
259 At para. 42. 
260 This conclusion is drawn from direct survey of the websites of a sample of 
ICANN-accredited registrars. 
261 The “portability” of the domain name across different registrars is actually one of 
the features introduced by ICANN along with the shared registry system mentioned above at 
page 15. 
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websites (or search engines) linking to their web site through their domain 
name. In this situation, which is a very common one, if a company wants to 
switch to a new TLD, provided that the name is still available,262 it will face the 
costs of advertising ex novo the change, in order to make sure to have the same 
reach; it will have to inform all partner websites and the search engines about 
the change to make sure that they link to the new address; it will not be sure 
that customers who have added the address of the company in their 
“favorites”263 will promptly update them.264 
Moreover, if we take a particular category of customers, namely 
companies, commercial users, which represent the highest share of registrants 
in the .com registry,265 it has become crucial for them to obtain visibility under 
the .com “brand”; for this category of customers the demand of a .com is 
rather rigid and therefore the existence of other TLDs seems to have little 
impact. 
This added value of .com is a rent that the .com registry is enjoying 
because of the development of the Internet and of the DNS and a number of 
factors contributed to this outcome: first, at the time when it clearly appeared 
that there was an explosion of commercial interests over the Internet, .com 
was the only TLD available for “e-companies” and it took several years before 
the introduction of new gTLDs to the root was actually implemented and the 
new gTLDs became operational. Moreover, when they were finally introduced, 
as explained above, only one was unrestricted and able to wield some kind of 
attractiveness. 
The creation of a reasonably high number of new unrestricted gTLDs 
could help eliminating this rent, but ICANN has already indicated that if any 
                                                 
262 Were it not available, our hypothetical company might have paid also for what is 
called a waiting list service, in order to be informed when the name would be available because 
of expiration of the previous registration. 
263 The “favorites” or “bookmarks” folder is the location on users’ PCs where the 
links to websites users are interested in are stored for future visits, as shortcuts to reach the 
same website without having to type the whole address again. 
264 The Commission guidelines on market analysis within the regulatory framework 
for electronic telecommunications makes this point at paragraph 50, (the guidelines are cited 
above at footnote 163): substantial switching costs can constitute a sufficient reason not to 
include two products in the same relevant market, although it is acknowledged that it can also 
be an indicator to be considered in the subsequent stage of assessing the market power of the 
undertaking concerned.  
265 .com is in principle a TLD specifically destined to commercial users. 
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new TLD will be introduced, they will be of the sponsored type,266 which will 
not particularly enlarge the offer. 
Given the status quo, other existing or potential TLDs seem not to 
exercise effective competitive constraints on the behaviour of the .com 
manager, commercial users’ demand for a .com is quite rigid and it does not 
seem likely that the situation is going to change in the short-medium run. This, 
in turn, makes the registrars’ demand quite rigid: registrars, the customers in 
this market, but also those who ultimately deal with registry operators, find it 
crucial to include in their offer to end users the possibility of registering a 
domain name in the .com registry. 
In sum, although in the absence of extensive empirical data or 
estimates of the cross-elasticity to support such conclusion, there reasonably 
seem to be enough indications to conclude that the .com represents a separate 
relevant product market.267  
When it comes to the geographic market, it does not seem questionable 
that it is to be identified as the global one: conditions of sales and of 
competition are sufficiently homogeneous all over the world and the demand 
can come from anywhere at the same or comparable costs. 
IV.3.2 Assessment of dominance 
If the above conclusions are correct, it follows that the manager of the 
.com registry enjoys a position of monopoly – arguably a natural one268 – since 
                                                 
266 See, for instance the Strategy: Introduction of new generic Top-Level Domains, 
published on 30 September 2004 at http://www.icann.org/tlds/new-gtld-strategy.pdf  
267 A recent report of the OECD (“Generic top level domain names: market 
development and allocation issues” DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2004)2/FINAL of 13 July 2004) 
reaches also the conclusion that each TLD operator is able to exercise some degree of 
monopoly power. However, it is to be mentioned that Milton Mueller has a different opinion: 
although no estimates of elasticity are available, this author interprets the anecdotal evidence in 
the sense of suggesting that users view TLDs as substitutable. See Mueller, “Towards an 
economics of the domain names system”, cited at footnote 45, paragraph 4.2.2, at page 25. I 
believe the conclusion is different, for the reasons explained in the text. 
268 See Bourgeois – Crémer – Marsal, A Study on the Internet Corporation of 
Assigned Names and Numbers – College of Europe 14 November 2003, at page 72 et seq.. 
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by the technical architecture of the DNS there must be only one operator for 
each TLD registry.269 
In this situation, it should have become also evident from what has 
been said above, that the undertaking operating the registry has in fact the 
ability of deciding its behaviour without suffering from actual or potential 
competition: nobody can enter the market, as there can be only one operator 
for the .com;270 other gTLDs  are not able to suggest themselves as alternatives 
and many customers are locked in.271 
To be sure, one could argue that in fact there is not much to compete 
on in such segment of the market: as mentioned, prices are decided upstream, 
provision of registry services is subject to ICANN’s approval or supervision,272 
and other features of competition on quality are prevented, like the imposition 
of a uniform procedure for dispute resolution, the famous UDRP referred to 
above.273 However, an undertaking in such position still has the special 
responsibility, referred to above, “not to allow its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition on the common market.”274 In particular, in this case, 
there is still some room for leveraging the monopolistic power exercised on a 
gTLD, in order to exclude competitors in related markets. 
The possible objection that the position of the .com manager might 
change overtime and its market power might diminish in an undefined future, 
does not take into account the fact that this company has the potential to 
                                                 
269 It could be added, for more precision, that this holds only as long as we can have 
only one .com registry, the one in the ICANN system. If we allowed more competing roots 
then there could be more operators for different .com registries and then the possibility of a 
competition amongst them could be evaluated. 
270 As said before, as long as there is only one ICANN’s .com. 
271 It is worth to just mention that the dominance of the company in question is 
referred to the global market and that implies, a fortiori, that it is held over the whole European 
Union, which satisfies the requirement for the application of EC competition law that the 
dominant position be held in a substantial part of the common market. 
272 See for instance the .com registry agreement at Sections 1.1 and 1.9. 
273 See at page 15. Also the UDRP is made obligatory by a clause in the registrar 
accreditation agreement. See Section 3.8. 
274 See above at footnote 171 and accompanying text. 
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commit abuses at present,275 maybe in order to extend or just to protect its 
dominance. The following section will, in fact, explore this possibility. 
IV.3.3 Hypotheses of abusive behaviour  
Given such peculiar structure of this segment of the market, it is not 
surprising that some concerns from, inter alia, the competition law point of 
view would arise. There were, in particular, some actions of the undertaking 
that I have indicated as dominant, i.e. Verisign, that have been subject to heavy 
criticism and that, indeed, raise some doubts as to their compatibility with 
antitrust rules. 
One first type of behaviour that was the source of substantial concern, 
stems from one of the most questionable (and questioned) characteristics of 
this segment of the market but has, in fact, lost much of its anticompetitive 
potential. It has been explained already276 that Verisign used to be the sole 
registry operator for .com and .net as well as the largest registrar. This kind of 
“vertical integration” between the registry and the registrar business was the 
source of serious competitive concerns, as the registry operator could favour 
its own registrar at the expenses of competing registrars: it could share 
information on registration; it could give preferential access to registration or 
connected services to its own registrar. For example, Verisign could favour its 
registrar in the access to the information concerning expired domain names, in 
order to precede any other registrar in the “race” for re-selling a valuable 
domain name that had not been confirmed by the previous owner.277  
However, precisely because of this anticompetitive potential, Verisign 
was ultimately required to divest itself of its registrar business (NSI), event that 
finally occurred in November 2003.278 It has been also argued that the fact that 
Verisign retained a 15% equity interest in NSI could still leave room for 
                                                 
275 Analogously to what has been observed by the European Commission in the 
Microsoft case. See above at footnote 191 and accompanying text. 
276 See above at page 13 et seq. 
277 I will come back to the market for expired domain names in the subsection which 
follows. 
278 See the announcement made by Verisign of the completion of the sale 
http://www.verisign.com/verisign-inc/news-and-events/news-archive/us-news-
2003/page_200312181054389.html last visited on 30 September 2004. 
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preferential treatment;279 yet for the time being no actions have been taken in 
this sense and therefore the main antitrust concerns with respect to this type of 
conduct have to be put on hold. 
Apart from the problems previously arising from the vertical 
integration, there are two other examples of questionable conduct, which it is 
worth talking about: the introduction of the so-called Waiting List Service 
(WLS) and of the SiteFinder Service. For their analysis, another quick glance at 
a few more technical aspects is needed. 
IV.3.3.1 The “Waiting List Service” and the “SiteFinder” service 
(a) What is referred to as “Waiting List Service” (WLS) is a service that 
concerns reassignment of expired domain names. There is, indeed, a high 
number of domain names whose registration is not renewed and that become 
available to new registrants. According to some registrars’ estimates, the 
number of domain names expiring each month is of approximately 800.000; 
moreover, approximately 20.000 are in fact cancelled from the registry each 
day.280 The interest in obtaining information as for which domain names 
expire is so high that it has given rise to a profitable related market: many 
registrars, indeed, have started offering to potential registrants a service of 
backordering, in the framework of various business models. Some registrars 
offer a sort of “monitoring” service in exchange of an annual fee, but with no 
guarantee as for the actual acquisition of the domain name; others offer 
monitoring but charge a registration fee only in the case the name is eventually 
registered to the customer; other registrars organise a kind of auction in case 
there are multiple reservations for the same name. Yet, no registrar can 
guarantee to its customer the actual registration: once a domain names 
becomes available, it is a matter of “first come, first served” to decide who will 
                                                 
279 See Registersite Complaint cit. above at footnote 217, at paragraphs 4.87. 
280 See Registersite Complaint cit. above at footnote 217, at paragraphs 4.37 and 
4.46. These two values stem from the fact that expired domain names are not immediately 
erased and put back to the market but benefit from a “grace period” and a “redemption 
period” during which the registrant can still re-obtain its domain name, usually at a higher fee. 
Once even these two periods have elapsed, the domain name is put in a pool of names to be 
erased (Batch Delete) and only after the cancellation, it becomes available and will be assigned 
to the first who will ask for it. 
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get it; therefore, if there are more companies trying to register a certain name, 
only the fastest will get it for its customer.281 
At some point, also Verisign decided to offer a similar kind of service. 
However, its service was different in the respect that Verisign wanted to offer 
it in its position as registry and not as registrar: Verisign would “sell” to 
registrars so-called WLS subscriptions for an annual fee of 24 USD; registrars 
would buy them on behalf of their customers interested in obtaining a certain 
expired domain name. If and when the domain name became available, 
Verisign would inform the WLS subscriber and this latter would be assigned 
the domain name. In other words, there will be no need for the services 
currently offered to customers and only the WLS subscriber will in fact have 
the possibility to obtain the domain name, if and when it expires. This also 
implies that, differently from what currently happens, it will become necessary 
for registrars (and therefore to their customers) to pass through Verisign and 
its system, and to pay the price accordingly, in order to obtain both the 
information on the expiring registration and the domain name itself. 
Verisign claims this is an improvement, as it will eliminate the waste of 
resources of the race to the registration, where many users pay to check the 
availability of a domain name without being sure to finally have it assigned. 
Opponents, on the other hand, claim that WLS is itself a waste of resources 
since subscribers are required to pay much more than they do under the 
current system and in any case there will be no certainty about actually 
obtaining the desired domain name as it is not sure that the current owner will 
let it expire: according to their estimates, only a 23% of currently registered 
domain names in .com and .net are eventually dropped by the assignees and 
only a 5% figure represents the expired domain names with a certain value.282 
According to the registrars, therefore, in the vast majority of cases, to pay for a 
WLS subscription is useless, and thus wasteful. 
To be precise, Verisign did not introduce its WLS directly and 
unilaterally, but first proposed it to ICANN in December 2001, in order to get 
its approval. The process of obtaining such approval through the ICANN 
complex decision making, took a considerable amount of time: the approval 
                                                 
281 Or for itself, for that matter: it might be a profitable business for a registrar to 
first become the assignee of a domain name which it deems very valuable and then resell it for 
a higher price. 
282 Complaint Registersite at paragraphs 4.79 and 4.83. 
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was finally given in March 2004283 and was subject to a number of conditions, 
so that Verisign eventually sued ICANN for a number of contractual and 
antitrust claims, as reported above.284 Whether this approval was actually 
necessary is a question currently sub iudice; however, technically speaking, 
Verisign could probably have started offering this service also unilaterally. 
(b) The other service mentioned above, i.e. SiteFinder, was indeed 
introduced unilaterally by Verisign in September 2003.285 In order to 
understand the functioning of this tool, I should refer again to the way domain 
names resolve into IP addresses, as it has been explained in more detail 
supra:286 extremely simplifying, when the user’s request of a domain name 
matches a domain name registered into the .com database, the .com registry 
gives the user the IP address of the owner of the domain so that he or she can 
reach the corresponding website. Conversely, when the domain name typed in 
the address bar of the browser does not correspond to any entry of the .com 
database, the user receives the information, according to the protocols and 
standards of the Internet, that there is no such domain name.287  
SiteFinder exploits this feature: through the insertion of a “wildcard” in 
the two registries concerned, any wrongly typed domain name would not cause 
a “not found” response, but a redirection to a page set up by Verisign itself 
suggesting to the user other domain names he or she might have “really” 
wanted. 
The very meaning of this is that with wildcard and redirection at work, 
every non existing domain name (misspelling or typos of famous assigned 
                                                 
283 During the ICANN meeting in Rome in March 2004. See the “Resolutions 
Adopted at Rome ICANN Board Meeting” available at http://www.icann.org/minutes/rome-
resolutions-06mar04.htm last visited on 8 December 2004. 
284 See above at page 62 et seq. 
285 See http://new.icannwatch.org/articles/03/09/15/1730233.shtml last visited on 
Sept. 29, 2003 and http://bertola.eu.org/toblog/?p=35 (in Italian), last visited on Oct. 30, 
2003. 
286 At page 8 et seq..  
287 NXDOMAIN (“no such domain”) is the technical expression in the language of 
BIND, the DNS software. 
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domains and all those domain names still free), do resolve288 to a website 
managed by Verisign, i.e. the .com and .net registries operator. 
The consequences of the use of this system by a registry operator, and 
moreover the biggest registry, are the attainment of both relevant economic and 
non economic advantages and at the same time a threat to the stability of the 
Internet,289 that gave rise to a lot of criticism290 – and in a few cases to 
lawsuits291 – by competitors, users, academics and by ICANN itself.292 
Following this pressure, Verisign decided to temporarily suspend the 
service.293 To date, SiteFinder has not been re-activated, however, it is likely 
that Verisign is waiting for the outcome of its lawsuit against ICANN before 
the state court of California,294 hoping to be authorised to re-launch it without 
having to wait for ICANN’s approval. 
The main claim against SiteFinder is that of hijacking misspelled and 
unassigned domain names to gain unfair anticompetitive advantages. First of 
all, the redirection to a web page managed by the registry itself is the source of 
interesting revenues: the page provided by SiteFinder contained “sponsored” 
links to suggested websites, meaning that the owners of those websites were 
willing to pay in order to benefit from the flow of Internet users ending up on 
the SiteFinder page because of typos or queries of wrong domain names.295 
                                                 
288 In other words, a query for a non existing or misspelled domain name obtains in 
response a website as if such domain name existed. How domain names “resolve” has been 
explained supra in Chapter I. 
289 See the document published by the Internet Architecture Board at 
http://www.iab.org/documents/docs/2003-09-20-dns-wildcards.html, last visited on Sept. 25, 
2003. 
290 See, for instance, http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/030922/lam075_1.html, last 
visited on Sept. 25, 2003; 
http://reuters.com/printerFriendlyPopup.jhtml?type=internetNews&storyID=3471297, last 
visited on Sept. 25, 2003. 
291 See above at page 64 et seq. 
292 See, for instance the webpages cited in footnote 285 and also 
www.icann.org/announcements/advisory-19sep03.htm, last visited on Sept. 25, 2003. 
293 “Sitefinder is just napping” at 
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=03/10/16/1247217&mode=thread, last visited on 
Nov. 17, 2003. 
294 See above at page 62 et seq. 
295 It has been reported that the revenue for Verisign when a user clicks to a link of a 
sponsor are about $150 millions annually, as estimated by Verisign (reported by 
http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/030922/lam075_1.html, last visited on Sept. 25, 2003). 
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The same practice, the use of misspelled domain names (called 
“typosquatting”) by non authorized registrants, has often been banned for 
being against trademark law and unfair competition law.296 
Furthermore, SiteFinder constitutes a powerful tool to monitor the 
frequency with which a particular domain name is typed; this constitute a very 
valuable information because it allows for an estimate of the potential visibility 
and “guessability” of that domain name and therefore of its value on the 
market. 
From the technical point of view, SiteFinder interfered with the 
operation of a number of software, protocols and applications, such as spam297 
filters – that relied on checking non existing domain names to sort out junk 
emails – link checkers and other software relying on machine-to-machine 
communication.298 
Also privacy concerns have been highlighted as, reportedly, the 
SiteFinder software hid some spyware.299 Finally, there was no way the users 
could decide to abandon the SiteFinder service300 and use another one or none 
at all. 
                                                 
296 The practice of typosquatting referred to in the text is considered equivalent to 
the registration of domain names that are confusingly similar to registered Trademarks. 
297 This term, borrowed from a TV series, is today used to indicate those unsolicited 
commercial emails sent to an undefined number of addressees, advertising the sale of certain 
products or services. In order to go around blocking filters, spammers have learned to often 
change the address from which they send their reclames; and often they make up non existing 
ones for this purposes. Therefore, one way to block spam is to set up a filter that before letting 
the email through, verifies if the domain of the sender’s email address actually exist. 
298 See J. Weinberg “SiteFinder and Internet Governance”, in University of Ottawa 
Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 1, Spring 2004 at page 9 et seq. of the SSRN electronic version. 
Even normal email servers were experiencing failures. 
299 Spyware is the name used to call a category of “software that gathers and reports 
information about a computer user without the user’s knowledge or consent. More broadly, 
the term spyware can refer to a wide range of related malware products which fall outside the 
strict definition of spyware. These products perform many different functions, including the 
delivery of unrequested advertising (pop-up ads in particular), harvesting private information, 
re-routing page requests to illegally claim commercial site referal fees, and installing stealth 
phone dialers”. See the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spyware last visited on 8 December 2004. 
300 Ironically, the webpage Verisign had set to appear in response to a query for a 
non existing domain name warned users who did not want to accept its terms and conditions 
to stop using the service. 
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As noted also in the case of the WLS, there was already a market also 
for SiteFinder-like services: several firms were already supplying Internet 
surfers with their own web page in response to misspelled domain names, 
including suggestions for “what they really meant” or links towards the 
websites of sponsoring companies, that constitute the main source of revenue 
for this commercial activity.301 The system used by these firms was the 
installation, upon users’ request, of a special plug-in software (or a tool-bar) 
able to generate the sort of informative page described above upon typing of a 
non existing domain name. In any case, the user could anytime decide to 
uninstall the plug-in and get back to the old system where the response was an 
“Error 404” page. 
IV.3.3.2 Antitrust concerns about the SiteFinder and the WLS 
The services in question are autonomous from, although related to, the 
normal supply of domain names registration services.  
(i) For what concerns the SiteFinder service, Verisign was providing the 
users with information such as a directory of websites of potential interest, 
advertisements and the indication that the domain name sought was available 
for registration. This last feature does not represent the main goal of the 
service, as those who type misspelled domain names are generally looking for a 
website and not for checking the availability of a domain name: this purpose is 
best served by the so-called whois database.302 Moreover, the revenues from 
SiteFinder-type services mainly come from those who pay in order to have 
their website indicated on the page that Internet users will see. The relevant 
market in this case seems therefore to coincide with the provision of directory 
services to Internet users in response to a DNS query.  
This service is to some extent similar to the one provided by a number 
of other Internet operators like Google, Yahoo etc., mainly coupled with 
search engine functions. However, the search engine must be activated by the 
user who first has to access the website of Yahoo or Google and then 
specifically perform a search, whereas this is not required in the case of the 
                                                 
301 Such kind of service was, inter alia, offered by Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, 
New.net. 
302 The whois database supplies the users with the information whether a certain 
domain name is registered and by whom.  
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supply of an informative page upon a DNS query. This means that the user 
will get such informative page even if she had no intention or interest in 
performing a search or before she could even do that. 
The situation on this market is that a number of competing firms, 
including some of those offering search engines functions, were already 
supplying SiteFinder-like services, yet only when the user had decided to 
download the specific plug-in software. A market of this kind seems rather 
contestable, as it is not difficult for a company already active in the provision 
of Internet services to start – as well as to stop – offering also this type of 
service. However, when SiteFinder is implemented, no such service is capable 
of being offered any longer, as the condition to activate it – that a certain 
domain name does not resolve – will not occur any more. Therefore, 
SiteFinder seems capable of eliminating all competitors in this market. As said, 
this is possible only for the company which is the sole operator of the .com 
and .net registries. 
(ii) In the case of the WLS, the services being offered are those of 
monitoring and querying the registry database, along with the provision of 
information and all other activities related to domain names that might expire. 
The final registration of the domain name, once it is available, is not different 
from the supply of registration services for those domain names that were 
never registered before.303 However, it is in the provision of the first type of 
value-added services that Verisign has attempted to enter the market through 
the WLS. The second market, for actual registration is foreclosed to Verisign – 
in its quality of registry operator – by the provisions contained in the Registry 
agreement. 
Similarly to what has been said for SiteFinder, also this market, in the 
way business is currently conducted, shows a high degree of competition and 
contestability; and similarly to SiteFinder, this contestability will be highly 
reduced by the introduction of Verisign’s business model because it will 
transform the current competing suppliers in retailers of Verisign’s WLS. 
(iii) From what has been just said, a number of common remarks can 
be pointed out concerning the two services. First of all, both the SiteFinder 
service and the WLS are registration-related services and each of them affects a 
                                                 
303 In this sense we should probably interpret the statement contained in Thomas v. 
NSI cit. above at footnote 208 (as reported by ICANN in its Motion to dismiss) that there is 
no different market for expired domain names. 
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secondary but related market to the registration of domain names. Moreover, 
in both cases, a competitive market for comparable products already existed 
and Verisign showed its intention to enter and compete therein. However, in 
both markets, the strategy it chose in order to be successful over its rivals is 
characterised by the exploitation of its market power in order to change the 
market structure and eliminate all competitors. A competition problem exists 
because this event does not occur due of the superiority of Verisign’s offer but 
rather because it is in the position to exploit certain features of the market 
upstream in which it holds a monopoly position: Verisign’s position in the 
upstream market of operation of the .com registry enables it not only to 
successfully enter into the related markets but also to do it in such a way as to 
completely change their structure. This kind of action has, indeed, the features 
of a leveraging of dominance with respect to the management of the .com and 
.net to gain market power in the downstream market of the mentioned related 
services. 
As a matter of fact, just because it is the manager of the .com registry, 
Verisign could introduce the wildcard in the database in order to redirect all 
the queries to its own page. By so doing, the queries would not and could not 
reach any competitor; competing services would become unusable and 
competitors would be driven out of the market. The same kind of story can be 
repeated for the WLS: being the registry operator, Verisign could subject the 
provision of the services related to the re-registration of expired domain names 
to a sort of “tax” of 24 USD per year per subscription to registrars and thus to 
registrants, while transform all existing competitors into Verisign’s own 
retailers.  
Verisign claims that its products are technical improvements and that 
blocking their deployment equals to blocking progress and benefits for 
consumers. Verisign’s competitors – and a number of other stakeholders – 
claim the opposite. Moreover, Verisign has pointed out that other registries, 
such as the manager of .museum, do use wildcards similar to the one in 
SiteFinder. However, this last remark cannot constitute a justification:304 in a 
small registry like .museum, a page containing the list of the few hundreds 
registered SLD can indeed be useful as a directory, like a sort of yellow pages 
of all museums belonging to such directory. However, this is a different kind 
of service and with substantially different effects, as compared to SiteFinder: 
                                                 
304 See J. Weinberg cit. at footnote 298, at pages 15 et seq. 
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the aim of a service like SiteFinder is that of providing advertisements and not 
that of offering a comprehensive list of all websites under .com or .net (which 
is unthinkable). 
The goal of protecting competition is to ensure that ultimately 
consumers get the best possible; and this should be a “natural” development of 
the elimination from the market of those who are less good. If Verisign’s 
business model has the effect of altering the market structure in such a way as 
to make it impossible to verify which product consumers would ultimately 
prefer, this would deny the essence of competition itself. Therefore, if 
Verisign’s actions actually have the exclusionary effect lamented by the firms 
currently active in the market defined above, then there are sufficient grounds 
for a claim of abuse of dominance. 
It is true that protecting the market structure would imply that 
competitors are indirectly protected; however, in this kind of cases, allowing 
other firms to compete is the way to assure that consumers will eventually get 
the best product. In other words, Verisign is certainly allowed to compete in 
the market for SiteFinder-like or WLS-like functionalities, but it should do it 
on the merits of its products and not by altering the market structure thereby 
creating a own monopoly. Furthermore, in the case of WLS the introduction 
of the fixed 24 USD fee might actually constitute an additional indication that 
the leverage of monopoly power would lead to an increase in the price, thus 
contributing to substantiate the claim of abuse of dominance. 
Therefore, the claim that the introduction of the two services was 
innovative and benefiting consumers does not seem adequate to contrast a 
claim of being abusive: to the extent that less restrictive means are available, as 
there seem to be, given that a number of companies are already competing in 
different ways in the market, Verisign should use those, instead of employing 
methods substantially harming competition.  
If it is difficult to say ex ante which structure is more efficient and 
therefore preferable, however, as noted also in a different context, the 
observation of the revealed preferences of the undertakings in the market can 
be helpful: if a certain structure has been adopted by firms without market 
power, but not by a firm with market power, “it suggests that it may have 
efficiency benefits.”305 
                                                 
305 See M. Cave cit. at footnote 121, at page 5, discussing the benefits from potential 
vertical integration. 
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A final additional remark is worth mentioning, namely that there is 
actually a difference between WLS and SiteFinder: while for the introduction 
of the former, Verisign “consulted” with ICANN, for the second function, it 
acted directly and started offering the service unilaterally. In the former case, 
therefore, it could be argued that, were it implemented, it is rather a restrictive 
agreement between ICANN and Verisign, than an abusive unilateral conduct. 
A proposed qualification for the WLS is, indeed, that of an exclusive dealing 
agreement,306 since it results in ICANN granting Verisign the exclusivity for 
providing the service of re-assigning expired domain names, at the expense of 
all other operators currently offering the same kind of service. 
The key of the issue is in the contract that binds the two corporations 
and that requires ICANN’s agreement for the supply of “registry services”;307 
thus, the definition of “registry service” is crucial to decide if Verisign actually 
needed to reach an agreement with ICANN. The matter is still sub iudice,308 
however, should the Court rule that WLS is not a “registry service” pursuant to 
the agreement, then Verisign will be free to implement it unilaterally and in this 
case it could be attacked as a form of abuse. 
IV.4 The Market for Root Server Operations 
At the top of the DNS industry, as explained above, there is a layer 
where the economic activity carried on is the operation of the root server. Such 
activity consists of maintaining the database that allows to identify the IP 
address of the operator of the different TLD registries so that their databases 
can be reached in order to continue the query process.309 The activity also 
includes updating the root with the new entries, i.e. new operators wishing to 
run new TLD registries and assuring that in so doing there is no occurrence of 
colliding entries. The expression colliding entries refers to the situation in 
which there are two registries for an identical TLD, thus causing the effect that 
different users trying to resolve the same domain name under that TLD might 
eventually receive different answers or even that the same user might receive 
                                                 
306 See M. Froomkin and M. Lemley, cit. above at footnote 127, at page 150 et seq. 
307 See .com Registry Agreement at section 1.9. 
308 See above at page 62 et seq.  
309 See the description provided above in Section I.1. 
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different answers for the same query if repeated in different times or from 
different computers. 
This activity constitutes a market on its own, since there is no 
substitutability with other products or services. The main economic features of 
this market are emphasized above when describing the DNS industry;310 
therefore I shall refer here to those considerations. 
With respect to the structure of this market, there is basically one main 
operator and a number of small competitors.311 The big operator, ICANN, has 
set up the above described distribution system through a mechanism of 
selection and accreditation of the companies operating in the markets 
downstream. In exchange, those who gain access gain also some participation 
in the constituencies that, in turn, will appoint the members of the board of 
ICANN. The small competitors are those referred to above as alternate root 
server operators.312 ICANN itself is not and cannot operate as registry nor as 
registrar. 
ICANN is not a successful company that conquered the market 
because of its most efficient organization or superior product or astonishing 
innovation. Nor was it the best bidder in an auction. In fact, it did not win any 
competitive battle: it was incorporated after the Internet and the DNS had 
already been created and established as a sort of standard based on non-
proprietary protocols and on open bottom-up consensus and was then granted 
the technical management of such important infrastructure that the Internet 
relies upon.  
Currently, it seems able to dominate the whole domain names industry, 
despite the fact that its efficiency and success are rather questionable.313 
                                                 
310 See Chapter II. 
311 It has actually been argued that none of them, individually taken, constitutes a real 
competitor for the root, since they are rather competing with the TLD registry operators; yet 
their association could be seen as a competitor for ICANN for the provision of the same kind 
of services. See Froomkin and Lemley cit. at footnote 127 at page 138. 
312 See above at page 26 et seq. 
313 See the analysis of the domain name industry conducted above in Section II and 
the one of ICANN in the following sections. 
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IV.4.1 Assessment of dominance 
In Chapter II it has been shown that in the market for root server 
operation a situation of natural monopoly does not occur. Therefore, there is 
no argument for claiming the necessity of conferring exclusive rights to one 
single company.314 And indeed, looking at the MoU and at the other 
agreements between ICANN and the US government, there is nothing that 
aims at granting such rights. Therefore nothing impedes that ICANN be 
subject to normal competitive constraints from those wishing to offer the same 
kind of service, such as the alternate roots.  
However, the fact that the DNS is not a natural monopoly and that a 
few alternative competing networks do exist315 does not exclude that the sole 
operator of the main root might for other reasons occupy a position of 
dominance in the market for root server operations. Yet, for substantiating this 
claim, it is important to verify if the size or importance of the ICANN network 
allows it to behave independently from these alternative network operators, or 
in other words, to exercise market power. 
Currently, the parameters of the computers of the majority of the 
Internet users and of the majority of the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are 
set up in such a way that they point to the A-root managed by ICANN or to its 
copies. Through its network, ICANN controls the vast majority of the domain 
names sold to end users and the penetration of the alternate roots has been 
estimated as “well under 1%” of all Internet users.316  
This fact by itself indicates a condition of dominance (or super-
dominance), according to the European courts’ case law. In fact, there are no 
actual or potential competitors that would be able to constrain ICANN’s 
decisions and behaviour. ICANN is able to decide autonomously how many 
and which TLDs will be visible to the vast majority of Internet users; in other 
                                                 
314 In fact, the presence of a natural monopoly is often been invoked in order to 
justify the need for a regulatory intervention granting exclusive rights for operating the 
fundamental infrastructure. The foundations of such a claim, however, have already been 
disproved by the economic analysis: if the market is a true natural monopoly, the monopolist 
does not need any exclusive right because smaller new entrants will anyway not be able to be 
equally efficient. 
315 See above in Chapter II. 
316 See Lemely and Froomkin, cit. at footnote 127 at page 142. 
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words, ICANN is supplying under monopoly conditions access to its root and 
can determine (and so far has directly determined) the level and type of output.  
Moreover, ICANN is able to autonomously decide who will run the 
database of each TLD and who will sell the registrations. It is commonplace 
that the selection procedures of ICANN are all but transparent and 
accountable. Only recently ICANN, obliged by a deadline set in a clause of the 
MoU317 concluded with the US Department of Commerce, issued a (draft) 
Strategy for Introduction of new Generic Top Level Domains.318 However, 
this short document is seen rather an attempt to formally fulfil its obligation 
than a real effort to set up a clear and transparent framework for prospective 
gTLD operators.319  
Third, ICANN is able to unilaterally determine the “fees” paid to it by 
registrars and registry operators with no connection to the service provided to 
them or to any other condition, except for that arising from its nature of not-
for-profit entity – ICANN can only “earn” enough to cover its costs and not 
to make profits. Notwithstanding this limitation, ICANN has over time 
increased those fees – and its expenditures accordingly.320 
Yet, we can imagine that there is even more than that. As it has been 
noted, in theory the power conferred by the control of the DNS could also be 
used to enforce any kind of regulation of the Internet or to exercise overall 
control over the content circulating on the Web.321 The risk of this kind of 
                                                 
317 Section V.C.8, as substituted by Amendment 6 to the MoU of 16 September 2003 
(Activities ICANN agrees to perform): to “define and implement a predictable strategy for 
selecting new TLDs using straightforward, transparent and objective procedures that preserve 
the stability of the Internet (strategy development to be completed by September 30, 2004 and 
implementation to commence by December 31, 2004)”. See 
http://www.icann.org/general/amend6-jpamou-17sep03.htm, last visited on 3 October 2004. 
318 Published on 30 September 2004 – the final deadline indicated in the MoU – at 
http://icann.org/tlds/new_gtld_strategy.pdf, last visited on 10 October 2004. 
319 See for instance, 
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=04/10/02/0453220&tid  last visited on 27 April 
2005. 
320 See ICANN’s budget of several years, all available at 
http://www.icann.org/financials/, last visited on 19 October 2004. 
321 See M. Froomkin, “Wrong turn in cyberspace: using ICANN to route around the 
APA and the Constitution” in Duke Law Journal, October, 2000, p. 21. However, this Author 
also acknowledges that at present, there are no signs that anyone intends to do it. Nevertheless, 
a significant example of this potential is given by the case of the Afghan TLD that was handed 
over to the US-supported interim authority upon presentation of a letter allegedly signed by 
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“private” regulatory power can also be minimised by competition: if there are 
more networks, compatible with one another, none of them could exercise 
such power, and if one of them did, users would have the possibility of 
deciding to switch to a competing one.322 
ICANN’s dominance is also protected from competitors’ entry into the 
market. The main natural barrier to entry is represented by the network effects 
described above:323 the fact of having been the first, and the actual size of its 
own network make it extremely difficult for new entrants to find their way into 
the market.  
However, although very difficult, it cannot be considered impossible to 
overcome the effects of this kind. The above discussion about compatibility 
and interoperability324 is aimed precisely at this: competitors will not have to 
build a new big network as long as they are able to make themselves 
compatible with the existing one. However, that same discussion highlighted 
that ICANN has no incentive to make itself compatible nor to allow those 
roots to interoperate with it. As a consequence, the existing barriers to entry 
from network effects are reinforced and enhanced by ICANN’s actions aiming 
at excluding or limiting its competitors. ICANN enjoys not only the 
advantages of the advertising and promotional strategies, but also the return in 
image from the fact the sovereign governments consider it as their interlocutor 
for DNS issues. In the European Union, ICANN is even expressly mentioned 
in some regulations.325 ICANN is also often making use of asymmetries in 
information: I am referring here, in particular, to the very common claim of 
“threats to stability of the Internet” used to try and block the emergence of 
certain actions or to re-conduct them within its structure, decision making 
processes, supervision and ultimately budget. This is of course based on the 
assumption that ICANN is the best placed to judge whether a certain conduct 
                                                                                                                            
the previous manager of the registry. Apart from any evaluation of the choice, this example 
just shows the power enjoyed by ICANN. 
322 Even if one shares the opinion that certain content or certain people should 
indeed be banned from the Internet, this is the sort of policy decision that does not rest with a 
corporation for the self-regulation of the domain names business. 
323 In Chapter II.4. 
324 See above at Chapter II.4. 
325 See for instance, the Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council no. 
733/2002 of 22 April 2002 on the implementation of the .eu Top Level Domain, in 2002 OJ L 
113/1, at recital 15. 
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represents a threat to stability. The doubts whether this is true or not, and 
whether ICANN’s judgment in such cases is objective and not biased by other 
kinds of considerations, have most of the times not been enough to 
counterbalance the fears of engendering instability. 
Besides these, there are other actions aiming at excluding competitors 
that might be caught by the prohibition of abusive behaviour pursuant to 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty. They will be analysed in the following section. 
IV.4.2 Problematic conduct 
In this section, I am going to point out a number of actions undertaken 
by ICANN and will analyse them through the lens of the prohibition of abuse 
of dominance. The relevant actions for this purpose are of three kinds: the 
conclusion of exclusive distribution agreements, the refusal to deal with 
alternate roots, the creation of new gTLDs colliding with an existent TLD 
within a competing root server. Each of these actions has the potential of 
foreclosing competition and this feature will be tested against the existence of 
an objective justification in order to substantiate a claim of abusiveness of such 
conduct. 
IV.4.2.1 Exclusive agreements 
ICANN has established a distribution system which includes two 
exclusive dealing obligations on its contractors, namely registries and registrars. 
With respect to the former, registries are prevented from acting in such a way 
as to favour the emergence of competing roots;326 in other words they can 
supply access only to the TLDs authorized by ICANN and cannot 
autonomously decide to run other TLDs registries belonging to alternate roots. 
On the other hand, with respect to the latter (the registrars), ICANN has 
imposed that its accredited registrars cannot supply TLDs belonging to 
                                                 
326 See the criteria for selection of new gTLDs at http://www.icann.org/tlds/tld-
criteria-15aug00.htm (last visited on 8 December 2004) at Section 1: “introduction of the 
proposed TLD should not disrupt current operations, nor should it create alternate root 
systems”. ICANN has also adopted a specific Internet Coordination Policy (binding for the 
participants to the ICANN network) stating the need of having a unique authoritative root. See 
Internet Coordination Policy 3 available at http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-3.htm last visited on 
8 December 2004. 
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alternate roots,327 thus making them exclusive distributors of ICANN-
authorized domain names. 
Exclusive distribution agreements entered into by firms without market 
power are considered in principle as having pro-competitive effects: they are 
helpful to minimise free riding, reduce transaction costs along the distribution 
chain, improve the quality of the service supplied. However, when one of the 
companies involved does have market power, it can use exclusivity to try and 
increase profits at the expense of competitors, by raising their costs, and at the 
expense of consumers by appropriating some of their surplus. These characters 
of so-called vertical agreements, entered into by firms operating at different 
stages of the production/distribution chain, are also acknowledged in 
European competition law.328 
Moreover, EC law also explicitly recognises that a dominant enterprise 
cannot impose non-compete obligations, such as an exclusivity clause, unless it 
can objectively justify it as a commercial practice329 within the framework of 
Article 82.330 It has been noted331 that, whilst for the evaluation of an 
exclusivity agreement under Article 81 it is necessary to examine the effects of 
such agreement on the market,332 the same standard seems not be necessary 
for assessment under Article 82: in other words, if there is dominance, a 
stricter rule applies, according to which these agreements are not prohibited as 
such, but they will be considered abusive if they make competitors’ entry into 
the market more difficult by raising their costs and exceed what is necessary to 
achieve a legitimate goal. As a consequence, this kind of conduct does not fall 
into the category of exploitative abuses, as the dominant firm’s customers are 
not being “oppressed” and might be even willing to enter into such 
                                                 
327 Registrars are also bound to the previously mentioned Internet Coordination 
Policy. The Registrar Accreditation Agreement provides in Section 5.3.6 that the agreement 
shall be terminated in the case a registrar continues acting in a manner “that ICANN has 
reasonably determined endangers the stability or operational integrity of the Internet”.  
328 See, for example, the Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints in OJ of 13 
October 2000, C 291/1. 
329 See above Chapter III. 
330 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints at paragraph 141. 
331 Whish, cit. at footnote 149 at pages 655 et seq.. 
332 Unless it is covered by the Block exemption Regulation no. 2790/1999. 
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agreements;333 it is the exclusionary nature of such contractual provisions that 
matters from the antitrust perspective. 
The anticompetitive effect of the existence of exclusive dealing 
arrangements between ICANN and its registries and registrars is the 
foreclosure of the market to the alternative root operators. As highlighted 
above, the market is already protected by barriers to entry that require 
substantial investment in order to access it. In order to enter into the market, 
alternate roots might decide to subsidise the costs for users’ switch from the 
ICANN system to theirs: for example, they might pay for having ISPs pointing 
at their databases or propose discounts to registrars accepting to sell domain 
names under an innovative non-ICANN TLD. Once alternative roots have 
achieved the critical mass, they would be able to recoup the investment. This 
might be a viable business strategy to overcome the network effects of the 
DNS industry.  
When ICANN precludes its registrars from dealing with alternate 
roots, it is foreclosing one of the few possibilities for them to enter the market 
and compete. The exclusive agreement with registries, on the other hand, 
prevents companies that already have the expertise and have already made the 
kind of investment that would allow them to run multiple TLD registries, from 
actually doing so.  
Along with the exclusivity thus far described, ICANN has also refused 
to allow alternate roots within its network: in the occasion of the selection of 
the new gTLDs and their operators in 2000, those who ran alternate roots or 
dealt with ICANN’s competitors were excluded from the possibility of 
becoming registries.334 This behaviour represents a kind of refusal to deal 
which does not seem justified by business practices: allowing them inside the 
ICANN network would re-conduct them under ICANN’s supervision and 
would make them subject to the obligation to pay fees to ICANN.335 This 
                                                 
333 In general, for there being an abuse, it does not matter that the dominant firm has 
imposed certain obligations or has been asked by the customers to enter into such contracts. 
See judgment Hoffmann-La Roche, cit. at paragraph 89. 
334 See the documents for the selection of new gTLDs, available on ICANN’s 
website at http://www.icann.org/tlds/tld-application-process.htm last visited on 6 December 
2004. 
335 History showed that alternative root operators would actually prefer to become 
ICANN registries: all of them had applied in the first round of selection of new gTLDs, 
making all the necessary investments and paying the relative application fee. 
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action seems rather directed to the ex ante elimination of the incentives to 
become potential competitors: by excluding that alternate roots operators 
could ever be allowed in the main root, ICANN conveys the message that it is 
better to wait and apply for an ICANN-authorized gTLD rather than risking 
own assets with no hope of eventually joining the main network. This risk is 
further enhanced by another kind of action undertaken by ICANN, which will 
be explored in the following subsection, namely the introduction of TLDs 
corresponding to those already offered by alternate roots. 
In the end, such exclusivity agreements and the refusal to deal have as 
their outcome the restriction of the output and the markets, in terms of gTLDs 
and domain names available to consumers. Reduction of output refers not only 
to the restriction by a dominant undertaking of its own output, but also to 
those actions directed at limiting the ability of competitors to increase 
production or develop new techniques. Both initiatives have been undertaken 
in ICANN’s case. Indeed, as pointed out above, ICANN has deliberately 
reduced the number of possible gTLDs and it has acted in order to prevent 
third parties from meeting the demand thus left unsatisfied.  
ICANN’s defence in such cases would refer to the existence of an 
“objective justification” for restricting competition. When ICANN has 
expressed its view about the introduction of new gTLDs in its A-root and 
about alternate root operators – which are both connected to the problem of 
shortage of gTLDs – it has always referred to the need of ensuring the stability 
of the Internet.336 Could the “stability claim” be viewed as an objective 
justification?  
In order to try to give an answer to this question, the problem must be 
first split into the two issues it is composed of: on the one hand, the increase 
of supply of TLDs within the ICANN network itself, and on the other hand 
the increase of supply outside the ICANN network, i.e. by competitors. 
With respect to the first issue, the stability claim is articulated by 
ICANN in the sense that it is not safe for it to add TLDs to the root server 
because this would put in danger the stability of the Internet; therefore it must 
be done very slowly and cautiously. There is, however, convincing evidence 
that such stability claim is overemphasized with respect to the real dangers for 
the Internet because of the introduction of new gTLDs. 
                                                 
336 See for instance the Internet Coordination Policy cited at footnote 326 above and 
the recent draft Strategy for introduction of new TLDs cit. above at page 97. 
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First of all, as mentioned already,337 when the growth of the Internet 
started compelling the enlargement of the name space, a first plan was 
proposed advocating the creation of a competitive environment with about 
150 new registries. This plan was rejected not because it was technically not 
feasible, but for other more political reasons.338 Moreover, quite a few 
ccTLDs, technically equivalent to gTLDs, have constantly been added to the 
root simply upon demand of the interested State, without ICANN being 
technically concerned. Third, other experts further noted that there is in 
principle no technical difference between operating some millions of names 
under .com – as it actually happens – and operating some millions of names in 
the legacy root.339 Finally there is general consensus that, as it was forecasted, 
the addition of the seven new gTLDs in 2000 has not induced noticeable 
changes in the operation of the root. 
The only technical claims that have been recognised are referred not to 
the insertion of new TLDs in the root, but rather to the rate thereof: it is not 
recommended to add millions of TLDs at once because of the harmful effects 
of mistakes in the root server.340 To be sure, another potential harmful effect 
could derive from the increased number of queries to the root servers that 
could put the infrastructure under too much pressure. However, it has been 
observed that this does not depend on the number of TLDs but is a general 
problem of the DNS infrastructure and of its ability to respond to the 
challenge of a growing Internet community: in other words, the number of 
queries does not depend on the number of gTLDs, but rather on the number 
of computers connected to the Internet that send those queries.341  
                                                 
337 See above at page 13. 
338 Ibidem 
339 See Mueller “Towards an economics of domain names” cit. at footnote 45, at 
page 34.  
340 Recently (April 2005) the National Academy of Sciences’ National Research 
Council has released its report on “The Domain Name System and Internet Navigation”, 
where it is stated that there are no purely technical reasons that the root name servers could 
not function with a much larger number of TLDs and that concerning the rate of addition, 
“tens” of new TLDs per year are not deemed to cause serious risks to the stability of the root. 
The report was prepared by a committee that included economists such as Hal Varian and 
Stanley Besen, besides Milton Mueller, technicians and representatives from industry. 
341 Email from the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) Chair Fred Baker to M. 
Mueller, cited by Mueller in “Towards an economics of domain names”, page 35. 
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It has been concluded that, even a conservative approach would 
support the possibility of adding around 50 new TLDs annually without 
incurring in any of the feared problems of instability.342 
With respect to the other part of the problem, the risk of instability 
stemming from the increased supply of TLDs by ICANN’s competitors, the 
argument is that alternate roots will put in danger the universal resolvability of 
domain names by favouring the existence of colliding TLDs. First of all, it is 
clear that this claim cannot be used to justify the refusal to deal with operators 
of alternate roots mentioned above: accepting them into ICANN’s root would 
in fact solve the risk of names collision ab origine.343  
In more general terms, however, this claim has been dealt with already 
supra in this work344 and thus I will simply refer to the remarks put forward 
therein: the mere existence of alternate roots does not necessarily imply name 
collision; in fact, alternate roots’ incentives are rather pushing towards assuring 
interoperability and avoiding names collisions; however, if we allow for more 
than one supplier at the top of the DNS, the coordination costs will necessarily 
increase. The claim of protecting Internet stability echoes another claim put 
forward by dominant operators in the Telecom sector at the beginning of the 
liberalisation age, the claim of “integrity of the network”. In those cases, there 
was some truth in the integrity claim, but most of it was just a last attempt to 
protect a monopolistic position.  
In the case that concerns us today, there is a large consent that 
universal resolution and univocal responses to DNS queries are a very 
important feature for the existence and reliability of the Internet itself. 
Therefore, should the already existing alternate roots’ incentives for 
interoperability not be considered sufficient to reach this goal, what follows is 
not that competition in the root server market should be prevented, but rather 
that it is necessary to impose, in addition, minimum coordination 
obligations.345  
                                                 
342 Ibidem. 
343 In this sense also Froomkin  and Lemley, cit. at footnote 127 at page 149. 
344 See Chapter II, at page 41 et seq. 
345 It has been also remarked that in order to counterbalance the claim of abusing its 
position, ICANN is not free to put forward the justification that competition in the first place 
is undesirable. See Froomkin and Lemley, cit at footnote 127 at page 150. 
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IV.4.2.2 Creation of a colliding TLD 
In the occasion of the first (and last, so far) introduction of new TLDs, 
ICANN approved the creation of the .biz TLD. However, a registry for .biz 
already existed and was run by one of those alternate roots.346 When this 
occurred, the alternate root’s users had to decide whether to stay with the 
current supplier or to switch to ICANN: the original .biz manager was allowing 
them access to both its own and ICANN’s domain names, but when the 
entries in the two networks started to collide, the need for univocal 
resolvability forced the users to decide which one was more worth keeping. 
Keeping the small competitor would mean to lose the whole rest of the 
Internet, which was not a viable option. Therefore, due to ICANN’s position 
in the market and to the network effects, this move, made before the 
competitor had reached a critical mass, determined the redirection of users to 
ICANN, with elimination of the other firm from the market.  
This behaviour has also the features of an abuse of dominance. It 
might be seen as having the characteristics of a tying: users who want access to 
the whole ICANN network must accept to be supplied also with the .biz. 
Tying by a dominant firm is regarded as harmful under competition law 
because it allows such firm to leverage its market power in order to increase its 
dominance or to protect its market position. The .biz example can be in fact 
assimilated to defensive leveraging: by introducing a colliding entry, ICANN 
showed to be an aggressive incumbent that would not hesitate to take actions 
directed to the elimination of a competitor from the market, even putting in 
danger universal resolvability. Potential competitors are effectively discouraged 
from running alternate roots with the danger that their business might 
eventually be disrupted by ICANN. This way, ICANN’s position on the 
market for root server operations would be preserved.347  
Should ICANN put forward, as an objective justification, the legitimate 
business reason of the freedom to introduce a new product for which there is a 
demand by the consumers, it would contradict its own affirmation of the 
                                                 
346 The Atlantic Root Network. See http://www.biztld.net/ last visited on 8 
December 2004. However, after the introduction of the ICANN-authorized .biz, the 
resolution of the  «original» .biz domain was discontinued. 
347 In fact, it is not even necessary to qualify such behaviour as tying. What is 
relevant here is the exclusionary effect of such conduct, which has the characteristics of an 
abuse, in the sense that it influences the structure of the market through methods different 
from those governing normal competition (see above in Section III.1). 
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necessity of universal resolvability: since the “product” in question was already 
supplied on the market, it is ICANN that is risking colliding entries and not the 
competitor. Such a claim would in fact amount to stating the necessity of 
having a monopoly on the supply of TLDs and that this monopoly should be 
that of ICANN. However, it has already been discussed348 that there is no 
necessary link between universal resolvability and monopolistic supply of 
TLDs, as the goal of having non colliding entries can be achieved in a way that 
is much less restrictive for competition, namely interconnection and reciprocal 
compatibility, principle that is precisely what ICANN has disregarded. 
IV.5 The concept of undertaking and the applicability of EC 
Competition Law 
The analysis undertaken in the previous sections relied on the 
assumption that the EC law abuse of dominant position would apply to the 
facts and entities discussed above. Yet, such claim must also be substantiated. 
In fact, in order to establish the applicability of EU competition law over the 
matters highlighted above, beside ascertaining the restrictive ability of any 
particular behaviour on competition, it is necessary also to verify that the 
concerned entities are actually undertakings for the purposes of Article 82 of 
the Treaty and that there is European jurisdiction in the first place.  
The position of the European Commission with respect to the latter 
problem has been made clear already at the time when the new setting for 
DNS Governance was being discussed: “Any system for allocating domain 
names that will be used by companies operating in the EU/EEA is capable of 
affecting competition in the EU/EEA.”349 Indeed, for EC Competition law to 
apply, it is not of particular concern that some of the entities concerned are 
non-EU undertaking as long as they engage in conducts directly affecting the 
European market. Apart from those cases, in which they deal with European 
undertakings,350 even when no European undertaking is involved, it is 
                                                 
348 See above at page 46 et seq. 
349 DG IV (former denomination of DG Competition) official K. Coates in his 
speech “Competing for the Internet” given on 1 February 1998, prior to the incorporation of 
ICANN, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1998_006_en.html last visited on 
27 October 2004. 
350 Like British Telecom, as one of the accredited registrars. 
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sufficient that there are “immediate and substantial” effects in the Community. 
To this respect, there is no doubt that the distribution of domain names has a 
substantial relevance within the European market.351  
EC competition law applies, however, only to “undertakings”, and 
therefore it is necessary to ascertain whether the entities involved in the 
domain names business fall into the definition of undertaking provided by the 
European Court of Justice. The concept of undertaking is a Community 
concept and includes every entity exercising an economic activity, regardless of 
its legal qualification under national law and of its way of financing.352 Also the 
concept of economic activity has been defined by the Court in the sense that it 
encompasses every activity consisting of providing goods or services on a 
particular market.353  
There is little doubt that domain name registrars meet this definition, as 
they offer the registration services to customers in exchange of a price, and the 
same can be said of the operators of the TLD registries, providing the (paid) 
service of management of the TLD directories. This conclusion holds also for 
those entities being characterized as public or not-for-profit, as in the case of 
some ccTLD operators. 
With respect to ICANN, this conclusion still holds. ICANN offers the 
service of management of the legacy root in exchange of the payment of some 
fees and organises a distribution chain to provide domain names to end-users; 
this activity falls also into the definition of economic activity and can therefore 
be subject to EC competition law. The complicated and technical nature of the 
services offered, according to other ECJ’s judgments, does not justify any 
exemption from this qualification.354 
                                                 
351 See judgments Wood Pulp, case 89/85, of 1988 in ECR 5193 and Gencor v. 
Commission, of 1999, case T-102/96, in ECR II-753. 
352 Cfr. judgments Höfner and Elser, of 23 April 1991, case 41/90, in ECR p. I-1979, 
no. 21; Fédération française des sociétés d'assurance, of 16 November 1995, case C-244/94, in 
ECR p. I-4013, no. 14, and Job Centre II, of 11 December 1997, case C-55/96, in ECR p. I-
7119, no 21. 
353 Judgment Commission v. Italy of 18 June 1998, case C-35/96, in ECR p. I-3851, 
no. 36. 
354 See, about the same discussion with respect to professions like attorneys or 
medical doctors, judgment Pavlov of 12 September 2000, cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 in ECR 
p. I-6451, no. 77. 
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Some problems could arise with respect to the “public interest” that 
could be connected with the management of the legacy and to the role of the 
national Governments in the decisions and policies enacted by ICANN.  
However, since the beginning of the discussions preceding the creation 
of ICANN, despite the fact that some commentators had advocated full 
antitrust immunity for the prospective US government contractor, the US 
Government, however, refused to grant such immunity. The White Paper, 
indeed, states that potential antitrust liability “will provide accountability and 
protection for the international Internet community” and that as any other 
corporation, also ICANN should anticipate the risk of legal challenges.355 The 
European Commission itself anticipated the necessity of a notification 
pursuant to European competition rules, of the proposed system because of its 
“private sector nature.”356 
Moreover, since the creation of this corporation, its private and 
independent nature was repeatedly stressed by the US Government itself, 
which neither issued binding guidelines for ICANN’s activity nor was ever 
consulted in the process of issuing new policies or other interventions. 
Moreover, the US government has not exercised any active supervision over 
the activities performed by ICANN and has, at instances, limited itself to 
rubber-stamp the decisions taken by ICANN’s board and staff.357 It has to be 
noted that the US Congress has from time to time shown some concerns 
about ICANN’s functioning and sometimes even called for a direct 
intervention, but no concrete measures have been undertaken so far. 
Moreover, albeit in a case related to different issues, recently an American 
court has ruled that ICANN is not a government actor.358 The American 
                                                 
355 See White Paper, cit at footnote 38 at point 9. “Competition Concerns”. 
356 See the Communication from the European Commission to the European 
Parliament and to the Council of 29.7.1998, COM(1998) 476, final: “Internet Governance. 
Management of Internet Names and Addresses. Analysis and assessment form the European 
Commission of the United States Department of Commerce White Paper”. It is not clear 
whether the ICANN system was in fact ever notified pursuant to the rules of procedure in 
place at the time (i.e. Regulation 17 of 1962). In any case, no decision has been taken by the 
Commission on this issue and none is likely to come: pursuant to the new regulation on the 
application of antitrust rules (Regulation 1/2003) no notification is necessary any more and all 
notifications already sent elapsed on the day Regulation 1/2003 entered into force. 
357 See Froomkin and Lemley cit. at footnote 127, at page 130; see also M. Mueller 
Ruling the root, cit. at footnote 23. 
358 Reported by http://domaine.blogspot.com/. The case is McNeil v. Verisign, 
decision unpublished, and reportedly concerned issues of freedom of expression.  
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scholarship359 that studied the position of ICANN seems inclined to qualify 
ICANN’s status as of a private enterprise.360 
Finally, it can be noted that ICANN has been sued in a number of 
antitrust actions in the USA:361 in those, even when the claims were dismissed, 
the defendant did not argue and the Court did not rule that ICANN was 
immune from antitrust law. It seems, therefore, possible to conclude that 
ICANN is a private enterprise and, consequently, to consider it subject to 
antitrust scrutiny also in Europe. 
                                                 
359 See Froomkin and Lemley, cit. at footnote 127, at p. 102 et seq.  
360 From a different point of view, some scholars complain about the lack of 
legitimacy, if ICANN is to be considered as a public body or agency. Cfr. M. Froomkin “Form 
and substance in cyberspace”, of 10 April 2002, in Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law, 
vol.6, 2002, p. 105, also available at Froomkin’s website 
http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/formandsubstance.pdf (last visited on 8 
December 2004). Yet, this does not change the substance of the current approach: in the 
absence of legitimacy as public body, ICANN cannot be but a private undertaking. 
361 See above at page 62. 
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V. THE EU AND THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
V.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I have discussed the assessment of some 
behaviour of dominant firms in the domain names markets according to 
European competition law. Given that the conclusion of the previous analysis 
is that it would be possible to consider such behaviour as abusive, one might 
wonder what the actual European involvement in such issues has been. 
European concerns about the Internet governance, although not as deep-
rooted as American ones,362 are nevertheless not new-found. At the time when 
the future organisation of the Internet governance was being decided in the 
mid-Nineties, the European Commission took an active role to have its voice 
heard. The Official Journal gives us numerous testimonies of the inter-
institutional Communications,363 and other notes were addressed to the US 
Government.364 The main concerns were the European participation to the 
decisions concerning the new system of Internet Governance and the 
internationalisation of the DNS, perceived as a global resource and therefore 
to be subtracted from US exclusive control.365 The Commission shared the 
concerns, expressed also by other observers, about the establishment of a 
competitive environment in the domain names markets. In more recent times, 
in the wake of the launch of ICANN reform, the Commission was again 
                                                 
362 A presentation of the reasons for the European lag with respect to the interest 
and the involvement in the governance of the Internet is carried out by R. Werle; this Author 
argues that the European lack of interest in the Internet until the mid-nineties is mainly due to 
the institutional framework, to the existence of national monopolies in the telecom sector and 
to the “blindness” of the European institutions in timely recognising the central role of the 
Internet while redesigning the European telecommunications policy. See R. Werle, “Internet @ 
Europe: Overcoming Institutional fragmentation and policy failure”, in European Integration 
online Papers (EioP) vol. 5 (2001) n° 7 of 25.6.2001; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-
007.htm last visited on 27 September 2004. 
363 See below at footnotes 367, 369 and 372 and accompanying text. 
364 Reply to the European Community and its member States to the US Green 
Paper, Communication of the Council and the Commission to the Department of Commerce, 
archived at 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/InternetGovernance/MainDocuments/R
eplytoUSGreenPaper.html last visited on 27 September 2004. 
365 See M. Mueller Ruling the root cit. above at footnote 23 at page 150 and 172. 
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involved in the negotiations and pushed for an enhancement of the role of the 
ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee366 to which it actively participates 
and holds the functions of Secretariat.  
The aim of this chapter is to give a brief overview of the EU approach 
to the Internet Governance, pointing out in particular the antitrust concerns 
showed and the initiatives undertaken by the European institutions during the 
course of the evolution of the governance system for domain names. The 
efforts for the creation of the .eu TLD will be also presented. Lastly, a problem 
peculiar to the European legal system will be analysed, concerning the practice 
of some national ccTLDs and the arguable anticompetitive nature thereof. 
V.2 The European Commission’s actions in the Internet Governance 
arena 
The European Commission first voiced its worries in the wake of the 
publication of the US DoC Green Paper, with its Communication of 20 
February 1998.367 As said above, the main concern was the European 
participation to the new governance system; however, the Commission pointed 
out also the problem of the “natural monopoly position” occupied by manager 
of the IP addresses and of the DNS “for practical purposes” and of its exercise 
of “certain regulatory functions”, while not having a clear status under 
European competition law; moreover, the structural separation of registry and 
registrar function was not deemed enough to enable competition in the domain 
names markets; finally, similarly to the telephone sector, the Commission urged 
that domain names portability and scalability be ensured.368  
In the subsequent Communication of 29 July 1998, that followed the 
issue of the US DoC White Paper,369 the Commission seemed to have been 
                                                 
366 See above at page 24. 
367 Communication to the Council from the Commission “International Policy Issues 
related to Internet Governance”, of 20 February 1998, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/eif/InternetPoliciesSite/InernetGovernance/MainDocuments/Co
mmunicationof20_february_1998.html, last visited on 27 September 2004. The concerns 
expressed in this communication were repeated in the Reply to the Green Paper, sent to the 
US DoC on 16 March 1998 (cit. above at footnote 364). 
368 Ibidem. 
369 See the Communication from the European Commission to the European 
Parliament and to the Council of 29.7.1998, COM(1998) 476, final: “Internet Governance. 
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globally satisfied of the response of the US Government to the comments 
highlighted in the previous communications, in particular with respect to the 
issue of “internationalisation” of the DNS;370 however, it kept stressing the 
importance of an antitrust assessment of the new system and anticipated the 
necessity of the notification thereof.371 In a new Communication of 
7.4.2000,372 the Commission restated, among other comments, its intention to 
actively participate in the management of the Internet and “to monitor 
developments in the Internet Naming and Addressing system from the point 
of view of competition policy”.373 It also reported that it had focused, in 
particular, on the effects of the agreements entered into by the US DoC, 
ICANN and NSI374 concerning NSI’s operation of the then three existing 
registries .com, .net and .org conditioned to the dismissal of the registrar 
business; in this respect, the Commission had concluded that “they broadly 
responded to the main competition concerns that the Commission had 
identified” and thus the investigation was closed.375 
However, the Commission was still keeping its eyes on the issue of the 
possible competition concerns stemming from the concurrence within the 
same entity of both the registry and the registrar business: the launch of 
another investigation is reported in 1999, concerning “Internet agreements” in 
order to assess their compatibility with European competition law.376 The 
Commission was troubled that NSI could discriminate against competing 
registrars in favour of its own registrar, that it would not be subject to the same 
rules as the other registrars, that domain name portability across competing 
                                                                                                                            
Management of Internet Names and Addresses. Analysis and assessment form the European 
Commission of the United States Department of Commerce White Paper”. 
370 The Commission defines the assessment of the White Paper “generally 
favourable” at point 3 of the said Communication.  
371 As mentioned above in footnote 356, there is no indication that such notification 
ever took place. 
372 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament of 7.4.2000, COM(2000) 202: “The organisation and Management of the Internet. 
International and European Policy Issues 1998-2000”. 
373 Id. at page 24, sub “10 Conclusions”. 
374 See above at page 16 et seq. 
375 See Communication of 7.4.2000 at page 13 sub “5.3 ICANN accreditation of 
competing Registrars”. 
376 European Commission Press Release of 29 July 1999 IP/99/596. 
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registrars could be deterred by the policy of the dominant one. In particular the 
possible discrimination in favour of NSI own registrar was continuously felt 
until NSI’s successor Verisign eventually proceeded with the divestiture of the 
registrar branch.377 To date, no final decision has been taken on this matter by 
the Commission, and it seems rather unlikely that such a step would be 
undertaken now that the divestiture has been completed. 
The EU was active in the domain names arena also with respect to a 
different issue: another part of the EU strategy for the Internet Governance, 
often mentioned in the same Communications cited above, was the 
introduction of a TLD .eu. Currently, the European Union is the assignee of 
the second level domain “eu” in the TLD .int. However, the EU was interested 
in the creation of .eu as a top level domain itself, in order to encourage cross-
border electronic commerce within the Union and to offer a EU-Internet 
identity to those companies wishing to establish an EU-wide Internet 
presence.378 To reach this goal, the EU, as any other entity wishing to run a 
TLD, needs to have it added to the legacy root and thus it turned its manager, 
ICANN.  
The process for the creation of such TLD proved to be rather 
complex. To begin with, the TLD .eu is peculiar because it is not a generic one, 
but it is not even a country-code TLD, since the EU is not a country and was 
not originally listed in the ISO standard which ICANN/IANA refer to when 
adding new ccTLDs to the root.379 Moreover, ICANN expects that the 
prospective .eu registry operator signs a contract that would bind it to 
ICANN’s policies. All these kinds of problems were probably among the 
causes of the length of the process of introducing the .eu. The slowness of the 
machinery of the EU further contributed to the delay:380 it took two 
                                                 
377 See above at footnote 51 and accompanying text. 
378 The Commission’s Information Society DG maintains a website containing the 
information on this matter is 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ecomm/all_about/todays_framework/publi
c_resources/names_addresses/eu_creation/index_en.htm last visited on 8 December 2004. 
379 Sceptics provocatively started calling for a .nato, .nafta or other international 
organisations’ acronyms. However, the eu abbreviation was eventually added to the standard 
and this issue was solved. 
380 “Empirical evidence indicates that the European Union is just slightly closer than 
the moon. It took eight years between President Kennedy’s speech announcing the goal of 
putting an American on the moon and Neil Armstrong’s and Buzz Aldrin’s historic steps. On 
the other hand, it looks like it will take only about seven years between the time European 
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regulations381 and a decision382 before the registry operator was selected;383 the 
contract for the management of the .eu registry was finally entered into in 
October 2004.384 At the time of writing the remaining step is to conclude 
negotiations385 with ICANN to have the .eu put in the root, before starting 
with the pre-registrations, sunrise period,386 and then finally the actual 
registration of domain names under .eu. 
The two regulations set up the principles governing the .eu TLD and 
the registration policy that the registry operator shall follow: physical persons 
resident in the EU and legal persons established therein are eligible for a 
domain name under .eu; first come, first served is the principle that will govern 
registrations, except for the preliminary phase in which only the holders of 
prior rights can be assigned a domain name; the registry operator will enter 
into an agreement wit ICANN; separation of the registry and registrars 
functions shall be assured; an alternative dispute resolution procedure shall be 
                                                                                                                            
Commission decided to institute a .eu TLD and the time that domain is expected to go ‘live’. 
As long as there are no unexpected delays”. See 
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=04/10/19/221202&mode=thread last visited on 20 
October 2004. 
381 Regulation no. 733/2002 cit. above at footnote 325 and Commission Regulation 
No 874/2004 of 28 April 2004, laying down public policy rules concerning the implementation 
and functions of the .eu Top Level Domain and the principles governing registration, in 2004 
OJ L 162/40. 
382 Commission Decision of 21 May 2003 on the designation of the .eu Top Level 
Domain Registry C(2003) 1624 in 2003 OJ CL 128/29. 
383 EURid, a consortium including the national registries of Italy, Belgium and 
Sweden. See http://www.eurid.org. 
384 See the 12 October 2004 news release: European Commission signs contract with 
.eu Registry” at 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetail.cfm?item_id=1383 
last visited on 20 October 2004. 
385 Despite years of talks about the .eu TLD, it seems that it will take nine more 
months to carry on the necessary negotiations between ICANN and the appointed registry 
operator, EURid. Recently, ICANN and the Commission have announced that “ICANN's 
board took steps to authorize the delegation of .EU as a ccTLD, and for ICANN Staff to enter 
into an agreement with EURid and to complete the delegation of .EU”. See the announcement 
at http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-23mar05.htm and the factsheet 
issued by the Commission at http://europa.eu.int/information_society/doc/factsheets/017-
doteu.pdf last visited on 27 April 2005. 
386 This expression designates the period of time, prior to the actual opening of the 
registrations, in which the holders of Trademarks and other rights can already request the 
assignment of the corresponding domain name. 
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established taking into account the indications of the WIPO and using as 
model ICANN’s UDRP. 
The overall approach of the EU to the Internet Governance is shown 
in the account of the facts given above. It can be noted, indeed, that in the 
global debate over the governance of the Internet and the management of its 
essential infrastructure – i.e. the DNS – the EU and its member States were 
watchful but did not take the lead for the definition of an alternative system of 
governance; the Commission rather left the lead to the US Government and 
limited its criticism to pointing out some issues supposed to be of particular 
European concern. In fact, the EU showed to have accepted the existence of a 
US-based ICANN-managed DNS: the Commission encouraged national 
ccTLD registries to participate to ICANN’s ccNSO387 and in the process for 
the introduction of a European Top Level Domain .eu, as just mentioned, it 
elected to go through the mechanisms of ICANN system, by negotiating the 
addition of the .eu to ICANN’s legacy  root.388  
At the end, the major achievement of the Commission can be 
identified in the enhanced role of the ICANN’s Governmental Advisory 
Committee (GAC) and in its own participation therein. Truly, on the one hand, 
this confers to the European Commission the power to push through some 
policies from within ICANN’s structure; however, on the other hand, it 
implies acceptance of such structure in the first place: the Commission finds 
thus itself “bound”, so to say, to a set of agreements and an organisation that 
proved to be the source of major problems, of the kind highlighted in the 
previous chapters, and that the GAC is ill-suited to address and solve. The 
European Union’s Presidency has moreover stated in the occasion of the 
aforementioned UN Working Group on Internet Governance, its support to 
“existing mechanisms or institutions”, albeit stressing at the same time the 
need for governmental role with respect to “principle issues of public 
policy”.389 Therefore, it is not clear whether the Commission will be willing to 
intervene against one of the entities of the ICANN system or against ICANN 
                                                 
387 Already in the Communication of 7.4.2000 cited at footnote 372. More recently, 
see Speech/04/191 of 15.4.2004 given by then Commissioner for Information Society Erkki 
Liikanen at the SIDN event in the Hague “Internet Governance the way ahead”. 
388 This was not an obligatory route, if it is true, as it seems, that China issued own 
TLDs without negotiating with ICANN. See above at footnote 147. 
389 Statement of the EU Presidency at the third meeting of the WGIG 18-20 April 
2005, available at http://www.wgig.org/meeting-april.html. 
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itself by using the powers conferred to it, for instance, in the enforcement of 
competition, or will elect to limit itself to its consultative role within the GAC. 
V.3 A particular problem with European ccTLDs 
One of the points raised by the Commission in the 2000 
Communication390 was that the registration policies of ccTLDs should be 
“consistent with the principles of the Internal Market and EU Competition 
policy”.391 With respect to this issue, indeed, a particular problem seems to 
arise for some of the national ccTLDs that impose nationality or residence in 
the country in order to qualify for a domain name in that country’s TLD. 
Before addressing the point, it is useful to recall some features of ccTLDs and 
to give a short overview of the national registration practices. 
V.3.1 ccTLDs and their registration practices in the EU 
As said before, there are in total 257 registries: 14 gTLDs and 243 
ccTLDs.392 However, the statuses of ccTLD and of gTLD registries are quite 
different. Differently from gTLDs, national registries are not bound by the 
obligation to keep registrar and registry functions separated and indeed many 
of them perform both types of operations, sometimes making use of additional 
retailers. ccTLD registries, especially the ones pre-existing to the creation of 
ICANN, still enjoy some degree of independence from ICANN and are not 
bound by registry contracts, although from the technical point of view they 
rely on the same hierarchy. Only with respect to new ccTLD registry operators 
and to those that have been re-delegated, ICANN has succeeded in negotiating 
special registry agreements.  
                                                 
390 Cited above at footnote 372. 
391 Repeated twice in Section 5.7 and in the Conclusions of the Communication of 
7.4.2000, respectively at page 15 and page 24. 
392 Leaving out the .arpa TLD, not open to the public and used exclusively for 
technical infrastructure purposes, see http://www.iana.org/arpa-dom/ last visited on Nov. 18, 
2003. 
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Yet, the existing national registries seem to be in a position allowing 
them not to accept the agreement if they are not satisfied with it,393 although 
ICANN has shown to hold the power to take away the management of a 
registry from an organization in order to give it to a different one.394 ICANN 
could, in principle, also decide to exercise the power to exclude a whole 
country from the Internet.395 
There are, therefore, good reasons for cautiousness on both sides, due 
to the political implication of the exercise of some power by an American 
corporation upon a foreign organization managing a resource which is 
perceived as closely connected with the national (Internet) identity of a 
different country.396 The analysis conducted in the previous chapters is 
therefore, only partly extendable to ccTLDs.  
As acknowledged by the European Commission, however, ccTLDs can 
be the source of a different sort of concern in a European perspective, in 
connection with the establishment of internal market and the application of 
competition principles. This concern may refer to the requirement of residence 
or establishment in a country as condition to register a domain name under 
that country’s ccTLD.  
                                                 
393 And they are definitely not, because it would mean to lose independence and to 
be obliged to pay increasing annual fees to ICANN. On this point, see the letter of 16.5.2004 
from the CENTR (Council of European National TLD Registries http://www.centr.org) to 
ICANN’s CEO concerning ICANN budget: “the budget figures and the contribution asked 
from ccTLDs are unrealistic and inappropriate”. 
394 As it has happened in the case of the manager of the ccTLD .au for Australia. 
However, when it happened, it was with the consent or the request of the State concerned. 
From a purely technical point of view, ICANN could independently decide so, but it is unlikely 
that it will do it in opposition to the will of the country in question. In other words, ICANN’s 
technical power and the interested Government’s political power made it possible.  
395 An example is given by the unclear suspension of the operation of the Libyan 
TLD for some days in 2003 or the case already mentioned of the Afghan TLD that was 
handed over to the US-supported interim authority upon presentation of a letter allegedly 
signed by the previous operator of the registry.  
396 The Commission has clearly stated in its Communication of 7.4.2000 cited at 
footnote 372, that “ICANN’s direct authority over the ccTLD Registries should be limited to a 
few very critical technical parameters. National ccTLDs’ registration policies are a matter 
between the Registry and its local Internet Community and the relevant government or public 
authority” (section 5.7 at page 15). 
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It is interesting to note that a national Registry397 that previously 
imposed residence requirements and then eliminated them, acknowledged that 
it was contrary to EU rules and went even further:398 
IIS believes EU law will in the long term preclude it from 
preventing registrations of legal entities domiciled within the EU [but outside 
of Sweden]. To impose restrictions only to the EU seems rather pointless, and 
IIS believes that interest abroad in registering an .se domain is going to be 
limited. It is also rather easy for those who wish to register an .se domain to 
circumvent the regulations by registering a partnership or similar in any EU 
country.399 
Surveying the ccTLD registration practices in the 25 Member States, it 
emerges, in fact, that the vast majority of the States do not put any restriction 
on registration based on nationality/residence/establishment. In a number of 
cases it is explicitly stated in the Naming rules that any natural or legal person 
is entitled to register a domain name under a given ccTLD (.gr, .nl, .lu, .se). 
Some registries that in the past had put restrictions on registration, have now 
removed them.400  
In a few countries, on the contrary, the naming rules adopted do 
contain some restrictions. Apart from those requiring a “connection” or “link” 
to the concerned country and those requiring a contact person in the 
country,401 there is a handful of countries requiring residency for natural 
                                                 
397 The Swedish Internet Infrastructure Foundation, in charge of delineating the 
registration policies for the .se TLD. 
398 In “Liberalized regulations for registration of domain names under .se”, report by 
the Regulations Committee, Edition 3.0, Stockholm, 6 June 2002, available at 
http://www.iis.se/meta/bilaga_slutrapport3.0_eng.pdf, last visited on 7 June 2004. 
399 ibidem, under “C. Eligibility to register under .se”. 
400 This is the case for the Italian one that now requires the entity applying for a .it 
domain name to be established in the EU, and the Swedish one that has adopted the policy of 
granting registration to all natural and legal persons that so wish. Slovenia has also changed its 
policy very recently, while it used to consider eligible for a .si domain only: commercial entities 
with principal offices in Slovenia which are inscribed in the Business Registry; main 
subsidiaries of foreign commercial entities engaged in activities on the Slovenian territory and 
inscribed in the Registry; diplomatic and consular representative offices of foreign States; 
international organization of which Slovenia is a member. 
401 Like Ireland, whose naming rules contain also a list of situation that can be 
interpreted as “connection” or interest in the concerned country. Interesting also the case of 
Cyprus, giving “preference” to entities that actually carry on business in Cyprus. 
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persons or inscription in the national Registry for companies: Spain, Finland, 
France and among the new Member States Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia. 
In Spain, the assignment of domain names under the .es is subject to 
quite some degree of regulation through a bunch of national decrees and 
orders. The naming rules state that “Assignment of a regular domain name will 
be to Spanish or foreign natural persons with legal residency in Spain and 
organisations with their own legal personality constituted according to Spanish 
Law, registered with the corresponding Public Spanish Register (Registro 
Público Español).”402 
Also Finland has a legislative act on domain names, in which it is stated 
that: “A legal person, a private entrepreneur, a Finnish public body, an 
unincorporated state enterprise, an independent public corporation, a public 
association, and a diplomatic mission of a foreign state registered in Finland 
may apply for a domain name.”403 
In France, the entity entrusted with the assignment of domain names is 
Afnic, a not-for-profit association that requires “legal existence” on the French 
territory, which is explained as domicile for natural persons and establishment 
for legal persons.404 
                                                 
402 Point 2.1 of the Rules. The Rules are available in English at 
https://www.nic.es/ingles/rules.html last visited on 3 November 2004. 
403 Section 5.3 of the Act on Domain Names of January 2003. An explanation can be 
found in the instructions on the website of the registry, available at 
https://domain.ficora.fi/fiDomain/aca.aspx, last visited on 7 June 2004, sub “Who can apply 
for a domain name”. as: 
“A company or a community entered into the Finnish Trade Register, the 
Finnish Register of Associations or the Finnish Register of Foundations, or a 
corporation within the Finnish public sector, may exclusively apply for a 
domain name. It is not possible to apply before the registration is final. 
Therefore, a pending registration does not do”. 
404 The criteria reported on the website 
http://www.afnic.fr/obtenir/chartes/nommage-fr#4 (last visited on 3 November 2004) 
identify as entitled to a .fr domain name: “legal entities: (1) whose head office is in France; (or), 
(2) which possess an address in France which is expressly listed in the public electronic 
databases of the registrars of the commercial courts or the National Statistical and Economic 
Studies Institute (INSEE), (or), (3) State institutions or departments, local authorities or 
associated establishments, (or), (4) which own a trademark registered with the National 
Intellectual Property Institute or own a registered EU or international trademark which 
expressly includes French territory; natural persons: (1) of French nationality; (or), (2) of foreign 
nationality who are domiciled in France; (or), (3) who own a trademark registered with the 
National Intellectual Property Institute or own a registered EU or international trademark 
which expressly includes French territory”. 
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Among the new member States, the Estonian national registry, in the 
FAQs available on its website,405 makes it clear that a company must be 
registered in Estonia in order to get a registration under both .ee and .com.ee. 
The same rule applies in Hungary,406 with the difference that registrations of 
third level domains under a predefined SLD are open, and that also foreign 
companies with a registered Trademark in Hungary are eligible for a .hu 
(similarly to France). Furthermore, Slovak rules407 require the user of the 
domain to be either a firm which is entitled to run a business in Slovakia or a 
physical person who is a Slovak citizen or a entrepreneur in Slovakia.  
V.3.2 Competition and internal market issues 
The above indicated restrictions for obtaining a domain name under a 
national ccTLD, based on residence or inscription in the national companies’ 
Registry might create a competitive disadvantage for businesses established in 
another Member State and a limitation to their freedom to provide services 
without being established. 
Provided that the relevant market is the one for the concerned ccTLD, 
as TLDs are not substitutable with each other for the reasons highlighted 
above,408 ccTLD registry operators hold a dominant position with respect to 
the assigment of domain names under the ccTLD they are in charge of: 
obviously, the ccTLD operator is the only supplier of domain names under 
that TLD, unilaterally deciding the price, the requirements, the timing and so 
on. 
It follows from what has just been said that the registry operator of a 
national TLD is in the position of abusing and the imposition of residence 
obligations could indeed be seen as abusive pursuant to Article 82 of the 
Treaty. 
                                                 
405 The English version is available at 
http://www.eenet.ee/services/subdomains.html last visited on 3 November 2004. 
406 http://www.domain.hu/domain/English/szabalyzat.html last visited on 3 
November 2004. 
407 https://www.sk-nic.sk/ last visited on 3 November 2004. 
408 See above at page 72 et seq. 
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The precedents of the European courts support the view that the 
behaviour of escluding non resident or non established registrants can be 
qualified as abusive under European competition rules. In the GVL case, 
indeed, the Court held that “refusal by an undertaking having a de facto 
monopoly to provide its services for all those who may be in need of them but 
who do not come within a certain category of persons defined by the 
undertaking on the basis of nationality or residence must be regarded as an 
abuse of a dominant position.”409 
Also the European Commission has followed a similar line of 
reasoning in the Football World Cup 1998 case,410 where it acknowledged that 
the de facto monopolist had a prima facie obligation to supply customers 
throughout the EEA without discriminating on the basis of residence, subject 
to exceptions to be carefully and individually assessed. According to the 
Commission, this conclusion holds even if the demand from foreign customers 
was expected to be relatively small as compared to the demand from 
nationals411 and even considering that other – arguably less effective – 
distribution channels were available to them.412 In this case, restrictive 
conditions of sale and restrictions of distribution channels for customers that 
did not have a residence in France was regarded as having “the effect of 
imposing unfair trade conditions on residents outside France which resulted in 
a limitation of the market to the prejudice of those consumers.”413 
For what concerns the case of domain names, it is indubitable that one 
of the main advantages of the Internet is precisely that it allows companies to 
conduct their business real time, regardless of the location of the undertaking 
and of its premises. For certain online activities, physical existence is not 
                                                 
409 Case 7/82, GVL [1983] ECR 483, para. 56. In this case, the German copyright 
management society conducted its activities in such a way that any foreign artist who was not 
resident in Germany was not in a position to benefit from rights of secondary exploitation, 
even if he could show that the law of some other state recognized the same rights. 
410 Commission Decision of 20 July 1999, 2000/12/EC, case IV/36.888, in OJ 2000 
L 5/55. The case concerned the sale of a certain category of entry tickets for the matches of 
the World Cup: customers were required to have French residence or to provide an address in 
France. 
411 Decision Football World Cup 1998 at paragraph 87.  
412 Ibidem at paragraph 94. 
413 Ibidem at paragraphs 87 and 91. 
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required at all414 and physical proximity to the customer is not an issue. 
Internet existence and Internet proximity (and reach) is, instead, an issue. 
As a matter of fact, it seems understandable that a company carrying on 
its business in a Member State different from the one where it is established, 
will find the registration of a “local” domain name useful and sometimes 
necessary in order to facilitate marketing and contacts with clients in that 
country, as it is reasonable to expect that they will generally look for websites 
registered under their TLD. 
The argument that the non-established company is not prevented from 
carrying on its business in a specific country, but only from using a domain 
name under the ccTLD of that country is not conclusive. The European Court 
of Justice has already recognised that depriving a company of “a rapid and 
direct technique for marketing and for contacting potential clients in other 
Member States” constitutes a restriction of the freedom to provide cross-
border services.415 More specifically from an antitrust point of view, the 
residence obligation puts the foreign company at competitive disadvantage 
because the extra burden of obtaining an inscription in the local Companies’ 
Registry in order to subsequently obtain a domain name, increases its costs for 
entering and operating in the market. 
The argument that the restriction is objectively justified by the need to 
protect consumers, because they connect the ccTLD with residence in the 
concerned country and can therefore be misled is contradicted by several facts. 
First, it is contradicted by the practice of the majority of the European ccTLD 
registries’ policy416 that do not require any proof of residence, without fearing 
to betray consumers’ reliance and expectations. The argument is further 
questioned by the registration policy of some well-known examples of ccTLDs 
that capture Internet users’ attention not certainly for the link with the country 
they officially “belong”, but rather for their distinctive ability. An obvious 
example is the .tv ccTLD with respect to which it is reasonable to exclude that 
customers will rely on any link of, for instance www.milionario.tv or 
                                                 
414 Besides a computer connected to the Internet and possibly some person at the 
keyboard. 
415 Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments [1995] ECR I-1141, para. 28. The case 
concerned a prohibition of making unsolicited telephone calls to (potential) foreign customers 
for marketing purposes. 
416 See above in the previous sub-section. 
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www.distrettodipolizia.tv417 with the Pacific Island of Tuvalu. The claim that 
consumers rely on the physical existence in a specific country of the company 
running a website under the ccTLD of that country, seems therefore 
unfounded. 
The related argument of the reduction in the “traceability” of websites 
operators once the residence requirement is waived can be dealt with by 
“traditional” international private law, as it happens with activities in the “real” 
world.418 In other words, with respect to the traceability issue, it does not seem 
that a residence/establishment requirement is more justified in the domain 
names market, than it is in any other market. 
Moreover, as mentioned,419 there are other ccTLDs where a “link” 
with the country is required to the applicants for registration of a domain 
name. This obligation is similar to the residence requirement in the aim that is 
pursued, but, differently from that one, it does not impose any extra burden on 
companies wishing to conduct their business in the country in question, but to 
prove this interest.420 This means that even accepting as an objective 
justification the necessity of a “connection” between the country and the 
undertaking in order to obtain a domain name under that country’s ccTLDs, 
there are less restrictive means – such as the prove of a “link” or the existence 
of a company’s contact point within the country – to reach this goal than the 
residence obligation, which is then, at best, disproportionate.421  
Yet, the Commission in the Football World Cup decision422 went actually 
even further, as compared to what has been observed above in the case of the 
restrictions imposed on ccTLDs registrants: it considered that requiring an 
address in the country meant in reality to discriminate on the basis of 
residence, since residents “were significantly better placed” to meet the address 
                                                 
417 The websites of the Italian version of the TV show “Who wants to be a 
millionaire” and of another popular Italian TV show. 
418 The applicable rules could be those solving conflicts of laws, such as the Brussels 
I Regulation. 
419 See footnote 401 and accompanying text. 
420 See the Irish naming rules available at 
http://www.domainregistry.ie/RegistrationPolicy.php last visited on 8 December 2004. 
421 See Case C-439/99 Commission/Italy [2002] ECR I-305, para. 30; Case C-
131/01 Commission/Italy [2003] para. 45. 
422 Cited above at footnote 410. 
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requirement. However, in the case that concerns us, to ban also the contact 
requirement present in the registration rules of same ccTLDs, could be seen as 
excessive: if a “link” with the country whose ccTLD is concerned is considered 
a reasonable expectation on consumers’ side, than such function could well be 
fulfilled by providing a contact in that country. 
One last point that might complicate the application of article 82 to the 
case of ccTLD registries, is represented by the different legal status of the 
registry operator and the nature of the naming rules in each country: for some 
ccTLDs, indeed, the management of the registration of domain names is 
attributed to some public authority or entity regarded as being entrusted with 
the operation of a service of public interest.423 
In these cases, however, the application of competition rules is not 
excluded, but reference has to be made to article 86 of the EC Treaty. For the 
reasons highlighted above, by the nature of the activity carried on by national 
ccTLD registries, it appears that such registry operators fall within the 
definition of undertakings for the purposes of EC Competition law.424 
However, because of the fact of being entrusted with the operation of a service 
that can be considered of “public interest”, the applicable test is that 
competition rules, and therefore article 82, will apply to the public undertaking 
as long as it does not obstruct the operation of the public service and the 
accomplishment of the tasks it has been assigned (article 86.2).425 
In our case, it does not seem that there are grounds for invoking the 
exception provided for in the mentioned paragraph 2 of article 86: if the 
residence requirement is found to be abusive, the elimination of this restriction 
from the registration rules is not capable of obstructing or disrupting the 
operation of the service: this restriction is not inherent to the performance of 
the service, but could be rather defined as “ancillary”; indeed, the experience of 
the vast majority of the ccTLD operators, whether public or private in nature, 
of not imposing any such requirement, shows that no serious problems are 
created, by the lack of a residence requirement, in the accomplishment of their 
tasks.  
                                                 
423 For instance, in Spain the competent authority entrusted with the assignment of 
SLD under .es is the Ente Público de la Red Técnica de Televisión (RED.ES), recognised by a 
number of laws and decrees. 
424 See above at page 107 et seq. 
425 See above at page 56. 
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CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
In this work I have tried to describe and analyse some problems arising 
from the current system for the management of the Internet Domain Names 
System (DNS), which constitutes the gateway to the Internet itself.  
Although, in principle, IP addresses are necessary to the functioning of 
the Internet while domain names, in pure technical terms, are not, nevertheless 
the former have not generated complex regulatory issues whilst the latter have 
in fact evolved into a problematic resource. The system as it stands today is 
organised as a single hierarchical network with a not-for profit American 
corporation at the top, a number of for-profit and not-for-profit companies 
running as natural monopolists one or more TLD registries and a few hundred 
firms operating as registrars of domain names, on behest of end-users, in each 
of the existing TLDs. Across the three levels of the domain names industry, as 
they have been described above, several problems emerged from the antitrust 
point of view: ICANN, at the top of the hierarchy, is the virtual monopolist in 
the market for root server; there is no effective competition among registry 
operators; the manager of the .com is in a position allowing it to exercise 
market power and to put in place behaviours that negatively affect 
competition, competitors and ultimately consumers; registrars, although quite 
competitive in the offer of different services to end users, cannot effectively 
compete on the actual domain name registration services: they pay the same 
price to the registry operator, they all propose the same dispute resolution 
procedure; they are prevented from offering or contributing to develop 
domain names not belonging to the ICANN hierarchy. 
From an economic perspective, it has been showed that in the domain 
names industry no natural monopoly seems to arise, except, perhaps, for the 
peculiar situation of the operation of each TLDs registry. There are, in fact, 
strong network effects but they do not constitute an argument in favour of the 
necessity of a single-supplier market structure, in particular with respect to the 
level of the root server operation. Nevertheless, there is an argument being put 
forward that competition among alternative root server operators is 
detrimental for the stability of the Internet, because the lack of coordination 
could result in the loss of universal resolvability of domain names, which is 
considered (although not unanimously) a key feature of the Internet. Relying 
on this argument, ICANN has assumed, since its creation, a role similar to that 
of a regulator of market activities: it decides who will operate in the market and 
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at which level, what will be offered as product and, to some extent, also at 
what conditions the economic activities should be performed and which 
interests ought to prevail. It showed overtime to take decisions that advantaged 
only certain stakeholders – in particular established operators already belonging 
to its own network; it provided a lot of slow motion and red tape to those 
dealing with it. However, the whole system is still organised as a private 
network and thus there is none of the checks and balances that generally exist 
to control the conduct of a public regulatory agency.  
Observing this situation and the kind of behaviour consequently 
allowed, and relying on the economic analysis of the domain names industry, 
other arguments support the claim that the risk of losses and abuses 
perpetrated by the incumbent and by the companies affiliated to its network is 
greater than the risk of instability due to the existence of alternative root 
operators that would establish competing but interoperable networks. 
According to this argument, competition is in fact desirable and would be 
beneficial under many respects: consumers would have a wider choice of 
products since there would be many more gTLDs available to register the 
desired name; prices would no longer be regulated but real price competition 
would take place; not only the ICANN-accredited registrars would perform a 
sort of intra-brand competition, but a true inter-brand competition could 
eventually arise; the problems downstream would also be minimised: the rise of 
competing networks might effectively reduce also the market power of 
currently dominant registry operators and the fear of new actual or potential 
competitors would discipline their behaviour; last, but not least, competition 
would force ICANN itself to minimise its X-inefficiency and become better 
responsive to the demand of the market. 
If, notwithstanding the gains in consumer surplus, cost savings and 
innovation, the costs stemming from the lack of coordination caused by the 
introduction of competition are estimated as in fact being of significant 
amount, in any case it does not follow that we need a unique supplier. What 
follows is that we need to ensure coordination. Coordination in the Internet 
governance is not impossible nor new: as mentioned, there are strong 
incentives for alternate root operators to coordinate with each other in order 
to avoid name-collisions;426 moreover, the thirteen copies of the root 
                                                 
426 See the analysis in Section II.4.2 above.  
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servers427 voluntarily coordinate and comply with ICANN-defined policies 
thanks to strong professional norms and pressure from market forces as well 
as political forces; the alternative Europe-based network of root servers 
ORSN428 also voluntarily elected to follow ICANN’s system and not to act in 
opposition to it.  
If the above described kind of voluntary coordination is not considered 
sufficient and a more stable and secured system is sought, then this could make 
the case for proposing a standard of minimum obligations that would restrain 
the behaviour of the market operators. However, since undistorted 
competition is generally more preferable, it is important to assure that there are 
only indispensable restrictions and not more. A much less restrictive (and 
moreover much less costly) option to the one currently in place is that of 
assuring a purely technical coordination of the assignment of the slots within 
the root database, avoiding colliding TLDs. This role could be played by a 
“reduced” ICANN429. Yet, such coordination should not extend to public 
policy choices: when, the public interest comes in question, then the issue at 
stakes cannot be solved by competition nor by coordination of private actions, 
but publicly accountable actors should step in.  
Like the examples of voluntary coordination mentioned a few lines 
above, also this kind of organisation of the DNS is already known: IANA, the 
“authority” originally in charge of the DNS,430 has been and still is the 
technical co-ordinator for the country-code TLDs on the basis of a few 
parameters. Currently, IANA is managed as a “function” of ICANN, so that 
the ICANN Board takes action also with respect to IANA. However, since the 
relationship with national ccTLDs is somewhat more delicate, because it 
involves issues of Internet identity of sovereign countries, ICANN has not 
been able to exercise the same kind of “regulatory” power it can afford in 
dealing with generic TLDs. Also the Council of European TLD Registries 
(CENTR) has recently stressed the value of a purely technical exercise of 
IANA functions. The same technical role could be played with respect to all 
                                                 
427 See above at page 7. 
428 http://european.nl.orsn.net/  
429 Such kind of commitments could be extracted from ICANN as consequence of 
an antitrust investigation. 
430 See above in Section I.2. 
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TLDs, not only when the regulatory powers of national States would directly 
conflict with those exercised by ICANN. 
In other words, there are two possible scenarios that we can imagine in 
order to minimise the competitive problems analysed in the course of the 
present work: either ICANN is considered a private corporation that competes 
with other companies willing to offer the same or comparable services, or it 
withdraws from the position of a market actor and exercises only a purely 
technical non-discretionary function of managing the root server database, 
without engaging in policy making or market regulation, for which it does not 
have any legitimacy.  
In this second case, it could even be accepted as beneficial for society, 
that the root database of existing TLDs be only one, in order to ensure the 
highest level of technical coordination, i.e. in order to ensure that no-one will 
try to insert in the database an entry which is already existing. In such a case a 
mild form of regulation might be necessary and it would imply the need of 
granting certain exclusive rights to the manager of such a kind of root 
database, which would be deprived of additional regulatory-type powers. 
Moreover, this exclusivity need not be permanent: it can be granted on a 
temporary basis and then re-assigned through an auction, for instance.  
Truly, the current system, as it is designed by the MoU seems already 
apt to such a change: the agreement with ICANN is only temporary and the 
US government could in principle withdraw its procurement contract from 
ICANN. However, so far, the US DoC has always renewed the contract, just 
revising some of the terms and conditions for the performance of the service; 
perhaps this is also the consequence of the lack of existing alternative 
operators to which the DoC, due to the legacy of the White Paper, would be 
willing to reassign the management of the DNS. Moreover, since the time 
when the White Paper was issued, the only comprehensive review of the 
system of the Internet Governance has been undertaken not within the USA 
administration, but at a different level, namely at the level of the United 
Nations’ WSIS.431 
Therefore, at the state, it does not seem realistic to expect that the 
development described above would stem from the will of only the US DoC as 
ICANN’s co-contractor; it would be probably necessary a strong political will 
                                                 
431 See above at page 19. 
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at international level in order to achieve the goal of a viable reform of the 
Internet Governance.  
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APPENDIX 1. EXISTING GENERIC TOP LEVEL DOMAIN 
 
TLD Year 
Sponsored/ 
Unsponsored 
Purpose 
Sponsor/ 
Operator 
.aero 2001 Sponsored  Air-transport industry 
Société Internationale de 
Télécommunications 
Aéronautiques SC, (SITA) 
.biz 2001 Unsponsored  Businesses NeuLevel 
.com 1995 Unsponsored 
Unrestricted (but 
intended for 
commercial 
registrants) 
VeriSign, Inc. 
.coop 2001 Sponsored  Cooperatives DotCooperation, LLC  
.edu 1995 Sponsored 
United States 
educational 
institutions 
EDUCAUSE 
.gov 1995 Sponsored 
United States 
government 
US General Services 
Administration 
.info 2001 Unsponsored  Unrestricted use Afilias, LLC 
.int 1998 Unsponsored 
Organizations 
established by 
international treaties 
between 
governments 
Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority 
.mil 1995 Sponsored United States military 
US DoD Network 
Information Center 
.museum 2001 Sponsored  Museums 
Museum Domain 
Management Association, 
(MuseDoma) 
.name 2001 Unsponsored  
For registration by 
individuals 
Global Name Registry, LTD 
.net 1995 Unsponsored 
Unrestricted (but 
intended for network 
providers, etc.) 
VeriSign, Inc. 
.org 1995 Unsponsored 
Unrestricted (but 
intended for 
Public Interest Registry. Until 
31 December 2002, .org was 
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organizations that do 
not fit elsewhere)  
operated by VeriSign Global 
Registry Services. 
.pro 2002 Unsponsored  
Accountants, lawyers, 
physicians, and other 
professionals 
RegistryPro, LTD 
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APPENDIX 2 - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ALAC At-Large Advisory Committee 
ASO Address Supporting Organization 
ccNSO Country-code Names Supporting Organisation 
CENTR Council of European Top Level Domain Registries 
DNS  Domain name system 
DoC US Department of Commerce 
EC Treaty Treaty establishing the European Community 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
CFI European Court of First Instance 
ECR European Court Report 
EU European Union 
GAC Governmental Advisory Committee 
GNSO Generic Names Supporting Organisation 
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
ITU International Telecommunications Union 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
NSI Network Solution Incorporation 
RAA Registrar Accreditation Agreement 
RSSAC Root Server System Advisory Committee 
SLD Second Level Domain 
SSAC Security and Stability Advisory Committee 
TLD Top Level Domain 
ccTLD country code Top Level Domain 
gTLD generic Top Level Domain 
sTLD Sponsored Top Level Domain 
TM Trademark 
UDRP Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy 
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UN United Nations 
WGIG Working Group on Internet Governance (UN) 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organisation 
WLS Waiting List Service 
WSIS World Summit on Information Society (UN) 
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APPENDIX 3 – ICANN ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 
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